Georgetown University Law Center

About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Public health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.

Religion as a Conversation Starter: What Liberal Religious Political Advocates Add to the Debate About Religion’s Place in Legal and Political Discourse

Abstract: Whether citizens should be allowed to make reference to their religious beliefs or use religious language in public discourse and public decision-making (often referred to as “the question of pluralism”) has long been considered a question of central importance to the creation and execution of American law While there is no shortage of answers to this question offered by legal theorists, philosophers, and theologians alike, one voice largely overlooked in this debate is the voice of a small group of individuals who, while writing extensively on the subject to a large audience, do so not from the academy, but rather from the world of liberal religious political advocacy This Note seeks to introduce the views of several of this groups most prominent members — Rabbi David Saperstein, Reverend Jim Wallis, and Dr Eboo Patel — into this largely theoretical discourse Part I briefly surveys the landscape of responses to the question of pluralism Part II demonstrates how the views of these leaders of the so-called “religious left” fit into that landscape It argues that they seek to occupy a middle ground between the various positions already offered by promoting an open, unmediated, and values-based discursive space in which all citizens speak to one another candidly, with reference to their comprehensive beliefs, whether religious or not, as a means of fostering active engagement on issues of common interest Part III concludes by considering whether or not their approach is effective in practice Ultimately, this Note seeks to add a new voice to the ever-important debate about religion’s place in law and politics In so doing, it shows that these thinkers offer a robust challenge to Richard Rorty’s famous argument that “religion is a conversation stopper [in public debate]” Rather, they show that religion can often serve as a conversation starter instead

The New Frontier for Labor in Trade Agreements

Abstract: In the spring of 2015, I took my students of international trade law to visit the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva. It was a two-day trip, organized around lectures and discussions with staff from different divisions of the organization, the Advisory Centre of WTO Law and the permanent missions of two countries. None of my students had been there before, and even though I had taught international trade law for several years, it was also my first time visiting the headquarters of the organization. We were excited and curious. The building looked big and majestic. The back side opened to a spacious park overlooking Lake Geneva. It made for a pleasant tour on a cool, sunny morning. The WTO was celebrating its 20th anniversary, and there were banners hanging from the walls in the internal atrium marking the occasion, as well as announcements of events to come. In our second session, we were led to a room with wooden panels and a colorful mural that spanned the four walls. It depicted industrial workers — strong men making a car, miners, shipbuilders, men using heavy equipment, but also women, seamstresses, teachers and a few children. In the center a bare-chested man between two goddess-like women was holding a torch. The mural struck me as an ode to work, to achievement and to emancipation. A tale of the human race transforming the world through physical and intellectual labor. The painting, by Dean Cornwell, reminded me of the frescos of Mexican artist Diego Rivera in its depiction of industrial workers, although this one had no reference to exploitation or the confrontation between capital and labor. It was an incredibly optimistic image of work and human progress. I was surprised to see a mural of workers in the WTO. The painting seemed not only vintage but also out of place. What was it doing here?

The Distortionary Effects of Subsidies for Charity in a Federal System

Abstract: Prevailing accounts of the efficiency of subsidies for the nonprofit sector presume that the only alternative source of public goods is a single sovereign, controlled by a single median voter. Tiebout sorting, however, also provides citizens with alternative bundles of public goods. When these two systems are in place simultaneously, they may interact. We present a model in which subsidies may affect not only the choice between nonprofit and government, but also the choice among governments. Because nonprofits allow citizens to obtain alternative bundles of public goods without relocation, subsidies for the nonprofit sector alter incentives to relocate. We show that this distortion in the market for local government may either increase or decrease welfare, depending on the nature and geographical scope of the good provided. As a result, for some goods it is ambiguous whether subsidies for charity on net increase social welfare. We also consider extensions involving simultaneous provision of similar goods of differing quality.

A Marriage is a Marriage is a Marriage: The Limits of Perry v. Brown

Abstract: The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry v. Brown, authored by Judge Reinhardt, has been widely lauded by marriage equality proponents for its creative minimalism. In keeping with commentators’ expectations, the court found a way to determine that California’s Proposition 8 violated the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, namely that the provision took away an entitlement that had previously been enjoyed by same-sex couples — the right to the appellation of one’s partnership as a “marriage” — for no rational reason. The people of California’s categorization and differential treatment of same-sex couples as compared with opposite-sex couples, the court held, failed the test of minimal rationality required for upholding state action. The two types of couples were simply too indistinguishable to carry the weight of the difference between them that the people of California had tried to codify. Thus, the court struck down the state constitutional amendment.The court did so, however, by relying heavily on facts peculiar to California’s political history, thereby limiting the case’s disruption of democratic processes in both California and elsewhere, and, not incidentally, minimizing the size of the target the case presents should the presumptively hostile Supreme Court review the decision. First, Proposition 8 removed an entitlement that had been granted by the California Supreme Court just a few years earlier. The case thus arose in a posture not shared by other cases involving same-sex marriage: what was at stake was the constitutionality of a referendum that took away — rather than failed to grant — same-sex marriage. Second, California, by statute, guarantees to same-sex couples a “domestic partnership” which statutorily grants all of the legal incidents of marriage, including rights of parentage and adoption. Because of the first fact — that what the Court was faced with was the withdrawal of a preexisting right — the Court did not have to reach the question of whether same-sex couples possess a “right to marry” where it has never before been recognized. Because of the second fact — that all that was at stake in California was the appellation “marriage” since the domestic partnership laws guaranteed to same-sex couples all other incidents of marital status — there was no need for the Court to decide whether there would be a “rational basis” for a state to refuse to grant the right to marry to same-sex couples on the basis of the purported superiority of child-raising in families headed by opposite-sex partners: the case simply does not raise these questions, since California’s statutory scheme grants equal family status to both sorts of couples, and Proposition 8 did not upset that. The court did not, therefore, have to decide that there exists a “fundamental right to marry,” or that any restriction on the rights of gay people to marry would violate fundamental constitutional values. Rather, it narrowly held that Proposition 8, which stripped gay citizens only of the appellation “married” and left all other incidents of marriage intact, worked a dignitary and psychic harm on gay and lesbian partners, and did so for no defensible reason. This decision is thus of no relevance to cases challenging a state’s refusal to extend marriage to include gays and lesbians, and it is of no relevance to cases challenging a state’s withdrawal of such a right if that right is also accompanied by a denial of concrete benefits and accompanied by some explanation — such as the superiority of hetero-sexual parenting — for the decision to do so. Perry v. Brown is nothing more than a sui generis decision for a unique set of facts. Thus, creative minimalism.