Georgetown University Law Center

About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Global health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.

Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for Public Interest Lawyers and Other Employees of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations

Abstract: In the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, Congress has created the income-based repayment (IBR) plan for student loans, through which graduates with high debts and low incomes may substantially reduce their monthly loan repayment obligations Congress has also created a public service loan forgiveness plan, through which the federal government will forgive the remaining debt of borrowers who make 120 IBR (or certain other) payments while serving full time in public service jobs (very broadly defined) These programs are available to those who borrowed for graduate and professional training as well as for undergraduate education These two programs will be of great value to public interest lawyers because of their typically high debts and low incomes, but they will also significantly assist social workers, government employees, soldiers, nurses, doctors, teachers, and many others who work in non-profit organizations and government agencies This article explains why Congress created these two related programs, demonstrates the magnitude of the benefits available to representative borrowers, and outlines how graduates can obtain these benefits It also elaborates how, even before the income-based repayment plan becomes effective in 2009, public service employees may make monthly repayments that will help to qualify them for eventual loan forgiveness Finally, the article discusses the need for additional legislation to enable these new programs to achieve their objectives fully

Towards Post-Modern Trade Relations?

Abstract: In the years since the publication of The New Global Trading Order: The Evolving State and the Future of Trade, Dennis Patterson and Ari Afilao’s ideas have lost none of their originality and their call for reimagining the law and institutions of international trade governance remains an open challenge. The authors offer a long-term historical reframing of the relationship between trade regulation and the dominant role of the state. The analysis hinges on what the authors view as a radical shift away from the dominant model of the ‘modern’ welfare nation-state after the fall of the Iron Curtain. They argue that despite the world being ushered into a different era at this historical moment, the institutions, law and politics of trade governance remained largely unchanged. The analysis culminates in proposals for a new style of statecraft, and institutions to match, that would be better suited to the political and economic realities of our time. At the core of this transformative project lies the argument that ‘neither politics nor economics alone hold the key to unlocking solutions to the problems presented by global trade’ (1). Rather, the authors’ focus is on the relationship between the state and trade governance. They argue that the trade order reflects the dominant constitutional order of the state at different points in history, and the current crisis regarding statehood and trade governance stems from the unacknowledged disconnect between the present de facto role of the state and the de jure status quo of trade regulation. Perhaps most intriguingly, the book seeks to combine a post-modern approach to trade law and statecraft with what is in many ways a historical, progressive, rationalist perspective. The 270-page volume is organised into eight substantive chapters, each of which is prefaced by a summary thesis statement. Throughout, the authors deploy a writing style and analytical techniques that make the book eminently legible for trade and non-trade scholars alike.

Rights, Harms, and Duties: A Response to Justice for Hedgehogs

Abstract: The author responds to the three jurisprudential positions that Ronald Dworkin discusses in his book - albeit briefly - so as to integrate them into his hedgehoggian program. The first is that we should think of rights as political trumps, such that the individual liberty protected by the right, and hence the behavior protected by the right, trumps in importance and in effect, both in law and in popular imaginings, the various collective goals with which the right might be in conflict. Second, we should think about our collective life, and the principles that should guide it, through the lens of the rights of individuals understood capaciously. Rights may be positive or negative, legal, constitutional, political, institutional, or moral, and might have either libertarian and regressive or egalitarian and redistributive consequences. Regardless, we should think about our collective life through the lens of individual rights rather than through the lens of the moral duty of legislators, state actors, lawmakers, or, simply, sovereigns, to make good law in the interest of the governed: the duty of lawmakers to exercise their lawmaking power in morally responsible or virtuous ways. Rights of citizens, not the moral duties of lawmakers, should guide our thinking in both politics and law. Third, the political principles that should inform our law are those which require us collectively to respect the rights of individuals to decide for themselves on the content of a good life, and do not permit or require us to collectively make those decisions and impose them on individuals through law. To live well, we must each decide for ourselves what it is to live a good life. Government must protect the individual latitude we need to live well, and that includes refraining from dictating or legislating on the basis of any state-generated understanding of the content of the good life.

Top 10 Law School Home Pages of 2009

Abstract: The website home page represents the virtual front door for any law school. It’s the place many prospective students start in the application process. Enrolled students, law school faculty and other employees often start with the home page to find classes, curricula and compensation plans. Home page content changes constantly. Deciding which home pages are good is often very subjective. Creating a ranking system for “good taste” is perhaps impossible. The ranking report "Top 10 Law School Home Pages of 2009" includes a tabulation of fourteen objective design criteria to analyze and rank 195 law school home pages. The intent was to count only objective criteria to attempt to find the best sites. All law school home pages were ranked based on a weighted analysis of these criteria. Pictures of the ten best sites are included in the report, followed by a full tabulation of all schools evaluated for the report. The goal was to include elements that make websites easier to use for sighted as well as visually-impaired users. Most elements require no special design skills, sophisticated technology or significant expenses.

Two Types of Empirical Textualism

Abstract: Modern textualist and originalist theories increasingly center interpretation around the “ordinary” or “public” meaning of legal texts. This approach is premised on the promotion of values like publicity, fair notice, and democratic legitimacy. As such, ordinary meaning is typically understood as a question about how members of the general public understand the text — an empirical question with an “objective” answer. This Essay explores the role of empirical methods, particularly experimental survey methods, in these ordinary meaning inquiries. The Essay expresses cautious optimism about new insight that empirical methods can bring, but it also warns against assuming that these methods will deliver uncontroversial, objective solutions in legal interpretation. As a concrete illustration, the Essay analyzes the main statutory question presented in Bostock v. Clayton County (2020). Both Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion and the dissents by Justices Alito and Kavanaugh offer avowedly textualist analyses of Title VII’s “ordinary meaning,” yet their reasoning and conclusions diverge. To help explain these differences, the Essay proposes a distinction between two types of empirical textualism, which we call the “ordinary criteria” and “legal criteria” versions. The former conceptualizes ordinary meaning as closely connected to empirical facts about how ordinary people understand statutory language; in effect, it equates ordinary meaning with ordinary understanding. The latter conceptualizes ordinary meaning differently, combining the common understanding of statutory terms with both their previously-established legal meanings and their legal entailments. Bostock exemplifies the difference between these approaches, with Justices Alito and Kavanaugh relying on the former and Justice Gorsuch on the latter. The Essay also presents a new experimental study of the key linguistic dispute in Bostock — public judgments about discrimination “because of” sex — that illustrates differences between these two approaches to empirical textualism.