Georgetown University Law Center

About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Global health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.

Do Credit-Based Insurance Scores Proxy for Income in Predicting Auto Claim Risk?

Abstract: Property and casualty insurers often use credit-based insurance scores in their underwriting and rating processes. The practice is controversial—many consumer groups oppose it, and most states regulate it, in part out of concern that insurance scores proxy for policyholder income in predicting claim risk. We offer new evidence on this issue in the context of auto insurance. Prior studies on the subject suffer from the limitation that they rely solely on aggregate measures of income, such as the median income in a policyholder's census tract or zip code. We analyze a panel of households that purchased auto and home policies from a U.S. insurance company. Because we observe the households’ home policies as well as their auto policies, we are able to employ two measures of income: the median income in a household's census tract, an aggregate measure, and the insured value of the household's dwelling, a policyholder-level measure. Using these measures, we find that insurance scores do not proxy for income in a standard actuarial model of auto claim risk.

The New Legal Criticism

Abstract: Professors Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman’s article Just Relationships is a fundamental reinterpretation of the moral ideals of large swaths of private law. Its significance, however, may go beyond even that broad ambition. In this Response, I suggest that Just Relationships is also an exemplar — perhaps par excellence — of an emergent form of critical discourse, which may itself foreshadow a paradigm shift in contemporary critical legal scholarship. That new form of scholarship might usefully be dubbed “the new legal criticism.” The label serves partly as an echo of the “New Criticism” movement that emerged in literary criticism in the middle of the twentieth-century, which, in methodological ways, the new legal criticism very much resembles. But primarily, the label “new legal criticism” suggests that this ascendant group of legal scholars articulates a different point of departure for critical thinking about law — particularly for critical thinking about private law — from that which most immediately preceded it in twentieth century legal thought: the critical legal studies movement. Part I describes new legal criticism and compares it with the critical legal scholarship movements of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Part II further expands my claim that Just Relationships is a good exemplar of the new legal criticism by looking at the roles played by relational justice in Dagan and Dorfman’s explication of their jurisprudential claims. Part III looks at the limits of new legal criticism, again as exemplified by Just Relationships. I will explore whether the reliance of the new legal criticism on law itself in the development of the idea of justice limits its potency as a form of criticism by comparing the authors’ discussion of discrimination in housing with a subject they do not address, at-will employment. Finally, the conclusion explores possible avenues of further exploration within the authors’ chosen field — private law, largely understood — and within the parameters set by the new legal criticism’s premises.

Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994-2015

Abstract: We have created a listing of vertical merger enforcement actions by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission during the period 1994-October 2015. This listing is an Appendix to Salop and Culley, Revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (forthcoming).

Beyond Coercion: Justice Kennedy's Aversion to Animus

Abstract: In evaluating the constitutionality of religious displays, Justice Kennedy adheres to the coercion test. A creche on the courthouse steps is acceptable because it does not coerce anyone to support or participate in a religious exercise. He rejects the endorsement test, which asks whether the display makes reasonable nonadherents feel like outsiders, finding it to be "flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice." Yet in the free exercise context, Kennedy has focused on whether a community shows hostility to minority faiths, and his opinions in Romer and Lawrence stress that legislatures acted unconstitutionally in showing animus to gays. Suppose a passive religious display conveyed a message of animus. Imagine, for example, a plaque on the courthouse wall that quoted Leviticus: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination." I believe Kennedy would strike down the display on the ground that it makes a reasonable gay observer feel like a pariah in the community, an approach similar to the endorsement test.