Government of Canada

About: Government of Canada is a government organization based out in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Productivity. The organization has 796 authors who have published 886 publications receiving 21366 citations. The organization is also known as: federal government of Canada & Her Majesty's Government.

Investment Law’s Monstrous Reform

Abstract: Abstract Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investment chapters in FTAs promote investment and enhance investor protection through substantive obligations, including national treatment, MFN treatment, fair and equitable treatment (FET), and the prohibition against expropriation. These obligations are often enforceable directly by investors through investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS). Despite the loud criticism of investment law, and more particularly, ISDS, States have not jettisoned the obligations or ISDS. As a review of State practice shows, new treaties contain important reform elements that clarify the meaning of vague concepts, including treatment ‘in like circumstances’, FET, and indirect expropriation. To a lesser extent, States are adopting reform elements that limit or even prevent access to ISDS. At the same time, States are eagerly pursuing procedural reform in ICSID and UNCITRAL. It remains to be seen whether these efforts will result in a new court or appellate mechanism, or whether they will contribute to the multilateralization of investment law, but even without it, the previously fragmented web of BITs are slowly being replaced by investment chapters in regional FTAs with much clearer obligations.

Tax Coordination in a Fiscal Union under Asymmetric Information

Abstract: How should a fiscal union be designed in order to optimally balance fiscal discretion and fiscal discipline? This question is addressed in a model where regions privately observe shocks to their respective desired fiscal policy but cannot achieve it unilaterally due to tax competition across regions. I show that regions can increase fiscal discretion by sharing tax revenue within a fiscal union. However, due to the informational asymmetry across regions, fiscal policy must be coordinated to ensure fiscal discipline. The first main result is that regions receive more insurance against common than against idiosyncratic shocks. The second main result is that past net contributors enjoy increased discretion and get to discipline past net recipients with state-contingent wasteful spending. This creates fiscal cycles in the form of predictable restrictions of tax competition.