Institution
HEC Paris
Education•Jouy-en-Josas, France•
About: HEC Paris is a education organization based out in Jouy-en-Josas, France. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Investment (macroeconomics) & Market liquidity. The organization has 584 authors who have published 2756 publications receiving 104467 citations. The organization is also known as: Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales & HEC School of Management Paris.
Topics: Investment (macroeconomics), Market liquidity, Corporate governance, Entrepreneurship, Portfolio
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that there is a substantial desirability bias even when there is no prior disposition toward any outcome, and that such a bias should not occur in the absence of prior dispositions toward those outcomes.
25 citations
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25 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors model a distressed bank's shareholders and creditors negotiating a restructuring given asymmetric information about asset quality and externalities onto the government, and find that strict bail-in rules increase delays by worsening informational frictions and reducing bargaining surplus.
Abstract: How do resolution frameworks affect the private restructuring of distressed banks? We model a distressed bank’s shareholders and creditors negotiating a restructuring given asymmetric information about asset quality and externalities onto the government. This yields negotiation delays used to signal asset quality. We find that strict bail-in rules increase delays by worsening informational frictions and reducing bargaining surplus. We characterize optimal bail-in rules for the government. We then consider the government’s possible involvement in negotiations. We find this can lead to shorter or longer delays. Notably, the government may gin from committing not to partake in negotiations.
25 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that the scoring methodology implemented by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is biased and can create wrong incentives for regulated banks, and propose a modified methodology that corrects for the bias.
Abstract: Regulatory data used to identify Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) have gradually become public since 2014. Exploiting this transparency shock, we show that the scoring methodology implemented by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is biased and can create wrong incentives for regulated banks. Using regulatory data for 106 US and international banks, we show that the economic magnitude of the bias turns out to be important as the regulatory capital of some banks is reduced by more than EUR 20 billion or 16% of their Tier 1 capital. The banks that benefit the most from the bias are US global and custodian banks. We then propose a modified methodology that corrects for the bias.
25 citations
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TL;DR: Participants felt the piece of currency a person had originally lost should be returned to him rather than another piece of Currency of equivalent value, even when they did not believe he would be able to tell the difference and considered distinguishing it from other money illogical.
25 citations
Authors
Showing all 605 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
Sandor Czellar | 133 | 1263 | 91049 |
Jean-Yves Reginster | 110 | 1195 | 58146 |
Pierre Hansen | 78 | 575 | 32505 |
Gilles Laurent | 77 | 264 | 27052 |
Olivier Bruyère | 72 | 579 | 24788 |
David Dubois | 50 | 169 | 12396 |
Rodolphe Durand | 49 | 173 | 10075 |
Itzhak Gilboa | 49 | 259 | 13352 |
Yves Dallery | 47 | 170 | 6373 |
Duc Khuong Nguyen | 47 | 235 | 8639 |
Eric Jondeau | 45 | 155 | 7088 |
Jean-Noël Kapferer | 45 | 151 | 12264 |
David Thesmar | 41 | 161 | 7242 |
Bruno Biais | 41 | 144 | 8936 |
Barbara B. Stern | 40 | 89 | 6001 |