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Institution

HEC Paris

EducationJouy-en-Josas, France
About: HEC Paris is a education organization based out in Jouy-en-Josas, France. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Investment (macroeconomics) & Market liquidity. The organization has 584 authors who have published 2756 publications receiving 104467 citations. The organization is also known as: Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales & HEC School of Management Paris.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that there is a substantial desirability bias even when there is no prior disposition toward any outcome, and that such a bias should not occur in the absence of prior dispositions toward those outcomes.

25 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors model a distressed bank's shareholders and creditors negotiating a restructuring given asymmetric information about asset quality and externalities onto the government, and find that strict bail-in rules increase delays by worsening informational frictions and reducing bargaining surplus.
Abstract: How do resolution frameworks affect the private restructuring of distressed banks? We model a distressed bank’s shareholders and creditors negotiating a restructuring given asymmetric information about asset quality and externalities onto the government. This yields negotiation delays used to signal asset quality. We find that strict bail-in rules increase delays by worsening informational frictions and reducing bargaining surplus. We characterize optimal bail-in rules for the government. We then consider the government’s possible involvement in negotiations. We find this can lead to shorter or longer delays. Notably, the government may gin from committing not to partake in negotiations.

25 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that the scoring methodology implemented by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is biased and can create wrong incentives for regulated banks, and propose a modified methodology that corrects for the bias.
Abstract: Regulatory data used to identify Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) have gradually become public since 2014. Exploiting this transparency shock, we show that the scoring methodology implemented by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is biased and can create wrong incentives for regulated banks. Using regulatory data for 106 US and international banks, we show that the economic magnitude of the bias turns out to be important as the regulatory capital of some banks is reduced by more than EUR 20 billion or 16% of their Tier 1 capital. The banks that benefit the most from the bias are US global and custodian banks. We then propose a modified methodology that corrects for the bias.

25 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Participants felt the piece of currency a person had originally lost should be returned to him rather than another piece of Currency of equivalent value, even when they did not believe he would be able to tell the difference and considered distinguishing it from other money illogical.

25 citations


Authors

Showing all 605 results

NameH-indexPapersCitations
Sandor Czellar133126391049
Jean-Yves Reginster110119558146
Pierre Hansen7857532505
Gilles Laurent7726427052
Olivier Bruyère7257924788
David Dubois5016912396
Rodolphe Durand4917310075
Itzhak Gilboa4925913352
Yves Dallery471706373
Duc Khuong Nguyen472358639
Eric Jondeau451557088
Jean-Noël Kapferer4515112264
David Thesmar411617242
Bruno Biais411448936
Barbara B. Stern40896001
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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Institution in previous years
YearPapers
20239
202233
2021129
2020141
2019110
2018136