HEC Paris

About: HEC Paris is a education organization based out in Jouy-en-Josas, France. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Investment (macroeconomics) & Market liquidity. The organization has 584 authors who have published 2756 publications receiving 104467 citations. The organization is also known as: Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales & HEC School of Management Paris.

Controlling for endogeneity with instrumental variables in strategic management research

Abstract: This article offers a framework to understand how endogeneity arises and how to control for it with instrumental variables to estimate causal relations with observational data. It builds on the state-of-the-art research in applied and theoretical econometrics to highlight the importance of endogeneity and review the methods that can be used to address it with instrumental variables.The article also discusses when the Heckman two-step procedure can be used, as well as the tests, methods and assumptions that researchers should check when using instrumental variables.To ease implementation of the instrumental variables techniques, the author offers the STATA commands of the exposed tests and methods. Further, an empirical example is provided along with the utilized STATA codes. In the end, this article serves as a`toolkit' allowing scholars not only to understand whether endogeneity is present in their empirical setting, but also to assess the empirical validity of their work when using instrumental variables.

Equilibrium and Welfare in Markets with Financially Constrained Arbitrageurs

Abstract: We propose a multi-period model in which competitive arbitrageurs exploit discrepancies between the prices of two identical risky assets, traded in segmented markets. Arbitrageurs need to collateralize separately their positions in each asset, and this implies a financial constraint limiting positions as a function of wealth. In our model, arbitrage activity benefits all investors because arbitrageurs supply liquidity to the market. However, arbitrageurs may fail to take a socially optimal level of risk, in the sense that a change in their positions may make all investors better off. We characterize conditions under which arbitrageurs take too much or too little risk.