HEC Paris

About: HEC Paris is a education organization based out in Jouy-en-Josas, France. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Market liquidity & Entrepreneurship. The organization has 584 authors who have published 2756 publications receiving 104467 citations. The organization is also known as: Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales & HEC School of Management Paris.

Intertemporal Tradeoffs for Gains and Losses: An Experimental Measurement of Discounted Utility*

Abstract: This article provides a parameter-free measurement of utility in intertemporal choice and presents new and more robust evidence on the discounting of money outcomes. Intertemporal utility was concave for gains and convex for losses, consistent with a hypothesis put forward by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). Discount rates declined over time but less so than previously observed under the assumption of linear utility. For approximately 40% of our subjects constant discounting provided the best fit. The remaining 60% were most consistent with Harvey's (1986) power discounting. Our data provide little support for the popular quasi-hyperbolic model, which is widely used in economics today. We observed an asymmetry in the discounting of gains and losses that, unlike earlier findings, cannot be explained by a framing effect.

The Ownership of Ratings

Abstract: Standard & Poor's provides corporate governance ratings to firms who can, upon learning those, decide to reveal them or not to the market. This paper identifies the circumstances under which such a simple ownership contract over ratings can emerge as the optimal arrangement. Firms hiding their ratings can only be an equilibrium outcome if they are sufficiently uncertain of their quality at the time of hiring a certification intermediary and if the decision to get a rating is not observable. For some distribution functions of firms' qualities, a competitive market is a necessary condition for this result to obtain. Competition between rating intermediaries will unambiguously lead to less information being revealed in equilibrium.

Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems

Abstract: We revisit lower bounds on the regret in the case of multi-armed bandit problems. We obtain non-asymptotic, distribution-dependent bounds and provide straightforward proofs based only on well-known properties of Kullback-Leibler divergences. These bounds show in particular that in an initial phase the regret grows almost linearly, and that the well-known logarithmic growth of the regret only holds in a final phase. The proof techniques come to the essence of the information-theoretic arguments used and they are deprived of all unnecessary complications.