Institution
HEC Paris
Education•Jouy-en-Josas, France•
About: HEC Paris is a education organization based out in Jouy-en-Josas, France. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Market liquidity & Entrepreneurship. The organization has 584 authors who have published 2756 publications receiving 104467 citations. The organization is also known as: Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales & HEC School of Management Paris.
Topics: Market liquidity, Entrepreneurship, Investment (macroeconomics), Portfolio, Corporate governance
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
More filters
••
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that this identity discourse may be interpreted as a strategy of Controlling researchers to achieve cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy of their discipline, and draw on interview material as well as publication and citation analyses, they show how various institutional pressures and constraints not only influenced the institutionalization of controlling as an academic discipline, but also impacted the form and substance of controlling research.
Abstract: The notion of ‘Controlling’, as it is commonly used in German-speaking countries, may be regarded as an equivalent term for management accounting. At the same time, there have been considerable efforts to establish Controlling as a discipline on its own, rather than to regard it simply as the German synonym of management accounting. This is reflected in many writings on Controlling which have tried to identify a possible ‘core’ or ‘essence’ of the subject. In this paper, we argue that this identity discourse may be interpreted as a strategy of Controlling researchers to achieve cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy of their discipline. Drawing on interview material as well as publication and citation analyses, we show how various institutional pressures and constraints not only influenced the institutionalization of Controlling as an academic discipline but also impacted the form and substance of Controlling research. This raises some important questions for our understanding of academic discip...
78 citations
••
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors identify the optimal contract between a rating agency and a firm and the circumstances under which simple ownership contracts implement this optimal solution, assuming that the decision to obtain a rating is endogenous and the price of a ratings is a strategic variable.
Abstract: We identify the optimal contract between a rating agency and a firm and the circumstances under which simple ownership contracts implement this optimal solution. We assume that the decision to obtain a rating is endogenous and the price of a rating is a strategic variable. Clients hiding their ratings can be an equilibrium only if they are ex ante uncertain of their quality and if the hiring decision is not observable. For some distribution functions, a competitive rating market is necessary for this result to obtain. In this context, competition between rating intermediaries will lead to less information in equilibrium.
78 citations
•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose that sunk costs of learning and the output over which these costs are spread determine the probability and depth of technology adoption, and find that plant size but not firm size predicts CAD and CNC adoption.
Abstract: I propose that sunk costs of learning and the output over which these costs are spread determine the probability and depth of technology adoption. Depth of adoption describes the extent to which firms exploit the advantages of the technology. I find that plant size but not firm size predicts CAD and CNC adoption. Learning costs are lumpy, are closely connected to technology adoption and determine both the probability and depth of adoption. Depth of adoption is considerably more plant idiosyncratic than the decision to adopt.
78 citations
••
01 Aug 2015TL;DR: It is shown that contacts are differently beneficial for job seekers depending on the stage of the job search process that job seekers are engaged in, and that external mobility is best enabled when job seekers engage with-and learn from-different kinds of contacts across stages of thejob search process.
Abstract: The topic of job mobility has received increasing attention in recent years. Yet, surprising in light of the wealth of research on social networks and job attainment, we do not have a unified model of the impact of different kinds of social contacts on job search success. In this paper I show that contacts are differently beneficial for job seekers depending on the stage of the job search process that job seekers are engaged in. Specifically, three stages of the job search process can be distinguished in which social contacts fulfill different roles for the job seekers: deciding the types of jobs for which to apply, submitting job applications, and preparing for interviews. I propose that contacts who are spread across different occupations are conducive to applying to more types of jobs, yet it is contacts who are more focused across occupations that are beneficial for being invited to more interviews-relative to the number of job types applied for-and for converting the interviews into offers. In addition, contacts with lower relationship depth with the job seeker are more helpful for getting invited to interviews, whereas contacts who have more frequent interactions with the job seeker are more helpful for converting interviews into offers. Analyses using a unique longitudinal data set on the job searches of 226 participants in an MBA program offer robust evidence in support of the hypotheses. The results suggest that external mobility is best enabled when job seekers engage with-and learn from-different kinds of contacts across stages of the job search process.
77 citations
••
TL;DR: Test if time spent in the military leads individuals to be more obedient to rules and regulations in the years after they have left the military and become CEOs suggests that CEOs who served in the U.S. military are less likely to be involved in financial misconduct.
Abstract: Research Summary: We examine the influence of CEOs' military background on financial misconduct using two distinctive datasets. First, we make use of accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAER) issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which contain intentional and substantial cases of financial fraud. Second, we use a dataset of “lucky grants,” which provide a measure of the likelihood of grant dates of CEOs' stock options having been manipulated. Results for both datasets indicate that CEOs who served in the military are less inclined to be involved in fraudulent financial reporting and to backdate stock options. In addition, we find that these relationships are moderated by board oversight (CEO duality and independent directors in the board). Managerial Summary: CEOs who formerly served in the U.S. military are prevalent among U.S. firms. The military puts strong emphasis on the obedience of its personnel. In this study, we test if time spent in the military leads individuals to be more obedient to rules and regulations in the years after they have left the military and become CEOs. Our findings strongly suggest that CEOs who served in the U.S. military are less likely to be involved in financial misconduct. We also find evidence that tougher board oversight strengthens this relationship. Our findings have implications for regulators, auditors, practitioners, and researchers who are interested in determinants of and mechanisms to prevent fraud and stock option backdating.
76 citations
Authors
Showing all 605 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
Sandor Czellar | 133 | 1263 | 91049 |
Jean-Yves Reginster | 110 | 1195 | 58146 |
Pierre Hansen | 78 | 575 | 32505 |
Gilles Laurent | 77 | 264 | 27052 |
Olivier Bruyère | 72 | 579 | 24788 |
David Dubois | 50 | 169 | 12396 |
Rodolphe Durand | 49 | 173 | 10075 |
Itzhak Gilboa | 49 | 259 | 13352 |
Yves Dallery | 47 | 170 | 6373 |
Duc Khuong Nguyen | 47 | 235 | 8639 |
Eric Jondeau | 45 | 155 | 7088 |
Jean-Noël Kapferer | 45 | 151 | 12264 |
David Thesmar | 41 | 161 | 7242 |
Bruno Biais | 41 | 144 | 8936 |
Barbara B. Stern | 40 | 89 | 6001 |