Institution
IE University
Education•Segovia, Castilla y León, Spain•
About: IE University is a education organization based out in Segovia, Castilla y León, Spain. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Corporate governance & Supply chain. The organization has 527 authors who have published 1709 publications receiving 64682 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: This study examines the efficacy of two idea evaluation processes: scoring vs. ranking in the context of innovation management and proposes and test an explanatory model in which the information becomes a cue that directs the participants’ efforts to evaluate the ideas.
Abstract: Using an online experiment, this study examines the efficacy of two idea evaluation processes: scoring vs. ranking in the context of innovation management. In the scoring process, the evaluators are asked to rate the quality of each idea by assigning it a score (e.g., from 0 to 10), while in the ranking process the evaluator simply orders all ideas according to their perceived qualities. Our results suggest that the scoring process strictly outperforms the ranking process in terms of the likelihood of selecting the highest‐quality ideas. This result remains robust, irrespective of the possibility of allowing ties in the ranking process. However, when the number of ideas to be evaluated is reduced from eight to three, the efficacies of the two idea evaluation processes become similar. Additionally, we find that the efficacy of the ranking process is significantly improved when additional information is provided, yet the efficacy of the scoring process does not change with more information. Based on the observations from the experimental data, we propose and test an explanatory model in which the information becomes a cue that directs the participants’ efforts to evaluate the ideas (i.e., the time taken for evaluation).
21 citations
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TL;DR: A simple communication model and characterizes optimal codes is developed and the results are used to interpret some existing organizational structures.
Abstract: We study the determination of specialized codes under bounded rationality, and its implications for organizations. Agents may de- crease communication costs by designing codes that …t their own en- vironment, using for example more precise words for more frequent events. Bounded rationality imposes sharply decreasing returns to scope, since when similarly skilled agents in dierent services must communicate with one another they must share common codes, which in turn degrades communication within each service. Thus the de- cision of whether to segregate services or integrate them trades o¤ the synergies that result from better coordination between services against the loss due to the need for a common, more vague, code than the one that would optimize communication within services. Al- ternatively, more skilled 'translators'may be used to allow separate services to appropriate the synergies while keeping their own codes. A decrease in diagnosis costs leads to increasing integration among services and to the substitution of common codes for hierarchies, as common codes allow for the direct interaction among agents in dif- ferent services. When adoption decisions are decentralized and non- contractible, the common code will be ine¢ ciently biased towards the
21 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the performance consequences of planned turnover of temporary workers due to the expiration of their contracts and reconciled the con-trol consequences of the planned turnover.
Abstract: This study examines the performance consequences of planned turnover. In particular, we investigate the departure of temporary workers due to the expiration of their contracts. We reconcile the con...
21 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism, and they find that for firms with greater institutional ownership the adverse effects of director abnormal compensation are mitigated, and the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm performance is reduced.
Abstract: This paper provides new evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism. We find that director abnormal compensation has a negative impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover and reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor stock performance. However, for firms with greater institutional ownership the adverse effects of director abnormal compensation are mitigated, and the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm performance is reduced. These findings suggest that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is likely associated with agency problems.
21 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored international negotiation prototypes in a Latin American country (Costa Rica) and identified two distinct negotiator types: a rational negotiator and an emotional one, and found that cultural values have substantial importance in both clusters.
21 citations
Authors
Showing all 569 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
Andreas Richter | 110 | 769 | 48262 |
Martin J. Conyon | 49 | 131 | 10026 |
Mahmoud Ezzamel | 49 | 138 | 7116 |
Mauro F. Guillén | 45 | 148 | 11899 |
Kazuhisa Bessho | 43 | 223 | 5490 |
Bryan W. Husted | 40 | 104 | 7369 |
Luis Garicano | 40 | 119 | 7446 |
Marc Goergen | 38 | 209 | 5677 |
Diego Miranda-Saavedra | 38 | 59 | 7559 |
Cipriano Forza | 37 | 84 | 6426 |
Dimo Dimov | 33 | 117 | 6158 |
Gordon Murray | 32 | 90 | 5604 |
Pascual Berrone | 29 | 64 | 7732 |
Albert Maydeu-Olivares | 27 | 37 | 3470 |
Jelena Zikic | 26 | 46 | 2398 |