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Institution

IE University

EducationSegovia, Castilla y León, Spain
About: IE University is a education organization based out in Segovia, Castilla y León, Spain. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Corporate governance & Supply chain. The organization has 527 authors who have published 1709 publications receiving 64682 citations.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This study examines the efficacy of two idea evaluation processes: scoring vs. ranking in the context of innovation management and proposes and test an explanatory model in which the information becomes a cue that directs the participants’ efforts to evaluate the ideas.
Abstract: Using an online experiment, this study examines the efficacy of two idea evaluation processes: scoring vs. ranking in the context of innovation management. In the scoring process, the evaluators are asked to rate the quality of each idea by assigning it a score (e.g., from 0 to 10), while in the ranking process the evaluator simply orders all ideas according to their perceived qualities. Our results suggest that the scoring process strictly outperforms the ranking process in terms of the likelihood of selecting the highest‐quality ideas. This result remains robust, irrespective of the possibility of allowing ties in the ranking process. However, when the number of ideas to be evaluated is reduced from eight to three, the efficacies of the two idea evaluation processes become similar. Additionally, we find that the efficacy of the ranking process is significantly improved when additional information is provided, yet the efficacy of the scoring process does not change with more information. Based on the observations from the experimental data, we propose and test an explanatory model in which the information becomes a cue that directs the participants’ efforts to evaluate the ideas (i.e., the time taken for evaluation).

21 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: A simple communication model and characterizes optimal codes is developed and the results are used to interpret some existing organizational structures.
Abstract: We study the determination of specialized codes under bounded rationality, and its implications for organizations. Agents may de- crease communication costs by designing codes that …t their own en- vironment, using for example more precise words for more frequent events. Bounded rationality imposes sharply decreasing returns to scope, since when similarly skilled agents in dierent services must communicate with one another they must share common codes, which in turn degrades communication within each service. Thus the de- cision of whether to segregate services or integrate them trades o¤ the synergies that result from better coordination between services against the loss due to the need for a common, more vague, code than the one that would optimize communication within services. Al- ternatively, more skilled 'translators'may be used to allow separate services to appropriate the synergies while keeping their own codes. A decrease in diagnosis costs leads to increasing integration among services and to the substitution of common codes for hierarchies, as common codes allow for the direct interaction among agents in dif- ferent services. When adoption decisions are decentralized and non- contractible, the common code will be ine¢ ciently biased towards the

21 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the performance consequences of planned turnover of temporary workers due to the expiration of their contracts and reconciled the con-trol consequences of the planned turnover.
Abstract: This study examines the performance consequences of planned turnover. In particular, we investigate the departure of temporary workers due to the expiration of their contracts. We reconcile the con...

21 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism, and they find that for firms with greater institutional ownership the adverse effects of director abnormal compensation are mitigated, and the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm performance is reduced.
Abstract: This paper provides new evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism. We find that director abnormal compensation has a negative impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover and reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor stock performance. However, for firms with greater institutional ownership the adverse effects of director abnormal compensation are mitigated, and the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm performance is reduced. These findings suggest that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is likely associated with agency problems.

21 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored international negotiation prototypes in a Latin American country (Costa Rica) and identified two distinct negotiator types: a rational negotiator and an emotional one, and found that cultural values have substantial importance in both clusters.

21 citations


Authors

Showing all 569 results

NameH-indexPapersCitations
Andreas Richter11076948262
Martin J. Conyon4913110026
Mahmoud Ezzamel491387116
Mauro F. Guillén4514811899
Kazuhisa Bessho432235490
Bryan W. Husted401047369
Luis Garicano401197446
Marc Goergen382095677
Diego Miranda-Saavedra38597559
Cipriano Forza37846426
Dimo Dimov331176158
Gordon Murray32905604
Pascual Berrone29647732
Albert Maydeu-Olivares27373470
Jelena Zikic26462398
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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Institution in previous years
YearPapers
202313
202246
2021124
2020142
2019103
201891