Institution
Indian Institute of Management Bangalore
Education•Bengaluru, Karnataka, India•
About: Indian Institute of Management Bangalore is a education organization based out in Bengaluru, Karnataka, India. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Emerging markets & Corporate governance. The organization has 491 authors who have published 1254 publications receiving 23853 citations. The organization is also known as: IIMB.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
More filters
••
TL;DR: The Guide to Political Revolution as discussed by the authors was written by the 2016 presidential candidate and independent senator from Vermont, Bernie Sanders, whose presidential campaign ran on the need to "change the status qu...
Abstract: Guide to Political Revolution was written by the 2016 presidential candidate and independent senator from Vermont, Bernie Sanders. His presidential campaign ran on the need to “change the status qu...
2 citations
•
TL;DR: This article proposed a two-tiered task-based model with self-enforcing contracts in which firms allocate complex tasks to long-term employees at incentive compatible wages, and routine tasks to fixed term employees at acceptable wages.
Abstract: Fixed-term contract employment has increasingly replaced regular open-ended employment as the predominant form of employment notably in developing countries. Guided by factory-level evidence showing nuanced patterns of co-movements of regular and contract wages, we propose a two-tiered task based model with self-enforcing contracts in which firms allocate complex tasks to long term employees at incentive compatible wages, and routine tasks to fixed term employees at acceptable wages. We show that the advent of contract employment effectively lowers the cost of maintaining worker discipline, and demonstrate the conditions under which a positive change in labor demand can end up increasing the share of contract employees. We then argue that the contract employment phenomenon sheds light on two margins of hiring distortions – respectively task assignment and total employment distortions – against which the effectiveness of a suite of oft proposed labor market exibility policies should be assessed.
2 citations
••
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine influence capital, a specific form of resource provision on boards, and find that generalist bureaucrats are more sought after by firms than specialist bureaucrats, usually as independent directors.
Abstract: One of the important roles which firm boards play is the resource provision role. In this study, we examine influence capital, a specific form of resource provision on boards. Two categories of government officials, i.e., Politicians and Bureaucrats tend to be the major providers of influence capital. While firm connections to politicians as board members has been examined in prior literature, connections to bureaucrats (and ex-bureaucrats) has not received the same level of attention. This is despite a sharp increase in the appointment of bureaucrats in company boards in the last few years. We analyze and provide evidence that industry regulation and foreign corporate ownership are major organizational determinants of selection of bureaucrats as board members. Further, it was also imperative to understand the differences in selection of various categories of bureaucrats as board members. We examined and find that generalist bureaucrats are more sought after by firms than specialist bureaucrats, usually as independent directors. Overall, this study provides an important initial thrust for studying bureaucrat board members as providers of influence capital.
2 citations
••
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study a situation where a single supplier sells capacity to an established and more powerful buyer and also to a relatively less powerful buyer, and find that when the supplier's capacity is either too low (below the lower threshold) or too high (above the higher threshold), there is no excess procurement as compared to the case when supplier has infinite capacity.
Abstract: Supply chains are often characterized by the presence of a dominant buyer purchasing from a supplier with limited capacity. We study such a situation where a single supplier sells capacity to an established and more powerful buyer and also to a relatively less powerful buyer. The more powerful buyer enjoys the first right to book her capacity requirements at supplier's end, and then the common supplier fulfills the requirement of the less powerful buyer. We find that when the supplier's capacity is either too low (below the lower threshold) or too high (above the higher threshold), there is no excess procurement as compared to the case when supplier has infinite capacity. When the supplier's capacity is between these two thresholds, the more powerful buyer purchases an excess amount in comparison to the infinite capacity case.
2 citations
••
29 Jul 2020
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine how socially subordinated actors may organize with dominant actors to create and institutionalize a new organizational form that addresses a complex social social problem, and examine how subaltern actors may cooperate with the dominant actors.
Abstract: In this study, we examine how socially subordinated — or subaltern— actors may organize with dominant actors to create and institutionalize a new organizational form that addresses a complex social...
2 citations
Authors
Showing all 531 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
Kannan Raghunandan | 49 | 100 | 10439 |
Saras D. Sarasvathy | 41 | 109 | 14815 |
Asha George | 35 | 156 | 4227 |
Dasaratha V. Rama | 32 | 67 | 4592 |
Raghbendra Jha | 31 | 335 | 3396 |
Gita Sen | 30 | 57 | 3550 |
Jayant R. Kale | 26 | 67 | 3534 |
Randall Hansen | 23 | 41 | 2299 |
Pulak Ghosh | 23 | 92 | 1763 |
M. R. Rao | 23 | 52 | 2326 |
Suneeta Krishnan | 20 | 49 | 2234 |
Ranji Vaidyanathan | 19 | 77 | 1646 |
Mukta Kulkarni | 19 | 45 | 1785 |
Haritha Saranga | 19 | 42 | 1523 |
Janat Shah | 19 | 52 | 1767 |