Institution
Institute for the Study of Labor
Nonprofit•Bonn, Germany•
About: Institute for the Study of Labor is a nonprofit organization based out in Bonn, Germany. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Wage & Unemployment. The organization has 2039 authors who have published 13475 publications receiving 439376 citations.
Topics: Wage, Unemployment, Earnings, Population, Productivity
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
More filters
•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors apply count data estimation techniques to investigate the fertility adjustment of immigrants in the destination country and find evidence in favor of the assimilation model according to which immigrant fertility converges to native levels over time.
Abstract: This study applies count data estimation techniques to investigate the fertility adjustment of immigrants in the destination country. Data on completed fertility are taken from the 1996 wave of the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). While the economic literature stresses the role of prices and incomes as determinants of fertility, the demographic literature discusses whether assimilation or disruption effects dominate immigrants' fertility after migration. We find evidence in favor of the assimilation model according to which immigrant fertility converges to native levels over time. In addition, we confirm the negative impact of female human capital on fertility outcomes.
150 citations
••
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a novel way to model the labor market in the context of a New-Keynesian general equilibrium model, incorporating labor market frictions in the form of hiring and firing costs.
Abstract: In this paper we propose a novel way to model the labor market in the context of a New-Keynesian general equilibrium model, incorporating labor market frictions in the form of hiring and firing costs. We show that such a model is able to replicate many important stylized facts of the business cycle. The reactions to monetary and real shocks become much more sluggish. Job creation and job destruction are negatively correlated. And the volatility of unemployment is much larger than in the standard search and matching model.
150 citations
••
TL;DR: The authors found that teams coordinate much more efficiently than individuals than individuals, and explain the differences between individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model, which adds one important cornerstone to the recent literature on the conditions for successful coordination.
Abstract: The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision-making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present an experiment with 825 participants, using six different coordination games, where either individuals or teams interact with each other. We find that teams coordinate much more efficiently than individuals. This finding adds one important cornerstone to the recent literature on the conditions for successful coordination. We explain the differences between individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model.
149 citations
•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors survey recent work in equilibrium models of labor markets characterized by search and recruitment frictions and by the need to reallocate workers across productive activities, and use the framework to study the influence of alternative labor market institutions and policies on wages and unemployment.
Abstract: This paper surveys recent work in equilibrium models of labor markets characterized by search and recruitment frictions and by the need to reallocate workers across productive activities. The duration of unemployment and jobs and wage determination are treated as endogenous outcomes of job creation and job destruction decisions made by workers and firms. The solutions studied are dynamic stochastic equilibria in the sense that time and uncertainty are explicitly modeled, expectations are rational, private gains from trade are exploited and the actions taken by all agents are mutually consistent. A number of alternative wage determination mechanisms are explored, including the frequently studied non-cooperative wage bargaining and wage posting by firms. We use the framework to study the influence of alternative labor market institutions and policies on wages and unemployment.
149 citations
•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting and find that the distribution of contributions is not as predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by contributing less than their best response.
Abstract: We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than simultaneous contributions. However, the distribution of contributions is not as predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by contributing less than their best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that we fail to observe a predicted first mover advantage.
149 citations
Authors
Showing all 2136 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
Michael Marmot | 193 | 1147 | 170338 |
James J. Heckman | 175 | 766 | 156816 |
Anders Björklund | 165 | 769 | 84268 |
Jean Tirole | 134 | 439 | 103279 |
Ernst Fehr | 131 | 486 | 108454 |
Matthew Jones | 125 | 1161 | 96909 |
Alan B. Krueger | 117 | 402 | 75442 |
Eric A. Hanushek | 109 | 449 | 59705 |
David Card | 107 | 433 | 55797 |
M. Hashem Pesaran | 102 | 361 | 88826 |
Richard B. Freeman | 100 | 860 | 46932 |
Richard Blundell | 93 | 487 | 61730 |
John Haltiwanger | 91 | 393 | 38803 |
John A. List | 91 | 583 | 36962 |
Joshua D. Angrist | 89 | 304 | 59505 |