Institution
Institute for the Study of Labor
Nonprofit•Bonn, Germany•
About: Institute for the Study of Labor is a nonprofit organization based out in Bonn, Germany. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Wage & Unemployment. The organization has 2039 authors who have published 13475 publications receiving 439376 citations.
Topics: Wage, Unemployment, Earnings, Population, Productivity
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: In this paper, a partial equilibrium two state model of employment dynamics is estimated, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, and they find employment and non-employment rates implied by the structural parameter estimates to be generally consistent with those observed for the population of young males.
Abstract: This paper takes a first step toward developing econometric models for the structural analysis of labor force dynamics. Our analysis is presented in continuous time, although most of the points raised here can be applied to discrete time models. We show that in previous attempts to estimate "structural" models of job search, a key source of information necessary to identify certain structural parameters has been neglected. We discuss the conditions under which structural search models can be estimated. In particular, the wage offer distribution must be recoverable -- i.e., it must be the case that the parameters of the untruncated wage offer distribution be estimable from the truncated accepted wage distribution. The wage offer distribution must be assumed to belong to a parametric family. Estimates of structural parameters are shown to be sensitive to the distributional assumption made. A partial equilibrium two state model of employment dynamics is estimated, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men. We find employment and nonemployment rates implied by the structural parameter estimates to be generally consistent with those observed for the population of young males.
461 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide some econometric evidence on the impact of financial factors like cash flow, debt and stock measures of liquidity on the investment decisions of U.K. firms.
Abstract: In this paper we provide some econometric evidence on the impact of financial factors like cash flow, debt and stock measures of liquidity on the investment decisions of U. K. firms. These variables are introduced via an extension of the Q model of investment which explicitly includes agency/financial distress costs. We discuss if the significance of cash flow may be due to the fact that it proxies for output or because it is a better measure of market fundamentals than Q. Moreover we investigate if the effect of financial factors varies across different types of firms, according to size, age, and type of industry (growing and declining). We analyze the determinants of the magnitude of the cash flow effect and explain why caution must be exercised in attributing inter-firm differences only to differences in the importance of agency or financial distress costs.
455 citations
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TL;DR: The authors analyzes the operation of works councils as a means of improving social output by creating more cooperative labor relations, arguing that workers provide more accurate information to employers about preferences when councils have some say over how that information is used.
Abstract: Works councils, found in most Western European economies, are elected bodies of employees with rights to information, consultation, and in some cases co-determination of employment conditions at local workplaces, mandated by law. Many European employers and unions believe that councils improve communication between workers and management, raising social output, while reducing the speed with which decisions are made. This paper analyzes the operation of councils as a means of improving social output by creating more cooperative labor relations. It argues that councils are mandated because the incentive for companies to institute them and delegate them power falls short of the social incentive; that workers provide more accurate information to employers about preferences when councils have some say over how that information is used; and that the communication from employers to workers produces socially desirable worker concessions in bad times that would not occur absent this institution. It compares a jury style random selection of works councilors with selection via elections.
453 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the relationship between financial development, CO2 emissions, trade and economic growth using simultaneous-equation panel data models for a panel of 12 MENA countries over the period 1990-2011.
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between financial development, CO2 emissions, trade and economic growth using simultaneous-equation panel data models for a panel of 12 MENA countries over the period 1990-2011. Our results indicate that there is evidence of bidirectional causality between CO2 emissions and economic growth. Economic growth and trade openness are interrelated i.e. bidirectional causality. Feedback hypothesis is validated between trade openness and financial development. Neutrality hypothesis is identified between CO2 emissions and financial development. Unidirectional causality running from financial development to economic growth and from trade openness to CO2 emissions is identified. Our empirical results also verified the existence of environmental Kuznets curve. These empirical insights are of particular interest to policymakers as they help build sound economic policies to sustain economic development and to improve the environmental quality.
451 citations
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TL;DR: In the absence of third-party enforcement, markets resemble a collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market as discussed by the authors, and long-term relationships between trading parties emerge endogenously and are associated with a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions.
Abstract: We provide evidence that long-term relationships between trading parties emerge endogenously in the absence of third party enforcement of contracts and are associated with a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. Without third party enforcement, the vast majority of trades are initiated with private offers and the parties share the gains from trade equally. Low effort or bad quality is penalized by the termination of the relationship, wielding a powerful effect on contract enforcement. Successful long-term relations exhibit generous rent sharing and high effort (quality) from the very beginning of the relationship. In the absence of third-party enforcement, markets resemble a collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market. If contracts are third party enforceable, rent sharing and long-term relations are absent and the vast majority of trades are initiated with public offers. Most trades take place in one-shot transactions and the contracting parties are indifferent with regard to the identity of their trading partner.
450 citations
Authors
Showing all 2136 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
Michael Marmot | 193 | 1147 | 170338 |
James J. Heckman | 175 | 766 | 156816 |
Anders Björklund | 165 | 769 | 84268 |
Jean Tirole | 134 | 439 | 103279 |
Ernst Fehr | 131 | 486 | 108454 |
Matthew Jones | 125 | 1161 | 96909 |
Alan B. Krueger | 117 | 402 | 75442 |
Eric A. Hanushek | 109 | 449 | 59705 |
David Card | 107 | 433 | 55797 |
M. Hashem Pesaran | 102 | 361 | 88826 |
Richard B. Freeman | 100 | 860 | 46932 |
Richard Blundell | 93 | 487 | 61730 |
John Haltiwanger | 91 | 393 | 38803 |
John A. List | 91 | 583 | 36962 |
Joshua D. Angrist | 89 | 304 | 59505 |