London School of Economics and Political Science

About: London School of Economics and Political Science is a education organization based out in London, United Kingdom. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & Politics. The organization has 8759 authors who have published 35017 publications receiving 1436302 citations.

The new accounting history: an introduction.

Abstract: Over the last decade accounting history has changed significantly. This change entails both a pluralization of the methodologies and a change in the position of history within the discipline of accounting. The extent of this change is held to entitle us to speak of the “new accounting history” as a loose assemblage of diverse research questions and issues. It involves attention to a variety of agents and agencies, the conditions of possibility of transformations in accounting knowledge and practice, the institutional forces that shape actions and outcomes and the rationales that set out the objects and objectives of accounting. The new accounting history is located in relation to changes in the discipline of history itself, and is held to have implications for the current burgeoning of interest in “field studies” of accounting.

Elected versus appointed regulators: theory and evidence

Abstract: This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for. Because voters have only one vote to cast and regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, there are electoral incentives to respond to stakeholder interests. If regulators are elected, their stance on regulation is the only salient issue so that the electoral incentive is to run a pro-consumer candidate. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from U.S. states, we find new evidence in favor of the idea that elected states are more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies. (JEL: H1, K2)

Financial Expert CEOs: CEO’s Work Experience and Firm’s Financial Policies

Abstract: This research studies the role of CEOs with a career background in finance. Firms that appoint financial expert CEOs hold less cash and more debt, and engage in more share repurchases. Financial expert CEOs are also more financially sophisticated. They are less likely to use one companywide discount rate instead of a project-specific one. They also manage financial policies more actively, communicate better with financial markets and their firm investments are less sensitive to firm cash flows. We use exogenous changes to business conditions and find financial expert CEOs are able to raise external funds even when credit conditions are tight. They were also more responsive to the dividend and capital gains tax cuts in 2003 and paid out more to shareholders. Newly appointed financial expert CEOs also seem more likely to replace incumbent CFOs. We do not find evidence that personal networks are driving these results. Finally, we analyze CEO-firm matching based on financial experience and provide evidence that is mostly consistent with a conclusion that employment histories of CEOs greatly matter for corporate policies.

The London Congestion Charge

Abstract: By the 1990s, the average speed of trips across London was below that at the beginning of the twentieth century -- before the car was introduced -- and by the end of that decade, public concern over levels of traffic congestion was high. In early 2003, London imposed a congestion charge -- a daily charge for driving or parking a vehicle on public roads within central London between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 6:30 p.m. on workdays. Traffic congestion has declined substantially, and the program is largely popular. This article describes the origins of the London congestion charge, how it overcame practical and theoretical difficulties, and what effects it has had. The introduction of the London congestion charge is, in important respects, a triumph of economics. It represents a high-profile public and political recognition of congestion as a distorting externality and of road pricing as an appropriate policy response.