London School of Economics and Political Science

About: London School of Economics and Political Science is a education organization based out in London, United Kingdom. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Politics & Population. The organization has 8759 authors who have published 35017 publications receiving 1436302 citations.

Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining

Abstract: In recent years there have been numerous calls for making the opera- tions of international organizations more "transparent +" One element in these demands involves the idea that international negotiations should be open to the same level of outside scrutiny that is presumed to prevail with bargaining in domestic contexts+ While transparency of this sort may have clear benefits by facilitating attempts to hold officials accountable, scholars have made less effort to consider whether mak- ing international bargaining more public might also have detrimental effects+ I develop a game-theoretic model that provides four hypotheses about the relative benefits of open-door versus closed-door bargaining, and about the preferences of different actors with regard to this type of transparency+ This model, which can be applied to inter- national and domestic contexts, helps extend positive theories about the design of institutions while also providing insights for the normative question of when trans- parency is desirable+ I show that the hypotheses developed are supported both by historical evidence from eighteenth-century disputes about publicity in national par- liaments, and by evidence from the more recent dispute about making European Coun- cil of Ministers deliberations public+

Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes

Abstract: The legitimacy and accountability of polycentric regulatory regimes, particularly at the transnational level, has been severely criticised, and the search is on to find ways in which they can be enhanced. This paper argues that before developing even more proposals, we need to pay far greater attention to the dynamics of accountability and legitimacy relationships, and to how regulators respond to them. The article thus seeks to develop first, a closer analysis of the significance of the institutional environment in the construction of legitimacy, the dialectical nature of accountability relationships, and the communicative structures through which accountability occurs and legitimacy is constructed. Secondly, it explores how regulators respond, or are likely to respond, to multiple legitimacy and accountability claims, and of how they themselves seek to build legitimacy in complex and dynamic situations. This analysis, as well as being of intrinsic interest, could be of use to those trying to design accountability relationships or seeking to build them on the ground. For until we understand the implications of the pressures for accountability and legitimacy, the 'how to' proposals which are proliferating risk being simply pipe dreams: diverting, but in the end making little difference.

Board Structure and Price Informativeness

Abstract: We develop and test the hypothesis that private information incorporated into stock prices (price informativeness) affects the structure of corporate boards. We find a negative relation between measures of price informativeness and measures of board independence. This finding is robust to the inclusion of many firm-level controls - including firm fixed effects - and to the choice of the measure of price informativeness. Consistent with the hypothesis that price informativeness and board monitoring are substitutes, this relationship is particularly strong for firms more exposed to both external and internal governance mechanisms, firms for which firm-specific knowledge is relatively unimportant, and during periods of extreme abnormal stock performance. Our results suggest that firms with more informative stock prices have less demanding board structures.

Private Credit in 129 Countries

Abstract: We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. We find that both creditor protection through the legal system and information sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to GDP, but that the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An analysis of legal reforms also shows that improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing precede faster credit growth. We also find that creditor rights are extremely stable over time, contrary to the convergence hypothesis. Finally, we find that legal origins are an important determinant of both creditor rights and information sharing institutions.