London School of Economics and Political Science

About: London School of Economics and Political Science is a education organization based out in London, United Kingdom. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Politics & Population. The organization has 8759 authors who have published 35017 publications receiving 1436302 citations.

World Development Report 2012: Gender equality and development

Abstract: World Development Report 2012: Gender equality and development Washington, DC: The World Bank 2011, 426 pp., ISBN: 978-0821388259 Since the 1970s, Gender in development has emerged as an issue of c...

Risk and Responsibility

Abstract: level. Risks only exist when there are decisions to be taken, for reasons given earlier. The idea of responsibility also presumes decisions. What brings into play the notion of responsibility is that someone takes a decision having discernable consequences. The transition from external to manufactured risk is bringing about a crisis of responsibility, because the connections between risk, responsibility and decisions alter. This is a crisis of responsibility with negative and positive features, roughly corresponding to the negative and positive aspects of risk. Given the inherently ambiguous nature of most situations of manufactured risk, and the inherent reflexivity of these situations, responsibility can neither easily be attributed nor assumed. This applies both where responsibility means limiting risk (as in ecological risks, or health risks) and where risk is an energising principle (financial markets). Several consequences follow: 1. The emergence of what Beck calls ‘organised irresponsibility’. By this he means that there are a diversity of humanly created risks for which people and organisations are certainly ‘responsible’ in a sense that they are its authors but where no one is held specifically accountable. Various questions then come to the fore. Who is to determine how harmful products are, what side effects are produced by them, and what level of risk is acceptable? How can ‘sufficient proof’ be determined in a world full of contested knowledge claims and probabilities? If there are damages to be paid, or reparations made, who is to decide about compensation and appropriate forms for future control or regulation? Much of the ‘social interrogation’ of risk and responsibility takes place through the prism of external risk and simple modernisation. This is true, for example, of anyone who expects an actuary to predict risk, and therefore assess responsibility, on the basis of past trends; or of anyone who supposes that one can simply turn to experts to provide solutions. Coping with situations of organised irresponsibility is likely to become more and more important in the fields of law, insurance and politics, but this won’t be easy to do precisely because of the rather imponderable character of most circumstances of manufactured risk. The dilemma of scaremongering versus cover-ups is a direct indication of the deep seated nature of the problems involved here. 2. Some say that the most effective way to cope with the rise of manufactured risk is to limit responsibility by adopting the ‘precautionary principle’. The notion of the precautionary principle seems to have first emerged in The Modern Law Review [Vol. 62 8 s The Modern Law Review Limited 1999 Germany in the 1980s, in the context of the ecological debates that were carried on there. At its simplest, it proposes that action on environmental issues (and by inference other forms of risk) should be taken even though there is scientific uncertainty about them. Thus in the 1980s, in several Continental countries, programmes were initiated to counter acid rain, whereas in Britain lack of conclusive evidence was used to justify inactivity on this and other pollution problems too. Yet the precautionary principle isn’t always helpful or even applicable as a means of coping with problems of responsibility. The precept of ‘staying close to nature’, or of limiting innovation rather than embracing it, can’t always apply. The reason is that the balance of benefits and dangers from scientific and technological advance, and other forms of social change, is imponderable. We may need quite often to be bold rather than cautious in supporting scientific innovation or other forms of change. This having been said, variations on the precautionary principle can nevertheless be a significant way of reintroducing responsibility. One variant of the principle, for example, is that firms producing goods should think through the whole product cycle before those goods are released onto the market or relevant technical processes utilised. Thus in the Brent Spar episode, the company putting up the oil platform in the first place had not adequately thought through to the final point of effective and reasonably safe disposal. 3. Situations of manufactured risk shift the relation between collective and individual responsibility in many risk situations. Although in many circumstances individuals cannot be held culpable, this is not the same as non-culpability in conditions of organised irresponsibility. In the latter case, this results from viewing responsibilities through the lenses of external or passive risk. Consider, for instance, health risks. Many people get ill through no fault of their own. But a large proportion of illnesses are related both to lifestyle practises and to wider conditions of the ‘created environment’. It doesn’t make any sense to suppose that liability in these circumstances can remain wholly with the collectivity, whether this be government or an insurance company. The active assumption of responsibility, as in attempts to reduce levels of smoking, becomes part of the very definition of risk situations and therefore the attribution of responsibility. Something quite similar applies to our responsibilities towards future generations. When most risk was external, such responsibility was relatively limited: nature was largely intact. Our responsibilities to future generations now are thoroughly infused with decisions we have to take resulting from our transformation of nature. 4. These considerations are relevant to one of the major political issues of our times, the future of the welfare state. The history of the welfare state in all countries is a tangled one. The welfare state emerged in some part as a means of holding back the aspirations of the poor and of controlling them – it had some of its roots in the political right. In recent years, however, as described earlier, the left has appropriated the welfare state as its own project. The debate around the welfare state has therefore concentrated to a considerable degree upon its role in limiting or reducing inequality. But the welfare state is more correctly seen as a form of collective risk management. The idea that the welfare state should be understood as a ‘safety’ or ‘provident’ state has been raised most forcefully in the writings January 1999] Risk and Responsibility s The Modern Law Review Limited 1999 9 of the French thinker Francois Ewald. The welfare state is tied into the basic suppositions of modernity – that security comes from the ever more effective control by human beings of their material and social environments. The crisis of the welfare state is usually represented as a fiscal one. If the welfare state is in trouble, it is because people won’t pay the taxes needed to fund welfare systems properly. There is some validity to this, but it is more illuminating to see the crisis of the welfare state as a crisis of risk management. The welfare state was built up on the presumption of external or passive risk. If you become unemployed, fall ill, become disabled or lose your home, the welfare state will step in to protect you. Welfare systems must now confront large areas of manufactured risk, shifting the relation between risk and responsibility. It isn’t surprising that there is now a great deal of talk about the need to connect rights with responsibilities. Unconditional rights might seem appropriate when individuals bear no responsibility for the risks they face, but such is not the case in situations of manufactured risk. 5. Where a society hasn’t got effective means of dealing with organised irresponsibility, the result isn’t always that no one is held culpable. On the contrary, the price of manufactured uncertainty is probably closely associated with the emergence of the ‘litiginous’ society. Where a common ‘contract of responsibility’ has broken down, culpability can appear everywhere. Here indemnity has effectively been separated from causality. I might be held responsible, for example, if someone is hurt through slipping on my garden path. 6. The theme of responsibility has to be integrated with a concern for the two sides of risk. The negative and positive sides of risk are still often discussed as though they were separate from one another. This translates into a division between two large bodies of literature. It is a remarkable fact that most of those who write about environmental risk make no reference at all to the literature on financial or entrepreneurial risk, or vice versa. Two of the most influential books to have been written about risk over the past ten years, for example, are Risk Society by Ulrich Beck and Against the Gods written by Peter Bernstein. Yet these books make no reference at all to one another. The fact that risk is often a positive or energising phenomenon is relevant to most of the situations of risk and responsibility discussed above, not just to economic risk. Thus to create a more effective welfare state, it is important that in some situations people are psychologically and materially able to take risks albeit in a ‘responsible’ way. It isn’t a good outcome for the individual or the wider society where a person is stuck on benefits or unwilling to take the risk of plunging into the labour market. The same applies to someone caught up in a dysfunctional or violent relationship. Risk is not only closely associated with responsibility, but also with initiative and the exploration of new horizons – something which takes us back to our starting point when the notion was first developed in post-

Reforming the health sector in developing countries: the central role of policy analysis

Abstract: Policy analysis is an established discipline in the industrialized world, yet its application to developing countries has been limited. The health sector in particular appears to have been neglected. This is surprising because there is a well recognized crisis in health systems, and prescriptions abound of what health policy reforms countries should introduce. However, little attention has been paid to how countries should carry out reforms, much less who is likely to favour or resist such policies. This paper argues that much health policy wrongly focuses attention on the content of reform, and neglects the actors involved in policy reform (at the international, national sub-national levels), the processes contingent on developing and implementing change and the context within which policy is developed. Focus on policy content diverts attention from understanding the processes which explain why desired policy outcomes fail to emerge. The paper is organized in 4 sections. The first sets the scene, demonstrating how the shift from consensus to conflict in health policy established the need for a greater emphasis on policy analysis. The second section explores what is meant by policy analysis. The third investigates what other disciplines have written that help to develop a framework of analysis. And the final section suggests how policy analysis can be used not only to analyze the policy process, but also to plan.

Uncertainty in predictions of the climate response to rising levels of greenhouse gases.

Abstract: In the climateprediction.net project, thousands of individuals have volunteered spare computing capacity on their PCs to help quantify uncertainty in the way our climate responds to increasing levels of greenhouse gases. By running a state-of-the-art climate model thousands of times, it is possible to find out how the model responds to slight changes in the approximations of physical processes that cannot be calculated explicitly. The first batch of results has now been analysed, and surface temperature changes in simulations that capture the climate realistically are ranging from below 2 °C to more than 11 °C. These represent the possible long-term change, averaged over the whole planet, as a result of doubling the levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide in the model. This is the first time that complex models have been found with such a wide range of responses. Their existence will help in quantifying the risks associated with climate change on a regional level. The range of possibilities for future climate evolution1,2,3 needs to be taken into account when planning climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies. This requires ensembles of multi-decadal simulations to assess both chaotic climate variability and model response uncertainty4,5,6,7,8,9. Statistical estimates of model response uncertainty, based on observations of recent climate change10,11,12,13, admit climate sensitivities—defined as the equilibrium response of global mean temperature to doubling levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide—substantially greater than 5 K. But such strong responses are not used in ranges for future climate change14 because they have not been seen in general circulation models. Here we present results from the ‘climateprediction.net’ experiment, the first multi-thousand-member grand ensemble of simulations using a general circulation model and thereby explicitly resolving regional details15,16,17,18,19,20,21. We find model versions as realistic as other state-of-the-art climate models but with climate sensitivities ranging from less than 2 K to more than 11 K. Models with such extreme sensitivities are critical for the study of the full range of possible responses of the climate system to rising greenhouse gas levels, and for assessing the risks associated with specific targets for stabilizing these levels.