National Bureau of Economic Research

About: National Bureau of Economic Research is a nonprofit organization based out in Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Population. The organization has 2626 authors who have published 34177 publications receiving 2818124 citations. The organization is also known as: NBER & The National Bureau of Economic Research.

Measuring Trends in Leisure: The Allocation of Time Over Five Decades

Abstract: In this paper, we use five decades of time-use surveys to document trends in the allocation of time. We find that a dramatic increase in leisure time lies behind the relatively stable number of market hours worked (per working-age adult) between 1965 and 2003. Specifically, we show that leisure for men increased by 6-8 hours per week (driven by a decline in market work hours) and for women by 4-8 hours per week (driven by a decline in home production work hours). This increase in leisure corresponds to roughly an additional 5 to 10 weeks of vacation per year, assuming a 40-hour work week. Alternatively, the "consumption equivalent" of the increase in leisure is valued at 8 to 9 percent of total 2003 U.S. consumption expenditures. We also find that leisure increased during the last 40 years for a number of sub-samples of the population, with less-educated adults experiencing the largest increases. Lastly, we document a growing "inequality" in leisure that is the mirror image of the growing inequality of wages and expenditures, making welfare calculation based solely on the latter series incomplete.

Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the 1970s

Abstract: Economists have long been intrigued by empirical evidence that suggests that oil price shocks may be closely related to macroeconomic performance. This interest dates back to the 1970s. The 1970s were a period of growing dependence on imported oil, unprecedented disruptions in the global oil market and poor macroeconomic performance in the United States. Thus, it was natural to suspect a causal relationship from oil prices to U.S. macroeconomic aggregates. Since then, a large body of work has accumulated that purports to establish this link on theoretical grounds and to provide empirical evidence in its support. We do not attempt a comprehensive survey of this literature, but rather provide an idiosyncratic synthesis of what we view as the key issues in this debate and the insights gained over the last 30 years. The timing seems right for such an account. Although the experience of the 1970s continues to play an important role in discussions of the link between oil and the macroeconomy, there have been a number of new “oil price shocks” since the 1970s, notably the 1986 collapse of oil prices and the 2000 boom in oil prices as well as the oil price increases associated with the 1990 –1991 Gulf war and the 2003 Iraq war. Given this richer case history, we are arguably in a better position than two decades ago to distinguish the idiosyncratic features of each oil crisis from the systematic effects. Increases in oil prices have been held responsible for recessions, periods of excessive inflation, reduced productivity and lower economic growth. In this paper, we review the arguments supporting such views. First, we highlight some of the conceptual difficulties in assigning a central role to oil price shocks in explaining

Financial institutions and markets across countries and over time - data and analysis

Abstract: This paper introduces the updated and expanded version of the Financial Development and Structure Database and presents recent trends in structure and development of financial institutions and markets across countries. The authors add indicators on banking structure and financial globalization. They find a deepening of both financial markets and institutions, a trend concentrated in high-income countries and more pronounced for markets than for banks. Similarly, the recent increase in cross-border lending and debt issues has been concentrated in high-income countries, while low and lower-middle income countries have experienced an increase in remittance flows. Low net interest margins, rising profitability and declining stability in high-income countries’ banking sectors characterize the recent financial sector boom in high income countries leading up to the global financial crisis of 2007.

Liquidity Risk Management and Credit Supply in the Financial Crisis

Abstract: Liquidity dried up during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing – stable sources of financing – continued to lend relative to other banks. Banks that held more illiquid assets on their balance sheets, in contrast, increased asset liquidity and reduced lending. Off-balance-sheet liquidity risk materialized on the balance sheet and constrained new credit origination as increased take down demand displaced lending capacity. We conclude that efforts to manage the liquidity crisis by banks led to a decline in credit supply.

Capital Mobility in Neoclassical Models of Growth

Abstract: The empirical evidence reveals conditional convergence in the sense that economies grow faster per capita if they start further below their steady-state positions. For a homogeneous group of economies - like the U.S. states, regions of western European countries, and the GECD countries - the convergence is unconditional in that the poor economies grow faster than the rich ones. The neoclassical growth model for a closed economy fits these facts if capital is viewed broadly to encompass human investments, so that diminishing returns to capital set in slowly, and if differences in government policies or preferences about saving lead to heterogeneity in steady-state positions. Yet if the model is opened to allow for full capital mobility, then the predicted rates of convergence for capital and output are much higher than those observed empirically. We show that the open-economy model conforms with the evidence if an economy can use foreign debt to finance only a portion of its capital, even if 50% or more of the total. The problems in using human capital as collateral can explain the required imperfection in the credit market.