Institution
National Bureau of Economic Research
Nonprofit•Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States•
About: National Bureau of Economic Research is a nonprofit organization based out in Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Population. The organization has 2626 authors who have published 34177 publications receiving 2818124 citations. The organization is also known as: NBER & The National Bureau of Economic Research.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: This article investigated the mechanisms through which leaders affect growth and found that autocrats affect growth directly, through fiscal and monetary policy, and also influence political institutions that, in turn, appear to affect growth.
Abstract: Economic growth within countries varies sharply across decades. This paper examines one explanation for these sustained shifts in growth - changes in the national leader. We use deaths of leaders while in office as a source of exogenous variation in leadership, and ask whether these randomly-timed leadership transitions are associated with shifts in country growth rates. We find robust evidence that leaders matter, particularly in autocratic settings. Moreover, the death of autocrats appears to lead towards improvements in growth. We investigate the mechanisms through which leaders affect growth and find that autocrats affect growth directly, through fiscal and monetary policy. Autocrats also influence political institutions that, in turn, appear to affect growth. In particular, we find that small movements toward democracy following the death of an autocrat appear to improve growth, while dramatic democratizations are associated with reductions in growth. The results suggest that individual leaders can play crucial roles in shaping the growth of nations.
813 citations
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TL;DR: The authors examined asset fire sales and institutional price pressure in equity markets, using market prices of mutual fund transactions caused by capital flows from 1980 to 2003, and found that investors who trade against constrained mutual funds earn highly significant returns for providing liquidity when few others are willing or able.
Abstract: This paper examines asset fire sales, and institutional price pressure more generally, in equity markets, using market prices of mutual fund transactions caused by capital flows from 1980 to 2003. Funds experiencing large outflows (inflows) tend to decrease (increase) existing positions, which creates price pressure in the securities held in common by these funds. Forced transactions represent a significant cost of financial distress for mutual funds. We find that investors who trade against constrained mutual funds earn highly significant returns for providing liquidity when few others are willing or able. In addition, future flow-driven transactions are predictable, creating an incentive to front-run the anticipated forced trades by funds experiencing extreme capital flows.
813 citations
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TL;DR: This article proposed quantitative definitions of weak instruments based on the maximum IV estimator bias, or the maximum Wald test size distortion, when there are multiple endogenous regressors, and tabulated critical values that enable using the first-stage F-statistic (or, for instance, the Cragg-Donald [1993] statistic) to test whether the given instruments are weak.
Abstract: Weak instruments can produce biased IV estimators and hypothesis tests with large size distortions. But what, precisely, are weak instruments, and how does one detect them in practice? This paper proposes quantitative definitions of weak instruments based on the maximum IV estimator bias, or the maximum Wald test size distortion, when there are multiple endogenous regressors. We tabulate critical values that enable using the first-stage F-statistic (or, when there are multiple endogenous regressors, the Cragg-Donald [1993] statistic) to test whether the given instruments are weak.
812 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the role of historical experiences, cultural factors and personal history as determinants of preferences for equality or tolerance for inequality is discussed, and empirical evidence for the US, using the General Social Survey, and for a large set of countries, using World Values Survey.
Abstract: This paper discusses what determines the preferences of individuals for redistribution. We review the theoretical literature and provide a framework to incorporate various effects previously studied separately in the literature. We then examine empirical evidence for the US, using the General Social Survey, and for a large set of countries, using the World Values Survey. The paper reviews previously found results and provides several new ones. We emphasize, in particular, the role of historical experiences, cultural factors and personal history as determinants of preferences for equality or tolerance for inequality.
812 citations
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TL;DR: The opportunity to move from a neighborhood with a highlevel of poverty to one with a lower level of poverty was associated with modest but potentially important reductions in the prevalence of extreme obesity and diabetes.
Abstract: ference of 4.61 percentage points (95% confidence interval (CI), −8.54 to −0.69), 3.38 percentage points (95% CI, −6.39 to −0.36), and 4.31 percentage points (95% CI, −7.82 to −0.80), respectively. The differences between the group receiving traditional vouchers and the control group were not significant. CONCLUSIONS The opportunity to move from a neighborhood with a high level of poverty to one with a lower level of poverty was associated with modest but potentially important reductions in the prevalence of extreme obesity and diabetes. The mechanisms under - lying these associations remain unclear but warrant further investigation, given their potential to guide the design of community-level interventions intended to improve health. (Funded by HUD and others.)
810 citations
Authors
Showing all 2855 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
James J. Heckman | 175 | 766 | 156816 |
Andrei Shleifer | 171 | 514 | 271880 |
Joseph E. Stiglitz | 164 | 1142 | 152469 |
Daron Acemoglu | 154 | 734 | 110678 |
Gordon H. Hanson | 152 | 1434 | 119422 |
Edward L. Glaeser | 137 | 550 | 83601 |
Alberto Alesina | 135 | 498 | 93388 |
Martin B. Keller | 131 | 541 | 65069 |
Jeffrey D. Sachs | 130 | 692 | 86589 |
John Y. Campbell | 128 | 400 | 98963 |
Robert J. Barro | 124 | 519 | 121046 |
René M. Stulz | 124 | 470 | 81342 |
Paul Krugman | 123 | 347 | 102312 |
Ross Levine | 122 | 398 | 108067 |
Philippe Aghion | 122 | 507 | 73438 |