Institution
National Bureau of Economic Research
Nonprofit•Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States•
About: National Bureau of Economic Research is a nonprofit organization based out in Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Population. The organization has 2626 authors who have published 34177 publications receiving 2818124 citations. The organization is also known as: NBER & The National Bureau of Economic Research.
Topics: Monetary policy, Population, Exchange rate, Interest rate, Wage
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors check whether the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman model are consistent with the data and, if the model finds support, to estimate its two key structural parameters: the government's valuation of welfare relative to contributions, and the fraction of the voting population represented by a lobby.
Abstract: A prominent model in the recent political-economy literature on trade policy is Grossman and Helpman's (1994) Protection for Sale' model. This model yields clear predictions for the cross-sectional structure of trade protection. The objective of our" paper is to check whether the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman model are consistent with the data and, if the model finds support, to estimate its two key structural parameters: the government's valuation of welfare relative to contributions, and the fraction of the voting population represented by a lobby. We find that the pattern of protection in the U.S. in 1983 is consistent with the basic predictions of the model. Our estimate of the government's valuation of welfare relative to contributions is surprisingly high; the weight of welfare in the government's objective function is estimated to be between 50 and 88 times the weight of contributions.
748 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the prevalence of Silicon Valley-style localizations of individual manufacturing industries in the United States was discussed and several models in which firms choose locations by throwing darts at a map were used to test whether the degree of localization is greater than would be expected to arise randomly and motivate a new index of geographic concentration.
Abstract: This paper discusses the prevalence of Silicon Valley-style localizations of individual manufacturing industries in the United States. Several models in which firms choose locations by throwing darts at a map are used to test whether the degree of localization is greater than would be expected to arise randomly and to motivate a new index of geographic concentration. The proposed index controls for differences in the size distribution of plants and for differences in the size of the geographic areas for which data is available. As a consequence, comparisons of the degree of geographic concentration across industries can be made with more confidence. We reaffirm previous observations in finding that almost all industries are localized, although the degree of localization appears to be slight in about half of the industries in our sample. We explore the nature of agglomerative forces in describing patterns of concentration, the geographic scope of localization, and the extent to which agglomerations involve plants in similar as opposed to identical industries.
748 citations
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TL;DR: The Moving to Opportunity (MTO) demonstration assigned housing vouchers via random lottery to public housing residents in five cities and used the exogenous variation in residential locations generated by MTO to estimate neighborhood effects on youth crime and delinquency.
Abstract: The Moving to Opportunity (MTO) demonstration assigned housing vouchers via random lottery to public housing residents in five cities. We use the exogenous variation in residential locations generated by MTO to estimate neighborhood effects on youth crime and delinquency. The offer to relocate to lower-poverty areas reduces arrests among female youth for violent and property crimes, relative to a control group. For males the offer to relocate reduces arrests for violent crime, at least in the short run, but increases problem behaviors and property crime arrests. The gender difference in treatment effects seems to reflect differences in how male and female youths from disadvantaged backgrounds adapt and respond to similar new neighborhood environments.
748 citations
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TL;DR: This paper used the identifying assumption that only supply shocks, such as shocks to technology, oil prices, and labor supply affect output in the long run, but only in the short run.
Abstract: What shocks account for the business cycle frequency and long run movements of output and prices? This paper addresses this question using the identifying assumption that only supply shocks, such as shocks to technology, oil prices, and labor supply affect output in the long run Real and monetary aggregate demand shocks can affect output, but only in the short run This assumption sufficiently restricts the reduced form of key macroeconomic variables to allow estimation of the shocks and their effect on output and price at all frequencies Aggregate demand shocks account for about twenty to thirty percent of output fluctuations at business cycle frequencies Technological shocks account for about one-quarter of cyclical fluctuations, and about one-third of output's variance at low frequencies Shocks to oil prices are important in explaining episodes in the 1970's and 1980's Shocks that permanently affect labor input account for the balance of fluctuations in output, namely, about half of its variance at all frequencies
747 citations
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TL;DR: This article showed that the costs of using the political process limit not only the size of the dominant group but also their gains, which is at one level, a detail which is the way Stigler treated it, but a detail with some important implications for entry into regulation and for the price-output structure that emerges from regulation.
Abstract: In previous literature, George Stigler asserts a law of diminishing returns to group size in politics: Beyond some point it becomes counterproductive to dilute the per capita transfer. Since the total transfer is endogenous, there is a corollary that dirninishing returns apply to the transfer as well, due both to the opposition provoked by the transfer and to the demand this opposition exerts on resources to quiet it. Stigler does not himself formalize this model, and my first task will be to do just this. My simplified formal version of his model produces a result to which Stigler gave only passing recognition, namely that the costs of using the political process limit not only the size of the dominant group but also their gains. This is at one level, a detail, which is the way Stigler treated it, but a detail with some important implications -- for entry into regulation, and for the price-output structure that emerges from regulation. The main task of the paper is to derive these implications from a generalization of Stigler's model.
745 citations
Authors
Showing all 2855 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
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James J. Heckman | 175 | 766 | 156816 |
Andrei Shleifer | 171 | 514 | 271880 |
Joseph E. Stiglitz | 164 | 1142 | 152469 |
Daron Acemoglu | 154 | 734 | 110678 |
Gordon H. Hanson | 152 | 1434 | 119422 |
Edward L. Glaeser | 137 | 550 | 83601 |
Alberto Alesina | 135 | 498 | 93388 |
Martin B. Keller | 131 | 541 | 65069 |
Jeffrey D. Sachs | 130 | 692 | 86589 |
John Y. Campbell | 128 | 400 | 98963 |
Robert J. Barro | 124 | 519 | 121046 |
René M. Stulz | 124 | 470 | 81342 |
Paul Krugman | 123 | 347 | 102312 |
Ross Levine | 122 | 398 | 108067 |
Philippe Aghion | 122 | 507 | 73438 |