National Bureau of Economic Research

About: National Bureau of Economic Research is a nonprofit organization based out in Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Population. The organization has 2626 authors who have published 34177 publications receiving 2818124 citations. The organization is also known as: NBER & The National Bureau of Economic Research.

Trade Credit, Financial Intermediary Development and Industry Growth

Abstract: Where do firms turn for financing in countries with poorly developed financial markets? One source is trade credit. And where formal financial intermediaries are deficient, industries that rely more on this source of financing grow faster. Recent empirical work has shown that financial development is important for economic growth, since well-developed financial markets are more effective at allocating capital to firms with high-value projects. This raises the question of whether firms with high-return projects in countries with poorly developed financial institutions are able to draw on alternative sources of capital to offset the effects of deficient (formal) financial intermediaries. Recent work suggests that implicit borrowing in the form of trade credit may provide one such source of funds. Using the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998), Fisman and Love show that in countries with relatively weak financial institutions, industries with greater dependence on trade credit financing (measured by the ratio of accounts payable to total assets) grow faster than industries that rely less on such credit. Furthermore, consistent with the notion that young firms may not use trade credit, the authors show that most of the effect they report comes from growth in preexisting firms rather than from an increase in the number of firms. This paper has also been published in the Journal of Finance. This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the determinants of access to finance.

Welfare, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers

Abstract: During 1984 -1996, welfare and tax policy were changed to encourage work by single mothers. The Earned Income Tax Credit was expanded, welfare benets were cut, welfare time limits were added, and welfare cases were terminated. Medicaid for the working poor was expanded, as were training programs and child care. During this same time period there were unprecedented increases in the employment and hours of single mothers. We show that a large share of the increase in work by single mothers can be attributed to the EITC and other tax changes, with smaller shares for welfare benet cuts, welfare waivers, training programs and child care programs.

The Determinants of Credit Spread Changes

Abstract: Using straight industrial bonds with quoted prices, we investigate the determinants of credit spread changes. We find the variables that should in theory determine credit spread changes in fact have limited explanatory power. Further, the residuals from this first-pass regression are highly cross-correlated, and principal components analysis strongly suggests they are driven by a single common factor. We investigate several macro-economic and financial variables as candidate proxies for this factor. We cannot, however, find any set of variables which explain this common systematic factor. Our results suggest the corporate bond market is a segmented market driven by corporate bond specific supply/demand shocks.

Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?

Abstract: This paper examines whether hostile takeovers can be distinguished from friendly takeovers, empirically, based on accounting and stock performance data. Much has been made of this distinction in both the popular and the academic literature, where gains from hostile takeovers result from replacing incumbent managers and gains from friendly takeovers result from strategic synergies. Alternatively, hostility could reflect strategic choices made by the bidder or the target. Empirical tests show that most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly deals in economic terms, except that hostile transactions involve publicity as part of the bargaining process.

The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design

Abstract: We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians in the United States. Because that market exhibits many complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not apply directly. However, computational experiments reveal that the theory provides a good approximation, and furthermore the set of stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are surprisingly small. A new kind of core convergence' result is presented to explain this; the fact that each applicant can interview for only a small fraction of available positions is important. We also describe in detail engineering aspects of the design process.