National Bureau of Economic Research

About: National Bureau of Economic Research is a nonprofit organization based out in Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Population. The organization has 2626 authors who have published 34177 publications receiving 2818124 citations. The organization is also known as: NBER & The National Bureau of Economic Research.

Bad News Travels Slowly: Size, Analyst Coverage and the Profitability of Momentum Strategies

Abstract: A number of theories have been proposed to explain the medium-term momentum in stock returns identified by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). We test one such theory--based on the gradual-information-diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1997)--and establish three key results. First, once one moves past the very smallest stocks (where thin market-making capacity appears to be an issue) the profitability of momentum strategies declines sharply with firm size. Second, holding size fixed, momentum strategies work particularly well among stocks which have low analyst coverage. Finally, there is a strong asymmetry: the effect of analyst coverage is much more pronounced for stocks that are past losers than for stocks that are past winners. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firm-specific information only gradually across the investing public.

Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870-2008

Abstract: The crisis of 2008-09 has focused attention on money and credit fluctuations, financial crises, and policy responses. In this paper we study the behavior of money, credit, and macroeconomic indicators over the long run based on a newly constructed historical dataset for 12 developed countries over the years 1870-2008, utilizing the data to study rare events associated with financial crisis episodes. We present new evidence that leverage in the financial sector has increased strongly in the second half of the twentieth century as shown by a decoupling of money and credit aggregates, and we also find a decline in safe assets on banks' balance sheets. We also show for the first time how monetary policy responses to financial crises have been more aggressive post-1945, but how despite these policies the output costs of crises have remained large. Importantly, we can also show that credit growth is a powerful predictor of financial crises, suggesting that such crises are

Why Do U.S. Firms Hold so Much More Cash than They Used to

Abstract: The average cash-to-assets ratio for U.S. industrial firms more than doubles from 1980 to 2006. A measure of the economic importance of this increase in cash holdings is that at the end of the sample period, the average firm can pay back all of its debt obligations with its cash holdings; in other words, the average firm has no leverage if leverage is measured as net debt. This change in cash ratios and net debt is the result of a secular trend rather than the outcome of the recent buildup in cash holdings of some large firms, and it is much more pronounced for firms that do not pay dividends and for firms in industries whose cash flows became riskier. The average cash ratio increases over the sample period because firms change: their cash flows become riskier, they hold fewer inventories and accounts receivable, and they are increasingly RD in contrast, in our empirical tests, agency considerations are not successful in explaining the increase.

Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups

Abstract: This paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment. We come to this conclusion by examining two sets of Japanese firms. The first set has close financial ties to large Japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm. The second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problems raising capital. Investment is more sensitive to liquidity for the second set of firms than for the first set. The analysis also highlights the role of financial intermediaries in the investment process.