Institution
National Bureau of Economic Research
Nonprofit•Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States•
About: National Bureau of Economic Research is a nonprofit organization based out in Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Population. The organization has 2626 authors who have published 34177 publications receiving 2818124 citations. The organization is also known as: NBER & The National Bureau of Economic Research.
Topics: Monetary policy, Population, Exchange rate, Interest rate, Wage
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: In this article, a model of growth departs from both the Malthusian and neoclassical approaches by including investments in human capital and assumes that rates of return on human capital investments rise, rather than, decline, as the stock of human capital increases, until the stock becomes large.
Abstract: Our model of growth departs from both the Malthusian and neoclassical approaches by including investments in human capital We assume, crucially, that rates of return on human capital investments rise, rather than, decline, as the stock of human capital increases, until the stock becomes large This arises because the education sector uses human capital note intensively than either the capital producing sector of the goods producing sector This produces multiple steady scares: an undeveloped steady stare with little human capital, low rates of return on human capital investments and high fertility, and a developed steady stats with higher rates of return a large, and, perhaps, growing stock of human capital and low fertility Multiple steady states mean that history and luck are critical determinants of a country's growth experience
1,829 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the size of the multiplier in a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model was investigated and it was shown that the multiplier effect is substantially larger than one when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds.
Abstract: We argue that the government-spending multiplier can be much larger than one when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds. The larger the fraction of government spending that occurs while the nominal interest rate is zero, the larger the value of the multiplier. After providing intuition for these results, we investigate the size of the multiplier in a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model. In this model the multiplier effect is substantially larger than one when the zero bound binds. Our model is consistent with the behavior of key macro aggregates during the recent financial crisis.
1,798 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (GARCH) model of returns is modified to allow for volatility feedback effect, which amplifies large negative stock returns and dampens large positive returns, making stock returns negatively skewed and increasing the potential for large crashes.
Abstract: It is sometimes argued that an increase in stock market volatility raises required stock returns, and thus lowers stock prices. This paper modifies the generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (GARCH) model of returns to allow for this volatility feedback effect. The resulting model is asymmetric, because volatility feedback amplifies large negative stock returns and dampens large positive returns, making stock returns negatively skewed and increasing the potential for large crashes. The model also implies that volatility feedback is more important when volatility is high. In U.S. monthly and daily data in the period 1926-88, the asymmetric model fits the data better than the standard GARCH model, accounting for almost half the skewness and excess kurtosis of standard monthly GARCH residuals. Estimated volatility discounts on the stock market range from 1% in normal times to 13% after the stock market crash of October 1987 and 25% in the early 1930's. However volatility feedback has little effect on the unconditional variance of stock returns.
1,793 citations
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TL;DR: This paper reported measures of preference parameters relating to risk tolerance, time preference, and intertemporal substitution, based on survey responses to hypothetical situations constructed using an economic theorist's concept of the underlying parameters.
Abstract: This paper reports measures of preference parameters relating to risk tolerance, time preference, and intertemporal substitution. These measures are based on survey responses to hypothetical situations constructed using an economic theorist's concept of the underlying parameters. The individual measures of preference parameters display heterogeneity. Estimated risk tolerance and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are essentially uncorrelated across individuals. Measured risk tolerance is positively related to risky behaviors, including smoking, drinking, failing to have insurance, and holding stocks rather than Treasury bills. These relationships are both statistically and quantitatively significant, although measured risk tolerance explains only a small fraction of the variation of the studied behaviors.
1,785 citations
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TL;DR: This paper examined the influence of venture capitalists on the professionalization of firms' internal organization and found that there is a "soft" facet to venture capitalists, in terms of supporting companies to build up their human resources within the organization.
Abstract: This paper examines empirical evidence on the impact that venture capitalists can have on the development path of new firms. We use a hand-collected data set on Silicon Valley start-up companies that allows us to "look inside the black box" and analyze the influence of venture capital on the professionalization of firms' internal organization. The evidence suggests that there is a "soft" facet to venture capitalists, in terms of supporting companies to build up their human resources within the organization. Venture capital is also important at the top, in that venture capital backed companies are more likely and faster to bring in outsiders as CEOs. These CEO replacements are often accompanied with the founder departing from the company, suggesting that venture capitalists also exhibit a "hard" facet in terms of exercising control. The paper examines how these various roles are interrelated, and shows how the role of venture capital varies with the state of the company.
1,784 citations
Authors
Showing all 2855 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
James J. Heckman | 175 | 766 | 156816 |
Andrei Shleifer | 171 | 514 | 271880 |
Joseph E. Stiglitz | 164 | 1142 | 152469 |
Daron Acemoglu | 154 | 734 | 110678 |
Gordon H. Hanson | 152 | 1434 | 119422 |
Edward L. Glaeser | 137 | 550 | 83601 |
Alberto Alesina | 135 | 498 | 93388 |
Martin B. Keller | 131 | 541 | 65069 |
Jeffrey D. Sachs | 130 | 692 | 86589 |
John Y. Campbell | 128 | 400 | 98963 |
Robert J. Barro | 124 | 519 | 121046 |
René M. Stulz | 124 | 470 | 81342 |
Paul Krugman | 123 | 347 | 102312 |
Ross Levine | 122 | 398 | 108067 |
Philippe Aghion | 122 | 507 | 73438 |