National Bureau of Economic Research

About: National Bureau of Economic Research is a nonprofit organization based out in Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Population. The organization has 2626 authors who have published 34177 publications receiving 2818124 citations. The organization is also known as: NBER & The National Bureau of Economic Research.

Globalization and the Gains from Variety

Abstract: Since the seminal work of Krugman (1979), product variety has played a central role in models of trade and growth. In spite of the general use of love-of-variety models, there has been no systematic study of how the import of new varieties has contributed to national welfare gains in the United States. In this paper we show that the unmeasured growth in product variety from US imports has been an important source of gains from trade over the last three decades (1972-2001). Using extremely disaggregated data, we show that the number of imported product varieties has increased by a factor of four. We also estimate the elasticities of substitution for each available category at the same level of aggregation, and describe their behavior across time and SITC-5 industries. Using these estimates we develop an exact price index and find that the upward bias in the conventional import price index is approximately 1.2 percent per year. The magnitude of this bias suggests that the welfare gains from variety growth in imports alone are 2.8 percent of GDP.

Efficient Tests for an Autoregressive Unit Root

Abstract: This paper derives the asymptotic power envelope for tests of a unit autoregressive root for various trend specifications and stationary Gaussian autoregressive disturbances. A family of tests is proposed, members of which are asymptotically similar under a general 1(1) null (allowing nonnormality and general dependence) and which achieve the Gaussian power envelope. One of these tests, which is asymptotically point optimal at a power of 50%, is found (numerically) to be approximately uniformly most powerful (UMP) in the case of a constant deterministic term, and approximately uniformly most powerful invariant (UMPI) in the case of a linear trend, although strictly no UMP or UMPI test exists. We also examine a modification, suggested by the expression for the power envelope, of the Dickey-Fuller (1979) t-statistic; this test is also found to be approximately UMP (constant deterministic term case) and UMPI (time trend case). The power improvement of both new tests is large: in the demeaned case, the Pitman efficiency of the proposed tests relative to the standard Dickey-Fuller t-test is 1.9 at a power of 50%. A Monte Carlo experiment indicates that both proposed tests, particularly the modified Dickey-Fuller t-test, exhibit good power and small size distortions in finite samples with dependent errors.

Consumption, Income, and Interest Rates: Reinterpreting the Time Series Evidence

Abstract: This paper proposes that the time-series data on consumption, income, and interest rates are best viewed as generated not by a single representative consumer but by two groups of consumers. Half the consumers are forward-looking and consume their permanent income, but are extremely reluctant to substitute consumption temporarily. Half the consumers follow the "rule of thumb" of consuming their current income. The paper documents three empirical regularities that, it argues, are best explained by this medal. First, expected changes in income are associated with expected changes in consumption. Second, expected real interest rates are not associated with expected changes in consumption. Third, periods in which consumption is high relative to income are typically followed by high growth in income. The paper concludes by briefly discussing the implications of these findings for economic policy and economic research.

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Abstract: This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, we argue, cannot be expected to bargain at arm's length with managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that many researchers have long viewed as puzzling. Among other things, we discuss option plan design, stealth compensation, executive loans, payments to departing executives, retirement benefits, the use of compensation consultants, and the observed relationship between CEO power and pay. We also explain how managerial influence might lead to substantially inefficient arrangements that produce weak or even perverse incentives.

International Asset Allocation With Regime Shifts

Abstract: Correlations between international equity market returns tend to increase in highly volatile bear markets, which has led some to doubt the benefits of international diversification. This article solves the dynamic portfolio choice problem of a U.S. investor faced with a time-varying investment opportunity set modeled using a regime-switching process which may be characterized by correlations and volatilities that increase in bad times. International diversification is still valuable with regime changes and currency hedging imparts further benefit. The costs of ignoring the regimes are small for all-equity portfolios but increase when a conditionally risk-free asset can be held. In standard international portfolio choice models such as Sercu (1980) and Solnik (1974a), agents optimally hold the world market portfolio and a series of hedge portfolios to hedge against real exchange rate risk. From the perspective of these models, investors across the world display strongly homebiased asset choices. One popular argument often heard to rationalize the “home bias puzzle” relies on the asymmetric correlation behavior of international equity returns. A number of empirical studies document that correlations between international equity returns are higher during bear markets than during bull markets. 1 If the diversification benefits from international investing are not forthcoming at the time that investors need them the most (when their home market experiences a downturn), the strong case for international investing may have to be reconsidered. Our goal is to formally evaluate this claim. To quantify the effect of these asymmetric correlations on optimal portfolio choice, we need a dynamic asset allocation model that accommodates time-varying correlations and volatilities. In the standard portfolio choice models and their empirical applications [French and Poterba (1991), Tesar and Werner (1995)], correlations