National Bureau of Economic Research

About: National Bureau of Economic Research is a nonprofit organization based out in Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Population. The organization has 2626 authors who have published 34177 publications receiving 2818124 citations. The organization is also known as: NBER & The National Bureau of Economic Research.

Finance, inequality and the poor

Abstract: Financial development disproportionately boosts incomes of the poorest quintile and reduces income inequality. About 40% of the long-run impact of financial development on the income growth of the poorest quintile is the result of reductions in income inequality, while 60% is due to the impact of financial development on aggregate economic growth. Furthermore, financial development is associated with a drop in the fraction of the population living on less than $ 1 a day, a result which holds when conditioning on average growth. These findings emphasize the importance of the financial system for the poor.

Approximately Normal Tests for Equal Predictive Accuracy in Nested Models

Abstract: Forecast evaluation often compares a parsimonious null model to a larger model that nests the null model. Under the null that the parsimonious model generates the data, the larger model introduces noise into its forecasts by estimating parameters whose population values are zero. We observe that the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) from the parsimonious model is therefore expected to be smaller than that of the larger model. We describe how to adjust MSPEs to account for this noise. We propose applying standard methods (West (1996)) to test whether the adjusted mean squared error difference is zero. We refer to nonstandard limiting distributions derived in Clark and McCracken (2001, 2005a) to argue that use of standard normal critical values will yield actual sizes close to, but a little less than, nominal size. Simulation evidence supports our recommended procedure.

Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory

Abstract: A thorough understanding of internal incentive structures is critical to developing a viable theory of the firm, since these incentives determine to a large extent how individuals inside an organization behave. Many common features of organizational incentive systems are not easily explained by traditional economic theory--including egalitarian pay systems in which compensation is largely independent of performance, the overwhelming use of promotion-based incentive systems, the absence of up-front fees for jobs and effective bonding contracts, and the general reluctance of employers to fire, penalize, or give poor performance evaluations to employees. Typical explanations for these practices offered by behaviorists and practitioners are distinctly uneconomic--focusing on notions such as fairness, equity, morale, trust, social responsibility, and culture. The challenge to economists is to provide viable economic explanations for these practices or to integrate these alternative notions into the traditional economic model.

Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971-1991

Abstract: Several recent studies suggest that equity mutual fund managers achieve superior returns and that considerable persistence in performance exists. This study utilizes a unique data set including returns from all equity mutual funds existing each year. These data enable us more precisely to examine performance and the extent of survivorship bias. In the aggregate, funds have under performed benchmark portfolios both after management expenses and even gross of expenses. Survivorship bias appears to be more important than other studies have estimated. Moreover, while considerable performance persistence existed during the 1970s, there was no consistency in fund returns during the 1980s.

Measuring monetary policy

Abstract: Extending the approach of Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Strongin (1992), and Christano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994a, 1994b), we develop and apply a VAR-based methodology for measuring the stance of monetary policy. More specifically, we develop a "demi-structural" VAR approach, which extracts information about monetary policy from data on bank reserves and the federal funds rate but leaves the relationships among the macroeconomic variables in the system unrestricted. The methodology can be used to compare and evaluate existing indicators of monetary policy and also to develop an "optimal" measure (given our framework). Among existing approaches, we find that innovations to the federal funds rate (Bernanke-Blinder) are a good measure of policy innovations during the periods 1965-1979 and 1988-1994; for the period 1979-1994 as a whole, innovations to the orthogonalized component of nonborrowed reserve (Strongin) seems to be the best choice. The new measure of policy stance that we develop conforms well to qualitative indicators of policy such as the Boschen-Mills (1991) index; and innovations to our measure lead to reasonable and precisely estimated dynamic responses by variables such as real GDP and the GDP deflator.