Paris West University Nanterre La Défense

About: Paris West University Nanterre La Défense is a education organization based out in Paris, France. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & Finite element method. The organization has 895 authors who have published 1430 publications receiving 21712 citations.

Civil Procedure Used for Enforcement of EC Competition Law by the English, French and German Civil Courts

Abstract: L'ouvrage de George Cumming, Brad Spitz et Ruth Janal propose une interessante etude des droits anglais, francais et allemand relatifs aux actions civiles du droit communautaire de la concurrence.…

Une méta-analyse de l'impact des subventions sur le prix mondial du coton

Abstract: Malgre le nombre important d’etudes sur les impacts des subventions sur le prix mondial du coton, il n’existe pas de consensus concernant la quantification de ces effets. L’objectif de cet article est de realiser une meta-analyse capable d’expliquer la source de l’heterogeneite des resultats, de donner des indications quant aux variables indispensables a la modelisation, mais aussi de presenter un chiffrage des effets des subventions. Nous montrons que les valeurs des elasticites, les montants des subventions et l’incorporation de certains facteurs-cles sont les sources principales des variations inter-etudes. Une modelisation appropriee requiert ainsi une estimation precise des elasticites et l’integration de certains facteurs constitutifs du prix mondial du coton tels que les niveaux de stocks ou le prix du polyester.

The distortionary effect of health insurance on healthcare demand

Abstract: This paper presents a general framework for modeling the impact of insurance on healthcare demand extending some of the results of the two-risk model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), but including the latter as a special case. Rothschild and Stiglitz’s approach assumes equivalence between the price of treatment and the discomfort caused by the disease. Relaxing this assumption turns out to be key in understanding participation in the insurance and healthcare markets. The demands for insurance and healthcare are modeled simultaneously, under symmetric and asymmetric information. Four main results arise from the relaxation of this assumption. First, only the presence of an insurance market can produce healthcare consumption at higher prices than the discomfort. Second, adverse selection may lead healthcare to be sold at a price lower than that under perfect information. Third, the potential non-participation of one type risk arises despite competition, depending on the degree of information. Last, in a public voluntary regime, one type risk may prefer to be uninsured and still consume healthcare.