Showing papers by "Pompeu Fabra University published in 1994"

Accuracy in Simulations

Abstract: it is useful to have criteria for judging the accuracy of a given numerical solution. In this paper we propose a test for accuracy that is easy to implement and can be applied to a wide class of models without knowledge of the exact solution. We discuss the power of the test by simulating several models with the linear-quadratic approximation and with the method of parameterized expectations. We conclude that the test is powerful.

Statistical Inference in Calibrated Models

Abstract: SUMMARY This paper describes a Monte Carlo procedure to assess the performance of calibrated dynamic general equilibrium models. The procedure formalizes the choice of parameters and the evaluation of the model and provides an efficient way to conduct a sensitivity analysis for perturbations of the parameters within a reasonable range. As an illustration the methodology is applied to two problems: the equity premium puzzle and how much of the variance of actual US output is explained by a real business cycle model.

Expectations and learning under alternative monetary regimes: an experimental approach

Abstract: We design and analyze experimental versions of monetary overlapping generations economies under alternative policy regimes. Economies with a constant level of real deficit financed through seignorage, economies in which the level of deficit is adapted in order to follow a monetary policy with a target rate of inflation, and economies with preannounced changes in deficit levels are reported here. We also examine the behavior of an economy with no stationary competitive equilibrium. Our time series are compared to rational expectations equilibrium paths and to adaptive learning dynamics.

Shattering the Illusion of Control: Multi-shot Versus Single-Shot Gambles

Abstract: The illusion of control refers to a phenomenon whereby people believe their chances of success at a task are greater than would be warranted by objective analysis. This article raises two questions. First, how robust is the illusion of control? Second, how might the illusion be ‘shattered?’ Previous experimental demonstrations involved situations that can be likened to unique or single-shot gambles. If, however, the phenomenon is robust, it should occur in repeated or multi-shot gambles in which the outcome depends on a series of gambles involving the same underlying random process. It should also appear in single-shot gambles that are framed so as to superficially resemble multi-shot gambles. We label this the strong illusion of control hypothesis. On the other hand, because people have a better appreciation of probabilistic concepts in tasks they are able to represent as relative frequencies, the introduction of a multi-shot or pseudo-multi-shot’ context might cue people to the random nature of the task, thereby shattering the illusion. The weak illusion of control hypothesis holds that the illusion of control will occur in single-shot but not in multi-shot or pseudo-multi-shot gambles. Two studies are reported that support the weak hypothesis. Alternative explanations are considered and implications are discussed.

Market capture by two competitors: the preemptive location problem*

Abstract: . We consider a location and allocation game for two competitor firms, A and B, that each seek to locate p facilities in a network. A market is captured by a particular firm if that market's closest facility belongs to that firm rather than a competitor. The question is as follows: Firm A wants to locate its p facilities so that B, which enters also with p facilities after Firm A has located its facilities, will capture the minimum market value possible. That is, Firm A wishes to preempt Firm B in its bid to capture market share to the maximum extent possible. A model is presented that addresses this issue, together with solution methods and computing times.

Regional cohesion: Evidence and theories of regional growth and convergence

Abstract: After arguing that the concepts of b-convergence and s-convergence are independently interesting, this paper extends the empirical evidence on regional growth and convergence across the United States, Japan, and five European nations. We confirm that the estimated speeds of convergence are surprisingly similar across data sets: regions tend to converge at a speed of approximately 2% per year. We also show that the inter-regional distribution of income in all countries has shrunk over time. We then argue that, among the proposed potential explanations of this phenomenon, the one-sector neoclassical growth model and the hypothesis of technological diffusion seem to be the only ones which survive scrutiny.

Is it possible to reduce tobacco consumption via alcohol taxation

Abstract: Recent studies with Spanish data suggest that indirect taxation is a potential instrument to reduce tobacco consumption but the magnitude of the estimated price elasticity limits the effectiveness of the taxes. However, if the separability restriction does not hold between tobacco and other goods, the results obtained could be misleading. This shortcoming of previous analyses leads us to formulate a demand system with alcohol, tobacco and other goods so as to estimate and test complementary effects and to assess the possibility for reducing consumption by indirect taxation of complementary commodities. We use the Spanish Family Expenditure Survey to carry out a cross-section study which allows us to estimate demand models under different assumptions about the nature of zero expenditures and to test the effectiveness of indirect taxation. The findings tend to support our initial suspicions about the inadequacy of imposing separability and point out the importance of alcohol taxation to reduce tobacco consumption. However, given the structure of the data used, these results should be viewed with caution and must be confirmed by additional evidence.

Commodity money in the presence of goods of heterogeneous quality

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that uncertainty about the quality of a particular commodity does not necessarily exclude it from emerging as commodity money. This is shown in the context of the model of a simple economy with specialized agents and decentralized trade described in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). In order to derive this result, considerations about marketability of the different goods are taken into account.

Reimbursing insurance carriers: the case of 'MUFACE' in the Spanish health care system.

Abstract: This article aims at contributing to the analysis of financial incentives in managed competition, on the basis of the literature on procurement and regulation under incomplete information. More specifically, we focus on MUFACE, the publicly funded health care system for Spanish civil servants and dependants. MUFACE makes up an internal market, where competing public and private insurers are reimbursed a flat capitation payment. Some of our results are that theoretically, both pre-contractual (adverse) selection of insurers contracted by MUFACE, and post-contractual risk selection of enrollees undertaken by insurers, should occur under flat capitation.

A positive theory of social security

Abstract: Social Security programmes around the world link public pensions to retirement: people do not lose their pensions if they make a million dollars a year in the stock market, but they do confront marginal tax rates of up to 100% if they choose to work. After arguing that most existing theories cannot explain this fact, I construct a positive theory which is consistent with it. The main idea is that pensions are a means to induce retirement, that is, to buy the elderly out of the labour force. The reason is that aggregate output is higher if the elderly do not work. This is modelled through positive externalities in the average stock of human capital: because skills depreciate with age, the elderly have lower than average skills and, as a result, they have a negative effect on the productivity of the young. When the difference between the skill level of the young and that of the old is large enough, aggregate ouput in an economy where the elderly do not work is higher. Retirement is desirable in this case, and social security transfers are the means by which such retirement is induced. The theory developed in this paper is also shown to be consistent with a number of other regularities.

Was Prometheus unbound by chance? Risk, diversification and growth

Abstract: This paper offers a theory of development which links the degree of market incompleteness to capital accumulation and growth. At early stages of development, the presence of indivisible projects limits the degree of risk-spreading (diversification) that the economy can achieve. The desire to avoid highly risky investments slows down capital accumulation and the inability to diversify idiosyncratic risks introduces high uncertainty in the growth process. The typical development pattern will consist of a lengthy period of ‘primitive accumulation’ with highly variable output, followed by take-off and financial deepening and lastly, steady growth. ‘Lucky’ countries will spend relatively less time in the primitive accumulation stage and develop faster. Although all agents are price-takers and there are no technological spillovers, the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient because individuals do not take into account their impact on the diversification opportunities of others. We also show that our results generalize to economies with international capital flows.

Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information

Abstract: When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an important instrument in the development of an optimal R&D policy. The regulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant information to regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there exist appropriability problems between the firms is one such variable that is private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopoly setting we analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policy where the government can either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sum subsidies to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy without subsidies will either block some welfare improving RJVs or allow some welfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies, the second-best policy trades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasing RJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones.