Stockholm School of Economics

About: Stockholm School of Economics is a education organization based out in Stockholm, Sweden. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & Cost effectiveness. The organization has 1186 authors who have published 4891 publications receiving 285543 citations. The organization is also known as: Stockholm Business School & Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.

Access to Markets and Rural Poverty: Evidence from Household Consumption in China

Abstract: This paper presents evidence on the effects of access to domestic and international markets on per capita consumption of households using data from rural China. The econometric analysis uses alternative identification schemes to address the potential endogeneity of access to markets. We use straight-line distances to coastline and navigable river, along with the topography of the intervening counties, as sources of exogeneous variations. We also use identification through heteroskedasticity, which does not rely on standard exclusion restrictions. The results from alternative identification schemes show that better access to both domestic and international markets has positive effects on per capita consumption, the domestic market effect is significantly larger in magnitude, and there is complementarity between the access to domestic and international markets.

Evaluating Health Risks: An Economic Approach

Abstract: A major problem in health economics is how to give a value to changes in health. This is the first book to examine all the money measures that are used in such evaluations. Changes in health might be caused by medical treatments, by public safety programmes and by anti-pollution programmes, and the cost-benefit analysis of such programmes involves the use of money measures. The author defines the properties of these money measures, examining them in both a certain and a risky world. He evaluates available empirical approaches for the assessment of the value of health changes, and considers measures such as quality-adjusted life years (qalys) and healthy-years equivalents (hyes). This book raises the important question of whether we are willing to pay the costs for our health care system. It will be of interest to advanced students of health economics and related disciplines, and will also be useful for professionals working on projects that affect human health.

Accidental outcomes guide punishment in a "trembling hand" game.

Abstract: How do people respond to others' accidental behaviors? Reward and punishment for an accident might depend on the actor's intentions, or instead on the unintended outcomes she brings about. Yet, existing paradigms in experimental economics do not include the possibility of accidental monetary allocations. We explore the balance of outcomes and intentions in a two-player economic game where monetary allocations are made with a “trembling hand”: that is, intentions and outcomes are sometimes mismatched. Player 1 allocates $10 between herself and Player 2 by rolling one of three dice. One die has a high probability of a selfish outcome, another has a high probability of a fair outcome, and the third has a high probability of a generous outcome. Based on Player 1's choice of die, Player 2 can infer her intentions. However, any of the three die can yield any of the three possible outcomes. Player 2 is given the opportunity to respond to Player 1's allocation by adding to or subtracting from Player 1's payoff. We find that Player 2's responses are influenced substantially by the accidental outcome of Player 1's roll of the die. Comparison to control conditions suggests that in contexts where the allocation is at least partially under the control of Player 1, Player 2 will punish Player 1 accountable for unintentional negative outcomes. In addition, Player 2's responses are influenced by Player 1's intention. However, Player 2 tends to modulate his responses substantially more for selfish intentions than for generous intentions. This novel economic game provides new insight into the psychological mechanisms underlying social preferences for fairness and retribution.

Fourth Moment Structure of the Garch (p,q) Process

Abstract: In this paper, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the unconditional fourth moment of the GARCH(p,q) process is given and also an expression for the moment itself. Furthermore ...