Temple University

About: Temple University is a education organization based out in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & Poison control. The organization has 32154 authors who have published 64375 publications receiving 2219828 citations.

Time delay switch

Abstract: A time delay switch for use with an electrical load and a source of electrical power, including a multiple-position toggle switch and a user-programmable microchip. The toggle is movable among three positions: an "OFF" position, an "ON" position on one side of the OFF position, and a "TIMER" position on the other side of the OFF position. The toggle is biased from TIMER to OFF so that, whenever it is moved to TIMER, it returns to the central OFF position. When the toggle is moved to TIMER, an electrical signal is sent to the microchip that (1) starts a clock for a preselected period of time and (2) permits electricity to flow through the switch as though the toggle was in the ON position during that time. Alteratively, the microchip can be programmed to start passing current after the preselected period elapses. Thus, the device can be used to turn a light or other electrical load off after a user-determined period of time, or to turn the load on after a preselected time. The duration of the clock interval can be adjusted by means of dip switches or the like, and the duration of the time delay can be adjusted simply by toggling to the TIMER position to program the microchip for as many clock intervals as are desired. A transducer generates an audible or visible signal, or both, in response to movement of the switch to the TIMER position.

A Temporal Analysis of Quarterly Earnings Thresholds: Propensities and Valuation Consequences

Abstract: Applying a Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)/Degeorge et al. (1999) type methodology to quarterly data for the 1985-2002 time period, we show that, since the mid-1990s, but not before then, managers seek to avoid negative quarterly earnings surprises more than to avoid either quarterly losses or quarterly earnings decreases. Our findings suggest that the quarterly earnings threshold hierarchy proposed by Degeorge et al. (1999) does not apply to recent years, and that managers' claim that avoiding quarterly earnings decreases is the threshold they most seek to achieve (Graham et al. 2004) is inconsistent with their actions. We provide an intuitively appealing economic rationale for why the shift in threshold hierarchy occurred; since the mid-1990s, but not before then, investors unambiguously rewarded (penalized) firms for reporting quarterly earnings meeting (missing) analysts' estimates more than they did for meeting (missing) the other two thresholds. We provide several explanations for why investors unambiguously reward firms for reporting quarterly earnings that meet or beat analysts' estimates more than for meeting the other two thresholds late (but not early) in our sample period: increased media coverage given to analyst forecasts, more analyst following, more firms covered by analysts, and temporal increases in both the accuracy and precision of analyst forecasts.

Founding Family Ownership and the Agency Cost of Debt

Abstract: We investigate the impact of founding-family ownership structure on the agency cost of debt. We find that founding-family ownership is common in large, publicly traded firms and is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower cost of debt financing. The evidence also indicates that the relation between founding-family holdings and debt costs is non-monotonic; debt costs first decrease as family ownership increases but then increase with increasing family ownership. However, irrespective of the level of family holdings, we find that family firms enjoy a lower cost of debt than non-family firms. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that continued founding-family ownership in publicly traded firms reduces the agency costs of debt. Additional analysis reveals that when a family member serves as the firm's CEO, the cost of debt financing is higher than if an outsider is CEO, but still lower than in non-family firms. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that founding-family firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and debt claimants, suggesting that bond investors view founding-family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests.