University of Adelaide

About: University of Adelaide is a education organization based out in Adelaide, South Australia, Australia. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & Poison control. The organization has 27251 authors who have published 79167 publications receiving 2671128 citations. The organization is also known as: The University of Adelaide & Adelaide University.

Vision-and-Language Navigation: Interpreting Visually-Grounded Navigation Instructions in Real Environments

Abstract: A robot that can carry out a natural-language instruction has been a dream since before the Jetsons cartoon series imagined a life of leisure mediated by a fleet of attentive robot helpers. It is a dream that remains stubbornly distant. However, recent advances in vision and language methods have made incredible progress in closely related areas. This is significant because a robot interpreting a natural-language navigation instruction on the basis of what it sees is carrying out a vision and language process that is similar to Visual Question Answering. Both tasks can be interpreted as visually grounded sequence-to-sequence translation problems, and many of the same methods are applicable. To enable and encourage the application of vision and language methods to the problem of interpreting visually-grounded navigation instructions, we present the Matter-port3D Simulator - a large-scale reinforcement learning environment based on real imagery [11]. Using this simulator, which can in future support a range of embodied vision and language tasks, we provide the first benchmark dataset for visually-grounded natural language navigation in real buildings - the Room-to-Room (R2R) dataset1.

Meltdown: reading kernel memory from user space

Abstract: The security of computer systems fundamentally relies on memory isolation, e.g., kernel address ranges are marked as non-accessible and are protected from user access. In this paper, we present Meltdown. Meltdown exploits side effects of out-of-order execution on modern processors to read arbitrary kernel-memory locations including personal data and passwords. Out-of-order execution is an indispensable performance feature and present in a wide range of modern processors. The attack is independent of the operating system, and it does not rely on any software vulnerabilities. Meltdown breaks all security guarantees provided by address space isolation as well as paravirtualized environments and, thus, every security mechanism building upon this foundation. On affected systems, Meltdown enables an adversary to read memory of other processes or virtual machines in the cloud without any permissions or privileges, affecting millions of customers and virtually every user of a personal computer. We show that the KAISER defense mechanism for KASLR has the important (but inadvertent) side effect of impeding Meltdown. We stress that KAISER must be deployed immediately to prevent large-scale exploitation of this severe information leakage.

Measuring organizational performance: beyond the triple bottom line

Abstract: Measuring organizational performance is difficult, especially when what has to be measured keeps changing. Sustainability concepts have dramatically widened the scope of measurement options and leading organizations are grappling with sustainability reporting, but there is no sign of consensus on a common reporting standard and the competing frameworks are impossibly complex. This paper recognizes that measuring sustainable performance has to be conceptually based but simplified to be practically useful. It proposes a stakeholder-based, Sustainable Balanced Scorecard (SBSC) conceptual framework coupled with a single-measure Organizational Sustainability Performance Index to integrate the measures in the SBSC. The Index helps make sustainable organizational performance measurable and accessible to stakeholders. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

Molecular-based design and emerging applications of nanoporous carbon spheres

Abstract: Over the past decade, considerable progress has been made in the synthesis and applications of nanoporous carbon spheres ranging in size from nanometres to micrometres. This Review presents the primary techniques for preparing nanoporous carbon spheres and the seminal research that has inspired their development, presented potential applications and uncovered future challenges. First we provide an overview of the synthesis techniques, including the Stober method and those based on templating, self-assembly, emulsion and hydrothermal carbonization, with special emphasis on the design and functionalization of nanoporous carbon spheres at the molecular level. Next, we cover the key applications of these spheres, including adsorption, catalysis, separation, energy storage and biomedicine — all of which might benefit from the regular geometry, good liquidity, tunable porosity and controllable particle-size distribution offered by nanoporous carbon spheres. Finally, we present the current challenges and opportunities in the development and commercial applications of nanoporous carbon spheres.

Foreshadow: extracting the keys to the intel SGX kingdom with transient out-of-order execution

Abstract: Trusted execution environments, and particularly the Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) included in recent Intel x86 processors, gained significant traction in recent years. A long track of research papers, and increasingly also real-world industry applications, take advantage of the strong hardware-enforced confidentiality and integrity guarantees provided by Intel SGX. Ultimately, enclaved execution holds the compelling potential of securely offloading sensitive computations to untrusted remote platforms. We present Foreshadow, a practical software-only microarchitectural attack that decisively dismantles the security objectives of current SGX implementations. Crucially, unlike previous SGX attacks, we do not make any assumptions on the victim enclave's code and do not necessarily require kernel-level access. At its core, Foreshadow abuses a speculative execution bug in modern Intel processors, on top of which we develop a novel exploitation methodology to reliably leak plaintext enclave secrets from the CPU cache. We demonstrate our attacks by extracting full cryptographic keys from Intel's vetted architectural enclaves, and validate their correctness by launching rogue production enclaves and forging arbitrary local and remote attestation responses. The extracted remote attestation keys affect millions of devices.