University of Maribor

About: University of Maribor is a education organization based out in Maribor, Slovenia. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & KEKB. The organization has 3987 authors who have published 13077 publications receiving 258339 citations. The organization is also known as: Univerza v Mariboru.

Self-organization of punishment in structured populations

Abstract: Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bare additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both, the spontaneous emergence of punishment, as well as its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation either through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or through the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction antisocial behavior. Presented results indicate that the process of self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could have evolved.

Dynamics of oligomer populations formed during the aggregation of Alzheimer's Aβ42 peptide.

Abstract: Oligomeric species populated during the aggregation of the Aβ42 peptide have been identified as potent cytotoxins linked to Alzheimer's disease, but the fundamental molecular pathways that control their dynamics have yet to be elucidated. By developing a general approach that combines theory, experiment and simulation, we reveal, in molecular detail, the mechanisms of Aβ42 oligomer dynamics during amyloid fibril formation. Even though all mature amyloid fibrils must originate as oligomers, we found that most Aβ42 oligomers dissociate into their monomeric precursors without forming new fibrils. Only a minority of oligomers converts into fibrillar structures. Moreover, the heterogeneous ensemble of oligomeric species interconverts on timescales comparable to those of aggregation. Our results identify fundamentally new steps that could be targeted by therapeutic interventions designed to combat protein misfolding diseases.

Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner's dilemma game on coevolving random networks

Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player adopts a new strategy or its degree exceeds a threshold value; second, new links are added randomly after a given number of game iterations. These coevolutionary processes correspond to the generic formation of new links and deletion of existing links that, especially in human societies, appear frequently as a consequence of ongoing socialization, change of lifestyle or death. Due to the counteraction of deletions and additions of links the initial heterogeneity of the interaction network is qualitatively preserved, and thus cannot be held responsible for the observed promotion of cooperation. Indeed, the coevolutionary rule evokes the spontaneous emergence of a powerful multilevel selection mechanism, which despite the sustained random topology of the evolving network, maintains cooperation across the whole span of defection temptation values.

Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules

Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent. Coevolution thus here refers to an evolutionary process affecting the teaching activity of players that accompanies the evolution of their strategies. Particularly, we increase the teaching activity of a player after it has successfully reproduced, yet we do so depending on the disseminated strategy. We separately consider coevolution affecting either only the cooperators or only the defectors, and show that both options promote cooperation irrespective of the applied game. Opposite to intuitive reasoning, however, we reveal that the coevolutionary promotion of players spreading defection is, in the long run, more beneficial for cooperation than the likewise promotion of cooperators. We explain the contradictive impact of the two considered coevolutionary rules by examining the differences between resulting heterogeneities that segregate participating players, and furthermore, demonstrate that the influential individuals completely determine the final outcome of the games. Our findings are immune to changes defining the type of considered social dilemmas and highlight that the heterogeneity of players, resulting in a positive feedback mechanism, is a fundamental property promoting cooperation in groups of selfish individuals.