Showing papers by "Urban Institute published in 1973"

Some evidence of transit demand elasticities

Abstract: This paper draws together empirical evidence from a variety of sources about the magnitudes of transit price elasticities and cross-elasticities. A number of different practical measures of demand elasticity are first defined and some expectations about magnitude are discussed. Evidence is then collated from the analysis of transit operating statistics, from experience in demonstration projects and from attempts to develop cross-sectional models of demand and modal choice.

III. the Economics of Control of the Illegal Supply of Heroin

Abstract: This paper is concerned with government policy toward the control of the illicit supply of heroin. Such policies include large-scale purchases of opium crops, enforcement of direct controls on opium production, and increasing the probability of arrest and severity of penalties facing both largeand small-scale heroin dealers. The general conclusion is that efforts to control supply are potential1y quite expensive and unlikely to be effective. The ultimate result of any supply policy is to raise the price of heroin. Since the demand for heroin is most likely price-inelastic, at least over a wide range, it is probably more worthwhile to operate directly on demand by affecting such variables as tastes, the prices and availability of alternative drugs, treatment availability, and so on. The paper will examine each of the policy alternatives mentioned above. Because accurate information on the economic aspects of heroin is scarce, and that which exists is frequently unreliable, the conclusions reached here must be considered tentative. This is primarily due to the inherent difficulty of gathering information on illegal enterprises and consumers of illegal commodities.

On the Income Distribution as a Public Good

Abstract: Lester Thurow's provocative paper,' which considers the circumstances in which attainment of a Pareto optimum requires income redistribution, unfortunately does as much to obscure and confuse as to clarify the logic of distributional adjustments As Thurow sees it, there are three reasons why redistribution may be necessary to achieve a Pareto optimum: (1) one man's income may be an argument in the utility function of another; 2 (2) utility may derive from the act of giving per se, rather than its effect on the recipient; and (3) the distribution of income -ie, a measure of inequality may itself be an argument in the utility function This third situation, Thurow argues, can arise because of externalities (different crime rates, degrees of political stability, etc) associated with alternative income distributions, or (even if there are no externalities) because of individual tastes for equality or inequality Though Thurow recognizes that (1) and (3) "shade into one another," and that all three cases "can lead to substantial income transfers," he concentrates on (3), since it implies that "income transfers take on a different characteristic than when they are generated by either of the other two motives" In this case, he argues, "The income distribution is a pure public good" (his emphasis,3 whereas it is not if transfers are a matter of "deriving utility from the incomes of others and from giving gifts" 4 But the implication that a market failure problem exists only if the income distribution itself enters individual functions is erroneous This very same type of public good problem arises if utility derives from the incomes of others If A's income level YA affects

Welfare, Workfare, and Pareto Optimality

Abstract: A number of recent papers have argued that social transfers may be necessary to secure Pareto optimality, if there is utility interdependence between potential donors and potential recipients. This paper establishes the types of welfare support plans that would be Pareto-optimal on different assumptions about the nature of utility interdependence. In particular, it identifies the assumptions about utility interdependence that are required to make Pareto-optimal plans out of a negative income or wage subsidy. The paper derives an expression for society's group rate of substitution between a recipient's income and leisure, which is shown to be instrumental in analyzing the Pareto optimality of proposed welfare plans.

Oscillatory Growth in Three Nations

Abstract: Both the definition of economic activity and the definition of periodicity seem to determine whether there are long tides in economic affairs. Spectral analysis of growth rates finds no long waves in the U.S., U.K., and Sweden, but this is consistent with the appearance of long classical (upcross) swings in the deviations from trend of several raw data series. These upcross oscillations may not be independent components of economic evolution but merely distorted reflections of trend growth processes.

Identifying socio-economic differences between high and low income metropolitan areas

Abstract: This is an exploratory effort to describe some distinguishing socio-economic characteristics between high and low income metropolitan areas and to identify those regions with atypical socio-economic profiles.

Brennan and Walsh Reconsidered (Mutt and Jeff Ride Again)

Abstract: Geoffrey Brennan and Cliff Walsh contrast the different transfer patterns of Pareto-optimal redistribution of income resulting from our model (American Economic Review, 1969) and from the model used by von Furstenberg and Mueller (FM). They attempt to show that our model is inconsistent and that, when corrected, would produce a similar transfer pattern to that of FM. We argue that our paper was more general than they allege and that the differences between the transfer patterns in our model and that of FM reflect differences in the concept of horizontal equity and assumptions about utility interdependence, and not any inconsistency on our part.

Contributions of social intervention research to government practices

Abstract: As our society becomes more complex, the number of areas requiring effective public action grows even more rapidly. Public programs, however, are not as effective and efficient as they might be. Government doesn’t learn from experience in time to change public policies or the details of public program operations. Taxpayers’ funds are often wasted-not used effectively and efficiently to achieve the objectives for which they were appropriated-and as a result the public will to support public action is weakened. As a researcher and as a public official, I have been interested for some time in the role that a particular type of social intervention research, program evaluation, can play in improving public program effectiveness. Behind the details of my professional work is the effort to obtain empirical evidence on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of public programs-but, more important, to utilize such empirical evidence in policy planning (e.g., at time of budget review) and in program management. The whole governmental system needs dramatic improvement-public decision-making needs the light of information on program results-otherwise resources available are fewer as public alienation from government grows. Evaluation research can provide the accountability and the information about program effectiveness that is normally provided by market action in the private sector. Evaluation research can provide the feedback link between results and decisions-between operations, and planning and programming. The findings of evaluation research can be used to modify program operations and to lay the groundwork of considered experience for other programs having similar objectives. All too often, however, this feedback link turns out to be the weakest linksometimes the missing link-in public policy-making and program management. The science of evaluation is underdeveloped at the federal level and is even more primitive in most state and local governments. As demands for accountability in the use of public funds continue to grow, the lack of adequate evaluation systems becomes a more serious disability. Evaluation has become somewhat fashionable in the past few years. Many public officials have acknowledged the need to evaluate social programs; federal legislation has called for evaluation; increasing amounts of money have been provided; evaluation staffs have been created or strengthened, and some major evaluation studies have been undertaken. Recently, there has been a shift toward fewer, but larger, evaluation studies and an increased acceptance of social experiments and planned-variation demonstration programs. In this paper, I will discuss some evaluation work with which I am familiar to give some partial answers to the questions: What have social scientists done in evaluation that has had an impact? What might they do? What kinds of contributions can evaluation research make to government programs? In this discussion, I’ll mix together activities that I normally keep quite separate: program evaluations (which use measures of actual program performance to assess the degree to which an existing program has met stated objectives), program analyses (which

Federally Encouraged Multijur Isdictional Ag Enci Es

Abstract: I n virtually every one of America’s metropolitan areas there are problems of governance which run beyond the capacities and jurisdictions of existing local governments. Except for that bare handful of metropolitan governing reorganizations, which have fashioned a single source of governance appropriate to the metropolitan area of residence, there are no local general purpose governments which are metropolitan in scope. The American metropolitan scene is a system of action dominated by its subunits and by those two major units of government outside of the metropolitan area-the states and the federal government.

Effects of Income Maintenance On the Economies of Communities: A Theoretical Exploration

Abstract: incorporate a negative income tax and aim to increase work incentives and eliminate inequities by providing a uniform minimum income for all people in the country. The Family Assistance Plan (FAP) proposed by the present administration purports to be such a plan, although critics find several shortcomings and failures also associated with it. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possible short-run effects of an income maintenance plan such as FAP on the economies of different communities in this country. Both the legislative and executive branches of the government