World Bank

About: World Bank is a other organization based out in Washington D.C., District of Columbia, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & Poverty. The organization has 7813 authors who have published 21594 publications receiving 1198361 citations. The organization is also known as: World Bank, WB & The World Bank.

Why are there so many civil wars in Africa? Understanding and preventing violent conflict

Abstract: Contrary to popular belief, Africa's civil wars are not due to its ethnic and religious diversity. Using recently developed models of the overall prevalence of civil wars in 161 countries between 1960-1999, we draw lessons with special reference to Africa, showing that the relatively higher prevalence of war in Africa is not due to the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of its countries, but rather to high levels of poverty, failed political institutions, and economic dependence on natural resources. We argue that the best and fastest strategy to reduce the prevalence of civil war in Africa and prevent future civil wars is to institute democratic reforms that effectively manage the challenges facing Africa's diverse societies. To promote inter-group cooperation in Africa, specially tailored political governance and economic management institutions are needed and we advance some hypotheses on the nature of such institutions. We suggest that Africa's ethnic diversity in fact helps --it does not impede-- the emergence of stable development as it necessitates inter-group bargaining processes. These processes can be peaceful if ethnic groups feel adequately represented by their national political institutions and if the economy provides opportunity for productive activity.

The fiscal cost implications of an accommodating approach to banking crises

Abstract: In recent decades, a majority of countries have experienced a systemic banking crisis requiring a major – and expensive – overhaul of their banking system. Budgetary outlays, whether immediate or deferred, have exceeded 50% of GDP in some cases. This paper uses cross-country econometric evidence to examine whether the design of crisis containment and resolution policies can systematically influence the overall magnitude of fiscal costs. We find that accommodating policies such as blanket deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support, repeated partial recapitalizations, debtor bail-outs and regulatory forbearance all tend to add significantly and sizably to fiscal costs.

Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions

Abstract: As a long-time student of the public sector, I welcomed the opportunity to come to Washington as a member of the Council of Economic Advisers and later to become the Chairman of the Council, partly because it gave me an opportunity to study at first hand this immensely important part of our economy and society and to test my ideas against the reality of government in action. To be sure, I came also as an activist, if not with a fully articulated agenda, at least with a view about what it was that government should, and should not be doing. My reference point was the fundamental theorems of welfare economics which, as some describe them, proved that the market left to itself would produce efficient allocations. Many saw in these theorems the vindication of Adam Smith’s faith in the invisible hand leading the self-interested decisions of each person to maximize the well-being of the nation as a whole. Today, many of us look at the fundamental theorem not as a description of the world, but as an explication of the conditions under which a market equilibrium will be Pareto efficient. These conditions are quite strong. The importance of some of the more explicit assumptions—like the lack of externalities and the completeness of markets—has long been known. In the last two decades, we have explored much more seriously the consequences of the informational assumptions implicit in the belief that markets are efficient. In particular, it has been shown that in the presence of imperfect information or incomplete markets, the economy will not be Pareto efficient; in other words, there Joseph Stiglitz is Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, World Bank, Washington, D.C. Stiglitz was a member of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1993–95, and chairman