Showing papers in "Administrative Science Quarterly in 1993"

Collective mind in organizations: Heedful interrelating on flight decks.

Abstract: We acknowledge with deep gratitude, generous and extensive help with previous versions of this manuscript from Sue Ashford, Michael Cohen, Dan Denison, Jane Dutton, Les Gasser, Joel Kahn, Rod Kramer, Peter Manning, Dave Meader, Debra Meyerson, Walter Nord, Linda Pike, Joe Porac, Bob Quinn, Lance Sandelands, Paul Schaffner, Howard Schwartz, Kathie Sutcliffe, Bob Sutton, Diane Vaughan, Jim Walsh, Rod White, Mayer Zald, and the anonymous reviewers for Administrative Science Quarterly.

The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster

Abstract: This is a revised version of the KatzNewcomb lecture presented at the University of Michigan, April 23-24, 1993. The 1993 lecture celebrated the life of Rensis Likert, the founding director of the Institute for Social Relations. All three people honored at the lecture-Dan Katz, Ted Newcomb, and Ren Likert-were born in 1903, which meant this lecture also celebrated their 90th birthdays. I am grateful to Lance Sandelands, Debra Meyerson, Robert Sutton, Doug Cowherd, and Karen Weick for their help in revising early drafts of this material. I also want to thank John Van Maanen, J. Richard Hackman, Linda Pike, and the anonymous ASQ reviewers for their he lp with later drafts.

Tightening the Iron Cage: Concertive Control in Self-Managing Teams

Abstract: In this paper, I provide an ethnographic account of how an organization’s control system evolved in response to a managerial change from hierarchical, bureaucratic control to concertive control in the form of self-managing teams. The study investigates how the organization’s members developed a system of value-based normative rules that controlled their actions more powerfully and completely than the former system. I describe the organization and its members and provide a detailed account of the dynamics that emerged as concertive control became manifest through the members’ interactions. This account depicts how concertive control evolved from the value consensus of the company’s team workers to a system of normative rules that became increasingly rationalized. Contrary to some proponents of such systems, concertive control did not free these workers from Weber’s iron cage of rational control. Instead, the concertive system, as it became manifest in this case, appeared to draw the iron cage tighter and to constrain the organization’s members more powerfully.

Follow the leader: Mimetic isomorphism and entry into new markets

Abstract: Follow the Leader: Mimetic Isomorphism and Entry Into New Markets Heather A. Haveman Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 38, Issue 4 (Dec., 1993), 593-627. Stable URL: http://links.j stor.org/sici?sici=OO01—8392%28199312%2938%3A4%3C593%3AFTLMIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2—V Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non—commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. Administrative Science Quarterly is published by Cornell University, Johnson Graduate School of Management. Please contact the publisher for further permissions regarding the use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/joumals/cjohn.html. Administrative Science Quarterly ©1993 Cornell University, Johnson Graduate School of Management JSTOR and the JSTOR logo are trademarks of JSTOR, and are Registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. For more information on JSTOR contact jstor—info@umich.edu. ©2002 JSTOR http://www.j stor.org/ Mon Jan 21 17:34:52 2002

Interorganizational imitation: The impact of interlocks on corporate acquisition activity

Abstract: I would like to thank my dissertation committee: Mark Fichman, Gerald Salancik, Doug Wholey, and Steve Klepper for their generous support and assistance. Thanks also to Alison Davis-Blake, Anne Miner, Craig Olson, Jim Walsh, Marshall Meyer, and three anonymous reviewers for providing helpful comments and insights. Earlier versions of this paper were awarded the 1992 Academy of Management, OMT Division, Louis R. Pondy Award for the best paper based on a dissertation, and the 1991 TIMS College on Organization, Best Dissertation Proposal Award. In this study, I examine direct evidence for the influence of interorganizational imitation on a voluntary, substantive strategic action that affects the economic core of the firm: corporate acquisitions. I argue that firm managers are exposed to the acquisition activities of other firms when they sit on those firms' boards. The acquisition activities of the firms they are tied to serve as models to be imitated. Hypotheses are developed and tested on 1981-1990 acquisition data for a sample of 327 firms. Results show that firm managers are imitating the acquisition activities of those other firms to which they are tied through directorships. Competing rival interpretations of positive evidence for imitation are examined, and the imitation interpretation is found to hold.'

Resetting the Clock: The Dynamics of Organizational Change and Failure.

Abstract: This paper examines a variety of duration dependencies in organizational failure rates and rates of change. The effects of change on the hazard rate vary both by type of change and over time. Organizational rates of change were found to depend on both frequency and time since last change.

Charisma and Leadership in Organizations.

Abstract: Leadership theory and research the concept of charisma the nature of charisma charisma, organization and routinization the new leadership and charisma research on the new leadership and charisma in business organizations the new leadership and charisma: an evaluation.

Power, Social Influence, and Sense Making: Effects of Network Centrality and Proximity on Employee Perceptions.

Abstract: Funding for this study was generously supplied by the Organizational Behavior Department of Yale University and the Harvard Business School Division of Research. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Sunbelt International Social Network Conference, San Diego, 1990 and the Academy of Management Annual Meetings, Miami, 1991. The authors are grateful to Paul DiMaggio, David Krackhardt, Peter Marsden, and Ron Rice for helpful suggestions. We also profited greatly from comments provided by Marshall Meyer and this journal's reviewers. This paper explores the hypothesis that network interaction patterns affect employee perceptions through two conceptually and empirically distinguishable mechanisms: localized social influence based on network proximity and systemic power based on network centrality. The study explores the relative contributions of individual attributes, formal organizational positions, network centrality, and network proximity in explaining individual variation in perceptions of work-related conditions in an advertising firm. Results suggest that network factors shape job-related perceptions, over and above the effects of individual attributes and formal positions. Both advice network centrality and friendship network proximity evidenced significant effects, although they were stronger for centrality than for proximity.'

The effect of wage dispersion on satisfaction, productivity, and working collaboratively: Evidence from college and university faculty.

Abstract: Nancy Langton would like to thank the Faculty of Commerce, UBC for computer support for the data analysis in this article. The writing and revision of this paper were partially supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada. Using a large sample of college and university faculty, we studied the effects of wage inequality on satisfaction, productivity, and collaboration. Results show that the greater the degree of wage dispersion within academic departments, the lower is individual faculty members' satisfaction and research productivity and the less likely it is that faculty members will collaborate on research. The negative effects of wage dispersion on satisfaction are reduced for people who are more committed (have longer tenure), in fields with more developed scientific paradigms, and when salaries are based more on experience and scholarly productivity, but they are greater for those who earn comparatively less money. Wage dispersion has a smaller negative effect on satisfaction in private colleges and universities in which salaries are less likely to be known. The results suggest that one's position in the salary structure, the availability of information about wage inequality, and legitimate bases of reward allocation all affect the extent to which wage dispersion produces adverse effects.'

Affect and managerial performance: A test of the sadder-but-wiser vs. happier-and-smarter hypotheses.

Abstract: We thank Jennifer Halpern for her role in the original planning of this study and for her contributions to the development of the coding scheme used in this project. This study was made possible by a faculty research grant to the first author from the Institute of Industrial Relations at the University of California at Berkeley. This study provides a comparative test of two psychological theories concerning the relationship between affect and performance. Managerial simulations are used to test whether people who are positive in disposition perform better or worse on both decisional and interpersonal tasks. Results are consistent in supporting the happier-and-smarter as opposed to the sadder-but-wiser hypothesis, since they show positive relationships between dispositional affect and performance. The results are discussed in terms of their relevance to both the older literature on links between satisfaction and performance and the more recent controversy over the dispositional approach to job attitudes.'

The Structure of Organizational Incentives

Abstract: 0 The financial support of Peat Marwick Main & Co., Ernst & Young, David Hauck, and the Reginald H. Jones Center for Management Policy, Strategy, and Organization is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank Sherwin Rosen, Stanley Baiman, Marshall Meyer, three anonymous reviewers, and the workshop participants at the Wharton School, Harvard Business School, Washington University, Northwestern University, Odense University, Uppsala University, and the Shore Conference on Strategic Models for their helpful comments. To improve understanding and design of organizational incentives, we used confidential compensation data obtained for four distinct organizational levels (ranging from plant manager to corporate chief executive officer) to evaluate the ability of tournament, managerial power, and agency theories to explain these observed compensation data. Our results suggest that organizational incentives are most appropriately characterized by a combination of these models, rather than being completely described by a single theoretical description.'

Organizational size and change: Diversification in the savings and loan industry after deregulation

Abstract: Organizational Size and Change: Diversification in the Savings and Loan Industry after Deregulation Heather A. Haveman Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 38, Issue 1 (Mar., 1993), 20-50. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001—8392%28199303%2938%3A1%3C20%3AOSACDI%3E2.0.CO%3B2—P Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non—commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. Administrative Science Quarterly is published by Cornell University, Johnson Graduate School of Management. Please contact the publisher for further permissions regarding the use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/joumals/cjohn.html. Administrative Science Quarterly ©1993 Cornell University, Johnson Graduate School of Management JSTOR and the JSTOR logo are trademarks of JSTOR, and are Registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. For more information on JSTOR contact jstor—info@umich.edu. ©2002 JSTOR http://www.j stor.org/ Sun Jan 20 17:17:24 2002

Determinants Of Employment Externalization - A Study Of Temporary Workers And Independent Contractors

Abstract: The authors' names are listed alphabetically; both authors contributed equally to this work. This manuscript was initially submitted to Administrative Science Quarterlys special issue on Process and Outcome: Perspectives on the Distribution of Rewards in Organizations. We gratefully acknowledge the advice and comments of Karen Cook, special issue editor. We would also like to thank Mark Granovetter, Carol Kulik, Dan Levinthal, Michael Schwartz, Judith Tanur, and three anonymous ASQ reviewers for their helpful comments on previous versions of this manuscript. This paper examines what determines the use of temporary workers and independent contractors in a variety of organizations. We hypothesize that four factors affect the use of externalized workers: employment costs, the external environment, organizational size and bureaucratization, and skill requirements. Data from a large sample of employers surveyed by the U.S. Department of Labor were used to test the hypotheses. Analyses showed that each factor affected the use of both temporary workers and independent contractors; however, the effects differed across the two types of workers. Firm-specific training, government oversight, bureaucratized employment practices, establishment size, and requirements for high levels of informational or technical skill had negative effects on organizations' use of temporary workers; variation in employment needs positively affected the use of temporary workers. Variation in employment needs, bureaucratized employment practices, establishment size, and being part of a multiple-site firm had positive effects on the use of independent contractors. We discuss the implications of these findings for the study of the employment relationship.'

Blowing the Whistle: The Organizational and Legal Implications for Companies and Employees.

Abstract: In this study the authors examine the profound consequences for individuals, organizations, and society at large of the phenomenon known as whistle-blowing. They examine several common views of the whistle-blower - from disloyal rat to courageous hero - and reveal how individuals reach the often difficult decision to turn in their companies. With case examples, such as Watergate, the Challenger disaster, and product liability lawsuits, they show executives how to deal with whistle-blowing and its consequences. For those contemplating \"turning in\" their companies, the authors offer real-life examples of the implications, both practical and legal.

Individual and corporate dispute resolution: Using procedural fairness as a decision heuristic.

Abstract: The research reported in this paper was supported by the National Science Foundation (grants 84-11142 and 85-18597), the American Bar Foundation, and the Institute for Civil Justice of the RAND Corporation. The authors are grateful to Barbara Meierhoefer, Pat Lombard, and the Federal Judicial Center for supplying the Study 2 data, to Ruth Kanfer and Chris Earley for permission to reanalyze data from their study with the first author, and to Tom Tyler, Robert Sutton, Gina Ke, Bob Bies, and Karen Cook for their comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. Two studies examined how litigants' evaluations of the outcome and process of lawsuits affected their judgments about the fairness of procedures and their acceptance of awards from court-ordered arbitration. The studies tested predictions concerning the operation of a "fairness heuristic"-that procedural justice judgments mediate the effects of process impressions and outcome evaluations on the decision to accept or reject the directives of an authority. Participants in the studies were corporate and individual litigants in federal tort and contract actions that were subject to court-ordered arbitration. In both studies the decision to accept the arbitrator's award or reject it and go to trial was strongly correlated with judgments of procedural justice, and much or all of the effect of outcome evaluations and process impressions on award acceptance was mediated by procedural justice judgments, which had a stronger effect than either subjective or objective measures of the arbitration award. Separate analyses of corporate and individual decision makers in the second study suggested that both groups relied heavily on procedural justice judgments in deciding whether or not to accept the arbitration award. The findings provide evidence of widespread use of a fairness heuristic and support the extension of justice-judgment research to corporate decision making.'

Caring for the Caregivers: Patterns of Organizational Caregiving.

Abstract: The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Marion McCollom and Vicky Parker on an earlier version of this manuscript and the extensive support of Robert Sutton and this journal's reviewers during the review process. The study offers a system-level perspective on job burnout among human service workers by focusing on their internal networks of caregiving relationships. A qualitative case study of a social service agency reveals how primary caregivers may be filled with or emptied of emotional resources necessary for caregiving in interactions with other agency members. Working from eight key behavioral dimensions of caregiving derived from the study, I define and illustrate five recurring patterns of caregiving that characterized agency members' relationships. By placing the patterns in relation to one another, I then reveal the system of caregiving, showing how it moved or failed to move throughout the agency as a whole. This system of caregiving is discussed in terms of its multiple determinants and its implications for members' abilities to perform the agency's primary task of giving care to clients.'

Leadership instability in hospitals: the influence of Board-CEO relations and organizational growth and decline.

Abstract: This study tested whether leadership instability--a systemic pattern of frequent succession in the top management position of an organization--was associated with sociopolitical structures that define the relationship between the board and chief executive officer (CEO), controlling for temporal patterns of the organizational life-cycle stage. In organizations that are not profit maximizing and subject to considerable uncertainty, such governance properties were hypothesized to affect leadership instability independent of organizational growth or decline. Results of regression analyses demonstrate strong main effects of board-CEO relations, net of the impact of organizational life cycle, on leadership instability.

Racial dynamics in cross-race developmental relationships.

Abstract: I want to thank Robin Ely, Ray Friedman, Herminia Ibarra, Linda Hill, Bill Kahn, and Kathy Kram for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Special thanks to Robert Sutton and the ASO reviewers for their encouragement and editorial assistance. Data from qualitative field studies of 22 cross-race (African-American and white) supportive work relationships between pairs of junior and senior people are used to examine how people's strategies for dealing with the issue of race affect the kind of relationship that develops between the two and whether the senior person becomes merely a sponsor for the protege, providing him or her with career support such as advocacy for promotions, feedback, and coaching, or whether the senior person becomes a mentor, offering psychosocial support and friendship along with instrumental career support. The study showed that the parties' preferred strategy for dealing with racial difference-either denying and suppressing it or discussing it openly-and whether both parties preferred the same strategy influenced the kind of relationship that developed. Only when the parties preferred the same strategy did the more supportive mentor-protege relationship develop. The paper provides a model of how racial dynamics affect cross-race developmental relationships.'

Two-step leverage: Managing constraint in organizational politics

Abstract: Martin Gargiulo INSEAD This paper proposes an alternative to resource-dependence approaches to strategic behavior, which predict that actors seek direct cooptive relations to alleviate constraint. I propose that an actor can gain leverage on a limiting party by building a cooptive relation with a player that may control this party's behavior, thus using two-step leverage. Data on dependence relations, political alliances, and confidential discussion networks among decision makers in a cooperative agribusiness furnish evidence of both direct and two-step leverage and clarify the contexts in which these two strategies are used. As predicted by the resource-dependence approach, leaders build ties of interpersonal obligation with people directly affecting their performance in the organization. When policy divergences or personal frictions make these ties untenable, however, leaders build strong cooptive relations with people who may constrain the performance of the party on whom they depend. Based on these results, I discuss an extension of resource-dependence theory and explore the potential uses of two-step leverage mechanisms in organizational politics.'

The nature of the firm : origins, evolution, and development

Abstract: This volume derives from a conference held in 1987 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Coase's classic article. The first chapter affords an overview of the volume. It is followed by a republication of the 1937 article, and by the three lectures Coase presented at the conference. These lectures provide a lively and informative history of the origins and development of his thought. Subsequent chapters explore a wide-range of theoretical and empirical issues that have arisen in the transaction cost economic tradition. They illustrate the power of the transaction cost approach to enhance understanding not only of business firms, but of problems of economic organization generally.

What do wages buy

Abstract: Jim Lincoln kindly provided me with the dataset. I have also benefited from reading his and his co-authors' research. Libby Bishop and Ishak Saporta provided expert research assistance, funded by the Institute of Industrial Relations and the Consortium on Competitiveness and Cooperation, U.C., Berkeley. Helpful comments from Jim Baron, Bill Dickens, Jonathan Leonard, Lee Levine, Jim Lincoln, Janet Yellen, seminar participants at Stanford, Wharton, the Sloan School, and U.C., Berkeley and from the editors and referees are gratefully acknowledged. This study examines data on more than 8,000 employees of nearly 100 manufacturing plants in the United States and Japan to measure the effects of differences in wages on workplace attitudes and behaviors. In both the U.S. and Japan, workers receiving high wages are less likely to quit, are more satisfied with their pay, and report that they work harder than they have to. These results support theories of segmented labor markets and of social comparison, but not theories of human capital or compensating differences. In the U.S. data there is no evidence that the effects of high wages are less powerful than the effects of low wages. This result contradicts some variants of status-inconsistency and distributive justice theories. In Japan, workers who are highly paid compared with others in their plant appear to experience discomfort. This result indicates the important role social comparison plays in Japan.'

Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation.

Abstract: Engineering Culture grew out of an attempt to take seriously the conceptual and methodological requirements of a cultural perspective on organizations. Briefly, the book is a critical ethnography of a large and successful high-tech corporation lauded in the popular managerial literature for its innovative postbureaucratic “corporate culture.” The corporate culture, the official story went, drove the company’s employees to peaks of corporate performance and personal self-actualization. Academic views of these managerial claims fell, unsurprisingly, into two distinct camps. On the one hand (the upper one, of course) were those who participated in the construction of this grand utopian narrative: numerous texts reinforced, jargonized, and legitimated managerial claims and fed them back to ever-hungry corporate consumers of good words. On the other hand, less popular but no less persistent and no less grand, was a continuing stream of criticism of the corporation. In this view, utopian managerial claims were---as ever---no more than a disguise for malevolent managerial intentions, now in the form of tyrannical attempts to penetrate and shape employees’ minds and hearts.

The volunteer dilemma

Abstract: We would like to thank Greg Oldham and Madan Pillutla for their constructive comments on an early version of this manuscript, Associate Editor Robert Sutton, Herbert Simon, and two anonymous reviewers for their particularly perceptive reactions and suggestions, and Linda Pike for her faultless editing. This paper uses evolutionary, social psychological, organizational, and game theoretic literatures as frames to explore the dilemma of the choice to volunteer. Although one's group may benefit from voluntary action, volunteers typically incur more costs than others, even when their actions are successful. The four experiments presented here addressed when and why people volunteer in fictitious financial scenarios that varied group size, the number of volunteers required, the payoffs to volunteers and nonvolunteers, and the need to work more or for smaller outcomes than others. The results suggest that, in general, undergraduates, M.B.A.s, and executives volunteered most often when personal benefits were high. Executives also focused on issues related to self-interest when they were questioned about voluntary action in the workplace. The discussion raises issues about voluntary action in situations in which people interact at a distance and speculates about implications for the dynamics and antecedents of altruistic action.'

Becoming a manager : mastery of a new identity

Abstract: In candid passages, 19 first-year managers disclose how they achieved a profound transformation of identity, how this affected them psychologically and how, through trial and error, observation and interpretation, they reached their goals.

The strategic management of technological innovation

Abstract: Introduction - defining the field of technology and strategy strategies in context structures, boundaries and alliances crisis, learning and adaptation.

Tangled Hierarchies: Teachers as Professionals and the Management of Schools.

Abstract: Introduction - professionals in bureaucracies the work of teachers autonomy and control restructuring the job of teaching compensating teachers structuring participation the changing role of unions conclusion - restructuring relationships in schools.

Doing Exemplary Research.

Abstract: This volume explores the doing of research - as a 'journey' for those involved. It looks at the meanings of exemplary research practice. Authors' descriptions of the origins, experiences and outcomes of their own research are interwoven with commentaries on these by other major figures in the field. The book is an outstanding resource for all organizational researchers.

The Context of Interunit Influence Attempts

Abstract: The authors thank Elaine Romanelli, Arie Lewin, and the editor and anonymous reviewers of ASO for their constructive criticism of previous drafts of this manuscript. We also thank Dick Lake, Blair Sheppard, and Anne Tsui for their collaboration in collecting the data. Support during the writing and revision stage was provided by the Roy J. Carver Entrepreneurial Fund of the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. This paper proposes and tests a model that predicts the extent to which members of organizational units will engage in ongoing attempts to influence the design and operations of other units, documenting interunit behavior that may be explicitly or implicitly political. The proposed model is thus derived from organization design perspectives on political behavior. The model predicts that resource constraints and lowered commitment to the status quo trigger influence activity within a set of related units and that this influence activity, along with other facets of interunit relationships (communication, formalization, and coordination uncertainty), in turn predicts the extent of a specific unit's influence attempts. Findings from a well-controlled test on 295 management units in 46 divisions of a large organization generate strong support for the model and tend to disconfirm rival explanations.'