Showing papers in "African Affairs in 1974"

Djibouti: france's strategic toehold in africa

Abstract: WITH THE fourth major outbreak of war in the Middle East having once again rivetted great power attention to this vital corner of the globe, a seemingly unobtrusive piece of barren territory lying between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic has suddenly gained in political and strategic importance. The French Territory of the Afars and the Issas, a sparsely-inhabited land of searing heat and mutually hostile tribal factions, commonly referred to by the name of its capital and only major city, Djibouti, has long been looked upon by western observers as nothing more than a sentimental remnant of France's once-sprawling African colonial empire. The French themselves have seemed hard-put to justify their continued presence in what was until 1967 known as French Somaliland; yet by an historical accident they may well find themselves the possessors of an area having a great deal more strategic importance than has been hitherto appreciated. Djibouti's value stems from its significant location at the Indian Ocean entrance to the Red Sea, a position from which a naval power of consequence could exert powerful influence over the oil tanker trade plying the waters of the Indian Ocean, and could also stand ready to make its presence felt in the pursuance of political goals. The Territory already possesses a modern port in Djibouti, which also serves as a base for an air transport network between Europe, East Africa, the Near East, and India.' For a number of years this position has been used by the French to link their upper African sphere of influence with that which they maintain in southern African, and until recently in the Malagasy Republic, formerly Madagascar. This strategic network has been little understood or appreciated by Western military observers, who tend to view the African continent as a hodgepodge of newly emergent states known primarily for their poverty, unstable rulers, and domestic political squabbles.