Showing papers in "African Affairs in 2002"

Vigilantes, violence and the politics of public order in Kenya

Abstract: This article examines recent violence in Nairobi in the context of increased vigilante activity throughout Kenya, and relates this to the broader political context of violence in the run-up to the next general election, which is expected to take place before the end of 2002. The starting point for the analysis is the conflict between two rival vigilante groups in Nairobi's Kariobangi North estate, Mungiki and the Taliban. It is argued that existing scholarly interpretations of Mungiki need to be reassessed in view of recent violent and criminal activities linked to the movement, and in light of the shifting political position of its leaders and the ethnocentric posture they have adopted. The increasing prevalence of vigilante groups in the city is shown to be partly a reflection of.growing criminal activities, especially extortion, and partly the consequence of struggles for political control in the city, where the ruling party KANU has only slender support. The 'New Vigilantes' of Nairobi exploit urban insecurity for materialist gain, but they have also merged with the Majeshi la Wazee ('Armies of the Elders') that have long been deployed to 'protect' the interests of their political clients. In this context, heightening urban violence is seen to be both criminal and political in character, and it is argued that it is likely that vigilante groups will again be used as political instruments in the electoral struggle for the city. ON THE NIGHT OF SUNDAY 3 MARCH 2002, a marauding gang of between 200 and 300 men and youths terrorized the residents in a quarter of Nairobi's Kariobangi North estate. Rampaging through the busy streets and alleyways adjacent to the market area and main bus junction, armed with an assortment of pangas, swords, iron bars and knives, the gangs violently assaulted local residents and passers-by. The carnage was gruesome. By the morning, 20 residents of Kariobangi were confirmed dead, and a further 31 had been admitted to hospital with serious wounds. Kenyan newspapers carried chilling pictures of the dead and injured during the next week, and television and radio news reports were filled with the tearful, anguished testimonies of the bereaved. The unexpected, random horror of the attack had stunned Nairobi's citizens. As witness accounts began to circulate and were picked up in the press, it was evident that the violence had been well planned, ruthlessly carried through and premeditated in its David M. Anderson is University Lecturer in African Studies, University of Oxford, and a Research Fellow of St Antony's College, Oxford.

Brotherhood solidarity, education and migration: The role of the Dahiras among the Murid muslim community of New York

Abstract: The recent history of the Muridiyya is marked by an increasing urbanization of the brotherhood.1 Mostly confined to the Peanut Basin of Senegal until the end of the Second World War, the brotherhood experienced an important migratory movement that sent Murid disciples first to the cities of Senegal and Africa, and then to Europe and the United States in the early 1980s. While scholars have noted and described the changes in the economy and constitution of the brotherhood, no attempt has been made to provide an alternative analysis of its development that integrates these transformations. A major contention of this article is that the recent evolution of the Muridiyya is best explained by characteristics internal to the brotherhood. Taking the Murid community of New York as a case study, it puts forward a framework for understanding the source of the cohesion and development of Murid migrant communities in an urban setting. This study has revealed that education, through the mediation of the dahiras, constitutes an important source of social capital among Murid migrants. The exploitation of networks of solidarity and brotherhood through dahira membership is critical to the survival of the Murids as a group and to their relative economic success in the urban context. THE MURID MUSLIM MOVEMENT WAS FOUNDED at the turn of the twentieth century by Amadu Bamba Mbakke, a holy man from west-central Senegal. Bamba was born in the early 1850s and grew up in a context of Cheikh Anta Babou is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, Michigan State University, USA. This article is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented at the international conference of Association pour une Anthropologie du D'veloppement (APAD) held in Saint-Louis, Senegal, January 2000. The author wishes to thank Leslie P. Moch, David W. Robinson, Hilary Jones, Michel Kuenzie and Ellen Foley at Michigan State University and Charles Becker, researcher at IRD (Dakar), for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts; also the Social Capital Interest Group of MSU and the Rockefeller Foundation for funding the field research on which the article is based. The data used were collected during two field trips in New York in 1996 and 1999. Additional informants were interviewed in Mbacke and Dakar (Senegal) between September 1999 and March 2000; the interviews were conducted in Wolof. 1. Brotherhood is not an accurate translation of tariqa (path) that Murid disciples and shaikhs use to describe their organization. The bond that ties the Murid goes beyond mere fraternity in pursuit of worldly accomplishment that the word brotherhood implies. Murids share common beliefs and trust in Amadu Bamba and rely on his guidance for their fulfilment in this world and their salvation in the hereafter.

The Politics of Disruption: War Veterans and the Local State In Zimbabwe

Abstract: This article is about war veterans' recent assault on the local state in Zimbabwe. From February 2001, veterans stormed local authorities in districts where the political opposition had strong support-primarily but not exclusively in Matabeleland and Midlands Provinces. They locked district council and other local goverment offices, closed some schools and demanded the dismissal of numerous officials, councilors, teachers and workers. Officials were suspended from their jobs and subjected to a procedure of 'vetting' by war veterans in which they were accused of a wide range of offences from dancing on the photograph of the President, to campaigning for the opposition party, to maladministration and corruption. This process has received little comment from President Mugabe, war veterans, or party leaders- in contrast to war veterans' interventions in other areas, such as land and labour issues- yet its consequences are potentially far-reaching. Here the focus is on Matabeleland North. I investigate the veterans' demands, the ad hoc bodies set up to deal with them, and local reactions to the closures and suspensions. I argue that war veterans' interventions have politicized all areas of public sector work and have seriously undermined the scope for professionalism within the public service. The ruling party has used veterans' disruption to newly conflate party and state structures at district and provincial level, and to set up new channels of authority. In so doing, Zanu(PF) has gained more control over the local state. However, the party's use of the veterans has also produced unintended effects related to the priorities of particular groups of veterans and their exploitation of a range of local grievances.

Franco‐African Relations: No Longer So Exceptional?

Abstract: Key developments in Franco-African relations since 1994 are reviewed. Reservations are expressed about the widely held view that these relations have undergone a process of normalization in recent years and that France is disengaging from its traditional pre carre (sphere of influence) in Black Africa. Instead, it is argued that, under pressure from a rapidly evolving international environment and a changing domestic policy context, a partial modernization of French African policy has taken place. This new global environment has put constraints on French African policy but has also presented France with new opportunities to pursue its national interests in Africa, in the context of globalization and international liberalism. However, certain features of the special relationship remain, such as the role played in Franco-African relations by the reseaux(personal networks). It is therefore concluded that, while a process of adaptation has indeed taken place, Franco-African relations are at present in a period of transition.

Whiteman Kontri and the enduring allure of modernity among Cameroonian youth

Abstract: This article gathers together representations of whiteness constructed by young black Cameroonians. It contributes to arguments about white identity by arguing that the meaning of whiteness is, in part, made by Africans. It assembles descriptions of white people and of the whiteman kontri (the West) that are often contradictory and that include both positive and negative judgements. In this respect these ideas reflect both Cameroonian politics and Cameroonian identity. The young Cameroonians whose ideas we were interested in were simultaneously drawn to, and exasperated by, a Western vision of modernity. They were despairing of the existing Cameroonian social and political structure and looked beyond national contexts for their dreams. But they were equally sceptical about the justice of the global economic context and articulated their doubts in terms of antagonism towards whites and defence of African identity. We contribute to debates about Occidentalism by suggesting that this is a concept that should be used with caution, since by suggesting an equivalent to ‘Orientalism’ it suggests equality and endorses an essentialized notion of whiteness and blackness, which can undermine attempts to understand the history of relations between Africa and the West. White man, white man, White man with the big purse, Since my mother born me I’ve never seen such a big purse. (Cameroonian Children’s Song) THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES THE MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS OF WHITENESS1 constructed by young black Cameroonians. It does so by gathering descriptions of white people and descriptions of the whiteman kontri — an 607 African Affairs (2002), 101, 607–634 © Royal African Society 2002 06Page (bc/d) 10/22/02 8:55 AM Page 607

From Crisis to Renewal: Towards a Successful Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development

Abstract: Africa’s new generation of enlightened leaders have promulgated an initiative to spur growth and reduce poverty on the continent. Entitled the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), it is couched within five core principles — good governance; entrenchment of democracy, peace and security; sound economic policy-making and execution; productive partnerships; and domestic ownership and leadership — which are seen as the preconditions for Africa’s renewal. This article analytically describes and assesses the NEPAD initiative, and the challenges to be confronted for its successful implementation as the road map guiding the journey to make the twenty-first century one of peace, democracy, development, and prosperity for Africa. DURING THE PAST DECADE AND BEYOND, AFRICA HAS BEEN DESCRIBED by various authors as a continent betrayed, in chaos, in self-destruction, in crisis, existing in name only, being predatory or kleptocratic, or collapsed into anarchy and viciousness.1 These are but a few of the colourful negative images painted about a region that, up to now, seemed to have lacked the capacity and willingness to come to grips with the need to develop, own, and implement a sustained policy and institutional environment conducive to, among other things, good governance, entrenchment of democracy, peace and security, growth and development, and poverty reduction. Of course, all of the negative images have been, and, in many ways, continue to be, accurate. However, a new generation of enlightened African leaders has now decided to stake Africa’s claim to the twenty-first century. In that 387 African Affairs (2002), 101, 387–402 © Royal African Society 2002 05 Hope (bc/d) 6/27/02 3:50 PM Page 387

Media matters: evaluating the role of the media in Ghana's 2000 Elections

Abstract: The role of the media, both state-owned and private, is an important and often overlooked component of any election, particularly those occurring in developing countries. Unfortunately, the existing academic literature on the subject is thin, especially concerning the recent flurry of democratic elections in Africa. This article briefly reviews the history of the media in Ghana’s Fourth republic and then examines the crucial role the media played in Ghana’s historic 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections. It details how the media contributed to the general success of the elections in which John Kufuor’s New Patriotic Party defeated Jerry Rawlings’ incumbent National Democratic Congress. Then, drawing on untapped public opinion survey data from the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, the Afrobarometer in Ghana, and the University of Ghana, it demonstrates how the various forms of the mass media are ‘consumed’ by Ghanaians, and how they affect citizens differently. Despite persistent romanticizing of the role of the media in many quarters, it concludes that, while the media are extremely important to certain segments of the Ghanaian population, they are virtually irrelevant to others. The state-owned media are supposed to support the government, because they are paid from government resources. Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings, former First Lady of Ghana1 For an election to be truly fair, different parties and candidates should have equal access to the media. Neither state power nor the power of money should determine that one party gets a hearing while another is denied it. The media must actively seek out the truth on the public’s behalf, and be free to tell it as they see it. Kofi Annan, Secretary General, United Nations2 585 African Affairs (2002), 101, 585–605 © Royal African Society 2002 05Temin (bc/dk) 10/22/02 8:54 AM Page 585

Justice denied: political violence in Kwazulu‐Natal after 1994

Abstract: To unravel post-apartheid political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, three case studies are presented: the Shobashobane massacre (1995); the Richmond killings (which reached their height in 1997-98); and the Nongoma assassinations (1999-2000). Detailed consideration of the activities of paramilitary forces, the security forces, and the criminal justice system reveals that post-apartheid political violence is systemically related to the dynamics of the 'unofficial' war between Inkatha and the African National Congress. In this context, it is argued that a failure to confront this war in terms of asserting political authority or through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has worked to drive political violence and to push it into new forms, with lethal effect. POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE PROVINCE OF KWAZULU-NATAL (KZN), South Africa, has, according to some sources, taken as many as 20,000 lives since 1984, especially since September 1987, when open warfare broke out in the Pietermaritzburg region with a series of territorial battles between Inkatha and the United Democratic Front (UDF).1 In these battles, Inkatha received support from the apartheid state's security forces, whilst the UDF found succour in its relationship with the African National Congress (ANC) and its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MIK). More than half the number of fatalities occurred after 1990: that is, after the National Party had lifted the ban on the liberation movements, and committed itself to negotiated political change, and after the ANC had suspended its armed struggle. The three-month period preceding the first democratic elections in April 1994 was especially tense, with around 1,000 people killed. Since 1994, 2,000 people have been killed in political violence in KZN.2 In the post-apartheid era, KwaZulu-Natal has been marked by a divided system of political authority, with reflecting electoral support Professor Rupert Taylor is in the Department of Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. The interviews used in this article were commissioned by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and conducted in KwaZuluNatal over 1999-2000. The research was supported by the International Development Research Centre . 1. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report [hereafter TRC Report], Volumes 1-5, CD-ROM version (Jutastat, Cape Town, June 1999), Vol. 3, Chap. 3. :2. SAIRR, South Africa Survey 2000/2001 (South African Institute of Race Relations [SAIRR], Johannesburg, 2002), p. 89.

'Rocking the Boat?': Church-NGOs and Democratization in Zimbabwe

Abstract: Historically, relations between church and state in independent Zimbabwe have tended to be co-operative and non-confrontational. However, in 1997 the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) initiated the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), leading to the government's defeat in the first post-independence referendum and setting the stage for the violent elections of June 2000. Nevertheless, as the NCA developed the strength and capacity which enabled it to challenge the status quo, the ZCC withdrew. As a key-player said '. . . as churches we had to take issues that don't raise too much dust or rock the boat too much, but the boat was rocking'. This suggests that, although the church may play a critical role in opening up space for debate, the state may still co-opt and weaken churches and other groups, in its effort to retain hegemony. Churches and church NGOs relate ambiguously to both the state and society, in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe, and remain vulnerable to political, economic and social pressures. Theories of democratization, and in particular the role played by churches and NGOs, must begin to recognize the complexity and ambiguity of state-society relations as detailed in this study. ZIMBABWE HAS A RICH LITERATURE ON THE ROLE OF CHURCHES and church organizations in the colonial period, which neatly captures the complexity of their relations with the Rhodesian state.1 Yet post-independence churchstate relations have been little studied. Upon investigation, many similarities between the earlier literature and the post-independence period become apparent, especially in terms of relations between state elites and church Sara Rich Dorman is a DPhil Candidate at St. Antony's College, Oxford. This article draws on research carried out between 1995 and 1999,whichwas greatly facilitated by, among others, Jonah Gokova and Tawanda Mutasah. The article has benefited from the comments of Erica Bornstein, W. J. Dorman, Tim Kelsall, David Maxwell, and Gavin Williams. 1. See Carl Hallencreutz and Ambrose Moyo (eds), Church and State in Zimbabwe (Mambo, Gweru, 1988); Terence Ranger, Are We NotAlso Men? The Samkange family andAfrican politics in Zimbabwe: 1920-64 (James Currey, London, 1995); Michael Lapsley, Neutrality or Co-option? Anglican Church and state from 1964 until the independence of Zimbabwe (Mambo, Gweru, 1986); Canaan Sodindo Banana, The Church in the Struggle (Mambo, Gweru, 1996); Diana Auret, Reaching for Justice (Mambo, Gweru, 1992); J. A. Dachs and W. Rea, The Catholic Church and Zimbabwe (Mambo, Gweru, 1979); Ian Linden, The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe (Longman, London,1980); R. H. Randolph, Dawn in Zimbabwe: The Catholic Church in the new order: a report on the activities of the Catholic Church in Zimbabwe for the five years 1977-1981 (Mambo, Gweru, 1985); Janice McLaughlin, On the Frontline: Catholic missions in Zimbabwe's liberation war (Baobab, Harare, 1996); Carl Hallencreutz, Religion and Politics in Harare (Swedish Institute of Missionary Research, Uppsala, 1998); David Maxwell, Christians and Chiefs in Zimbabwe (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1999).

Globalization and the future of anthropology

Abstract: Globalization of the world's financial systems in particular has given rise to an extensive literature on other aspects of the phenomenon, including its effects on culture and political behaviour This article argues that globalization itself is not as new as is sometimes supposed, not least in that even the world's most isolated societies have always been constituent, permeable, parts of wider networks Hence, the notion that anthropology is challenged by globalization because of its tradition of viewing local societies as 'closed', to be viewed by specialists in the role of participant observers, is to forget that anthropology, before the influence of Malinkowski, was itself once comparative and diffusionist The discipline needs simply to recover its earlier bearings and to rethink an emphasis that made a far too emphatic distinction between the universalizing force of the 'modern' and the isolation of 'primitive' societies AS WE WELL KNOW, ANTHROPOLOGY TRADITIONALLY DEFINED ITSELF as the study of 'primitive' or 'exotic' societies, including such sectors of Western societies as rural communities or ethnic minorities Ever since the revolution effected by Malinowski, the legitimacy of the discipline has rested on a single foundation: the technique of long-term participant observation within a clearly bounded field site And although there are many who believe that an anthropology of the contemporary world is indeed possible,1 there are those who argue that the very uniqueness of anthropology's object and thus its very existence as a discipline are today imperilled This argument is based on a particular reading of the current process of globalization and of its consequences for the world's cultures Bearing in mind that the theory of globalization has its origins in economics and political science, I am concerned here only with the implications of the paradigm's extension into the domain of culture By examining globalization as both an empirical phenomenon and a theoretical construction, I shall attempt to unpack the set of assumptions underlying the idea that globalization represents a mortal threat to anthropology The author is an anthropologist at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris This article is an adaptation of the first chapter of his book Branchements: Anthropologie de l'universiti des cultures (Flammarion, Paris, 2001) This translation from the French is by Peter Cohen 1 Marc Aug,, Pour une anthropologie des mondes contemporains (Aubier, Paris, 1994)

‘Almost an Oxfam in itself’: Oxfam, Ujamaa and development in Tanzania

Abstract: This article examines how Oxfam came to forge an exceptionally close relationship with the Tanzanian state during the 1960s and 1970s. Oxfam, an organization that sought in this period to build and strengthen grassroots participation in development planning and implementation, participated in a development programme in Tanzania that, during the 1970s, actually withdrew power from the peasantry. The government shifted ever more towards an authoritarian position, and forced the relocation of upwards of six million people into newly established villages. Yet Oxfam seemingly was blind to the realities of what was going on, maintaining throughout this period that the development programme was oriented towards the creation of communal production and grassroots democracy Oxfam's definition of Ujamaa. The article argues that Oxfam came to this position through its involvement in a rural development project in southern Tanzania in the 1960s. The Ruvuma Development Association became, for Oxfam, its touchstone for interpreting and defining what Ujamaa meant. Having erected a prism through which to understand Tanzanian development, Oxfam failed to perceive the growing divergence between the state and itself in objectives and strategy in the implementation of a rural development strategy. IN 1976, AN OXFAM CONSULTANT WROTE: 'Tanzania seems to engender a characteristic socialist enthusiasm in almost all who work there. Nearly everything one reads about projects in Tanzania from people working there has that special youthful buoyancy about it."'1 It was not just those who worked there who appeared to possess a close affinity for Tanzania. It seemed that Oxfam's supporters those vital donors without whom Oxfam could not have operated were similarly afflicted with Tanzaphilia. The Oxfam Field Director wrote in 1975: From a crude fund-raising point of view we would probably benefit in view of the esteem with which Tanzania is held in Britain in some quarters. At the moment the supporters of Tanzania may not be our richest contributors -but since they are mostly young, they could be long-term ones.2 Michael Jennings is a Research Officer at the Wellcome Unit for the History of Medicine, Oxford. This article is the result of work for his Ph.D. thesis. 1. Some of the Oxfam staff quoted or referred to in this article will not be named. PD to BIP, December 1976. Oxfam Archives (OxA), Oxford, Tan 80, v. II. 2. AM to MH, 27 August 1975. OxA Tan 64.

Briefing: Zimbabwe's 2002 Presidential Election

Abstract: THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION in Zimbabwe, from 9 to 11 March 2002, was arguably the most significant election in Zimbabwe's 22-year post-independence history. Moreover, it was an event that attracted widespread international political attention and media coverage. At the centre of this attention was Robert Mugabe, one of the central figures of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle, whose politics and rhetoric since the late 1990s had taken on an increasingly vehement nationalist and anti-imperialist cast around the long-standing demand for land redistribution in the country. The strongly anti-Western tone of his political message, the anti-neo-liberal policy interventions of the beleaguered Zimbabwean government, and the state-sponsored violence through which such policies were being pursued, pushed Mugabe into the forefront of African and international politics. Mugabe and his ruling ZANU-PF party articulated their politics as a return to the unfinished land agenda of the liberation struggle. Their central targets in this onslaught were the small white community, still dominant on the land and in much of the industrial sector, and, behind them, British, European and American foreign interests. Mugabe's core election message was thus expressed in a combination of the central legitimacy of the liberation struggle, a call for pan-Africanist unity around the fight for economic independence, and a denunciation of Western encroachment on African sovereignty, against what were considered Western notions of human and civic rights. As Zimbabwe's Minister of Information, Professor Jonathan Moyo, put it, Zimbabweans 'do not believe in moving from independence and sovereignty to new colonialism, they do not believe in the discourse of human rights to deepen inequality'.1 In this political configuration African identity and solidarity were constructed in essentialist terms, and the political and civic opposition identified as the enemies of 'Africanness' and 'the nation'.

Briefing: The Chad‐Cameroon petroleum and pipeline development project

Abstract: THE CHAD-CAMEROON PROJECT is currently the largest single private-sector investment in Africa. Neither its size nor its technical features, however, account for its originality nor for the enormous interest it has aroused. Within the energy industry, the Chad-Cameroon project could be seen as a conventional mid-scale project, part of the current rapid expansion of oil and gas development in West Africa, which stretches from Mauritania to Angola. The plan consists of the following components: In Chad: Three oil fields near to Doba in southern Chad (Kome, Miandoum and Bolobo) Approximately 315 oil wells, with electric pumps (all pipes and lines buried) Two collecting stations and one pumping station Central treatment centre (Kome), producing up to 225,000 barrels p/d of crude

Somalia: alternative scenarios for political reconstruction

Abstract: Somalia, which for most of the 1990s lacked most of the institutions of a central state, is gradually being recomposed. However, there is no consensus on how it is to be rebuilt. A new provisional government in Mogadishu seems to aim for the restoration of a centralized state. In other parts of the former country, such as in Puntland and Somaliland, there are other views of reconstruction. The views of the main international actors will be crucial in deciding the outcomes of these various initiatives. FOR OVER A YEAR, SOMALIA HAS AGAIN HAD A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT and parliament and by virtue of that possibly the renewed beginnings of a central state but not everyone is equally pleased with it. In August 2000, almost ten years after the fall of the Syad Barre regime and the 'stateless' period which followed the complete collapse and fragmentation of the erstwhile Somali state system, a new interim president, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, was installed in Mogadishu, followed in October by the appointment of an interim premier, Ali Khalif Galaydh, who was charged with the formation of a transitional cabinet of national reconciliation. Galaydh's 84-member cabinet was to last only 13 months, however, as it was toppled in a vote of no confidence in the interim parliament on 28 October 2001. Following this, President Abdiqassim began with the formation of a new government, trying to include factions that had hitherto remained unrepresented. During its first year in office, the transitional government manifested itself publicly mainly through calls for national unity and reconciliation, to be achieved either through 'dialogue' or 'by force'. At the same time it was reported to have been receiving substantial gifts and loans from Saudi Arabia which other reports say landed largely in the wrong ministerial hands' and to have been actively engaged in the purchase of arms, especially from Ukraine. Meanwhile, internal conflicts continued and even increased in gravity during 2001. Among other things, various rounds of skirmishes within and outside the parliament have been noted. The issue is that neither the provisional government nor the parliament has been recognized by a number of important political groups and stakeholders. The author works at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. An earlier Dutch version of this article appeared in Internationale Spectator 55, 4 (April 2001). 1. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 29 June 2001. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, news releases.

Traditional Protest Media and Anti-Military Struggle in Nigeria, 1988-1999

Abstract: This article, derived from an extensive research report sponsored by the Ford Foundation through a grant administered by the African Centre for Democratic Government, Nigeria documents the deployment of traditional media theatre, oratory, folk music in the anti-military struggle of 1988-99 in Nigeria. These resources were used successfully by civil society to engage the authoritarian state in this period, notwithstanding the state's use of them to bolster its hegemony. Most of the protest artists were persecuted, but maintained their position and thereby deepened social anger against the military. THIS ARTICLE SEEKS TO DOCUMENT POPULAR RESISTANCE to military dictatorship through the use of traditional protest media in the Yorubaspeaking area of Nigeria. Based on fieldwork conducted in Ibadan and Lagos between January and June 2000, it shows how in times of repression, when the regular channels of free expression are closed or suppressed, civil society falls back on indigenous modes of communication to express dissent and to censure the authorities. Ibadan and Lagos were selected as study sites because they contain a rare concentration of indigenous media workers such as Ewi poets, theatre artistes, and folk musicians, whose work was scrutinized, and with whom this researcher carried out in-depth interviews. Historical and archival research was employed to complement the insights gained from primary data. As is well known, the period between the late 1980s and 1999 when a civilian democracy was inaugurated, was one of intense repression in Nigeria. The woes of a failed structural adjustment policy, aborted transitions and the ravages of a predatory and monumentally corrupt military class brought a once thriving nation to its knees, and to the bottom of the international economic pecking order. A 'transition without end' mounted by General Babangidal culminated in an annulled election in 1993, and gave way to the dark age of the Abacha period, between late 1993 and 1998. The brutal dictator's death in June 1998 ushered in the government of General Abdulsalami Abubakar, who, under pressure from a resurgent civil The author is a lecturer in political science at Lagos State University, Nigeria. He was formerly editorial page editor of the Daily Times, Nigeria's oldest newspaper. 1. Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran (eds), Transition Without End: Nigerian politics and civil society under Babangida (Vantage Publishers, Ibadan, 1997).

The neo‐colonial context of the democratic experiment of Congo‐Brazzaville

Abstract: This article examines the failure of the democratic experiment in CongoBrazzaville in the context of the country's dependent relationship with its former colonizer, France. Congo's experiment with multiparty politics began in 1991, endured a series of crises from 1992 to 1994, then collapsed in the civil war of 1997. Meanwhile, the transitional regime (1991-92) and the elected regime of Pascal Lissouba (1992-97) experienced much more troubled relations with France than did the dictatorial regime of Denis Sassou-Nguesso, which preceded them. When SassouNguesso returned to power by force of arms with French support in 1997, many concluded that France bore the primary responsibility for the failure of the democratic experiment. This study finds, however, that, while both French government officials and Elf operatives sought systematically to maintain their influence in Congo, neither bears primary responsibility for the failure of the multiparty experiment. THIS ARTICLE ENQUIRES INTO THE EFFECTS OF FRENCH POLICY AND ACTION on the failure of the democratic experiment in the Republic of Congo that began in 1991. France's foreign and economic policies towards Congo are a prime candidate to explain this failure because of France's intensive relationship with the Congo Republic that dates from the colonial period. France has been by far the largest source of investment and development aid for Congo and the country's chief trading partner. Given this considerable French influence, one may naturally suspect that the French role was critical in the trajectory of the democratic experiment. In fact, a number of senior Congolese political figures, including a former President, have specifically accused the French of destroying the nascent democracy by supporting a coup against the elected regime. The question of responsibility for the failure of Congo's democratic experiment is both interesting and important. It is interesting because many observers believe that multiparty political systems still offer the best hope The author is an Associate Professor in the International Relations Department at Florida International University, Miami, USA. He wishes to thank Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga, David Gardinier, Staffan Lindberg, Andreas Mehler, Peter Schraeder and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on this paper. The author takes complete responsibility for all errors of fact and interpretation.

Commentary: The New Partnership for Africa's Development and the Zimbabwe Elections: Implications and Prospects for the Future

Abstract: Controversy surrounding the presidential elections in Zimbabwe, and the manner in which this matter has been handled by African heads of state, has cast serious doubts on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD) was launched in October 2001 as a blueprint for Africa's regeneration. Its limited approach to interrogating the global political economy has already been commented upon elsewhere.' This commentary, however, rather concentrates on holding NEPAD's commitment to democracy and peace signed by African elites themselves to account. It contrasts the actual concrete action that various African elites have pursued (or not pursued) in the aftermath of the Zimbabwe presidential election with the rhetoric they have been advancing in recent months. The NEPAD document itself asserts that 'African peoples have begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and political leadership. These developments are, however, uneven and inadequate and need to be further expedited.'2 There is, so the document claims, 'a new resolve to deal with conflicts and censure deviation from the [democratic] norm'.3 This springs from the view that 'development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance'.4 The NEPAD shows, the document claims, that 'Africa undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy, which core components include political pluralism, allowing for Ian Taylor teaches international relations at the University of Botswana and is also visiting research fellow at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. 1. Ian Taylor and Philip Nel, "'Getting the rhetoric right", getting the strategy wrong: "New Africa", globalisation and the confines of elite reformism', Third World Quarterly 23, 1 (February 2002), pp. 163-180. For an assessment of the NEPAD initiation see above, pp. 387-402, Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr, 'From crisis to renewal: towards a successful implementation of the new partnership for Africa's development'. 2. The New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development, October 2001, p. 2. 3. Ibid., p. 10. 4. Ibid., p. 17.

Uganda's referendum 2000: The silent boycott: A comment

Abstract: In the June 2000 referendum, Ugandans were asked to choose between the existing 'movement' system and a multiparty system. Bratton and Lambright (BL) did a survey of people's attitudes to democracy and argued that there was an 'extensive "silent" boycott' of the referendum 'among persons who sympathized with the idea of multiparty competition'. Such people did not like the referendum choice 'which they interpreted as being between a hegemonic movement and an unacceptable set of old political parties'. This main finding is questioned. Apart from methodological problems, it is argued that more context-specific analyses of the referendum results are needed to understand public opinion in Uganda about democracy and the movement system. More importantly, BL ignore the fact that the movement system is a combination of no-party political arrangements and devolution, implicitly assuming that the latter has no impact on present attitudes to government systems and democracy. There is a need to conceptualize and assess the significance of devolution in democratization processes in Africa and how it may influence public opinion on democracy. SINCE THE END OF THE 1980s, MUCH OF AFRICA has seen a move away from authoritarian forms of government back to multiparty systems. This is one of the most important political developments on the continent during the last three decades.2 Uganda is an important exception to this general trend. Here President Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) have invented a system of government - the movement system - which they claim is more suitable for Africa than Western-style multiparty competition. It has three main features. All Ugandans are deemed to be members of the NRM. Moreover, political parties are allowed to exist, but are banned from most political activities. Finally, a substantial devolution ('decentralization' in Ugandan parlance) of authority, resources and political processes has occurred through Resistance (now called Local) Councils. The process Ole Therkildsen is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen. He wishes to thank Astrid Blom, Julie Koch, Jorgen Elklit and Stig Jensen for valuable comments.

Continuing a conversation: prospects for African studies in the 21st century

Abstract: subjects'.' And within its pages, for the past twenty years, African Affairs has sustained a conversation on the state of African Studies in the United Kingdom: on how 'all African subjects' are pursued, understood and explained both to academic and to wider audiences. That conversation's most agitated tones were heard first in April 1986, midway through the Thatcher years, when a colloquium on 'The State of African Studies' was sponsored by the Royal African Society. Two of the papers presented there appeared as articles and they were followed by a case study of a discipline at one of the 'Hayter centres'. Different in scope, the three pieces were alike in their pessimism. Michael Twaddle summarized the proceedings of the colloquium (with its background of 'the drying-up of British government funding', 'staff erosions', and 'financially somewhat gloomy setting') and concluded that, unless effective remedial measures were taken, 'Richard Hodder-Williams's children most probably will not be studying Africa if they attend some British university still worthy of the name in the year 2000'.2 Hodder-Williams, parent of this fear, surveyed Africanists in British universities and warned that the continuation of their line was 'in danger of disappearing by the end of the century'.3 Tony Hopkins was equally bleak. Remarkable as 'the body of literature contained under the rubric of African studies' was, 'yet the subject is dying because its practitioners are fading away'.4 A few years later, John Fage reflected on 40 years dedicated to the study

Briefing: Famine in southern Africa

Abstract: ages between now and the next main harvest in April or May of next year. Approximately six million people face critical food shortages in Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi alone.1 The food crisis has many causes, which vary in magnitude from country to country. Climate, bad governance, HIV/AIDS, unsustainable debt2 and collapsing public services have all contributed. While the food crisis has undoubtedly been triggered by bad weather, the climatic shock was not atypical for the region; rainfall, although erratic, has been average for the 2001-2 season.3 Much more serious droughts were experienced in the early 1990s, for example.4 A major cause of the food crisis is the failure of agricultural policies, themselves often decided or heavily influenced by the international financial institutions and donors, and in some cases most notably Zimbabwe exacerbated by the whims of national governments. This food crisis is not a natural disaster. It is, above all, a catastrophe caused by poor policy. Across the region, the UN's World Food Programme (WFP) and a range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have already started distributing humanitarian aid, and are gearing up to deliver as much aid as possible in order to avert a famine. In many places, this is the second or third consecutive year of food shortages. Already in parts of Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe people are employing high-risk strategies to survive, such as eating potentially poisonous wild foods or stealing crops. Others are trying to cope by reducing meals to just one a day, or by resorting to prostitution. However, prostitution is potentially lethal in these countries, where up to one in three people is infected with HIV/AIDs. Even where food is available, prices are rising owing to overall scarcity and difficulties with transporting it to remote areas. A recent Oxfam assessment in Shangombo District in Zambia's southern province reported that