Showing papers in "American Journal of Political Science in 1991"
TL;DR: In this article, a dynamic, spatial analysis of the entire roll call voting record from 1789 to 1985 is presented, revealing a structure characterized by a predominant major dimension with, at times, a significant, but less important second dimension.
Abstract: Congressional roll call voting has been highly structured for most of U.S. history. The structure is revealed by a dynamic, spatial analysis of the entire roll call voting record from 1789 to 1985. The space is characterized by a predominant major dimension with, at times, a significant, but less important second dimension. In the modern era, spatial positions are very stable. This stability is such that, under certain conditions, short run forecasting of roll call votes is possible. Since the end of World War II, changes in congressional voting patterns have occurred almost entirely through the process of replacement of retiring or defeated legislators with new members. Politically, selection is far more important than adaptation.
744 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, an alternative logic of alliances to the capability aggregation model where both allies receive security from an alliance is proposed. But the alternative logic assumes that one partner receives autonomy benefits, and the other, security benefits from the alliance.
Abstract: This paper proposes an alternative logic of alliances to the capability aggregation model where both allies receive security from an alliance. In this alternative logic, one partner receives autonomy benefits, and the other, security benefits from the alliance. The former type of alliances are called symmetric and the latter asymmetric. The paper develops both logics from a model of alliance choices in the face of trade-offs between autonomy and security and provides a precise definition of those two concepts. It then derives a series of critical tests that show the trade-off model is superior to the capability aggregation model. First, asymmetric alliances will be easier to form and last longer than symmetric alliances. Second, regardless of the type of alliance, the greater the change in its members' individual capabilities, the more likely it will be broken. Third, second-rank major powers will be more likely to form asymmetric alliances as their capabilities increase. All the hypotheses are supported by a statistical examination of military alliances formed between 1815 and 1965. The implications of the argument for several topics in international relations theory are drawn out.
509 citations
TL;DR: The authors explored cross-generational change using three-wave parent-offspring data and found that parents play a major role in determining the initial political direction of their offspring and continue to play a significant though reduced role in the over-time development of their adult children.
Abstract: Movement of party identification, both within and across generations, is increasingly seen as responsive to current policy preferences. We explore cross-generational change using three-wave parent-offspring data. The results strongly support the revised view of a more malleable partisanship influenced by offspring issue preferences. Nonetheless, parents play a major role in determining the initial political direction of their offspring and continue to play a significant though reduced role in the over-time development of their adult children. The results are similar for presidential preferences, though parental influence is entirely channeled through offspring partisanship.
354 citations
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TL;DR: For example, this paper found that white conservatives are more likely to favor government help for blacks who have acted in accord with traditional values, and that discrimination is most common in the absence of any ideological stance.
Abstract: This study combines the methodological advantages of a fully experimental design and a genuinely representative survey sample to explore the nature and workings of contemporary racial prejudice. The correlational results both replicate and extend the findings of earlier work. Political conservatism, for example, was found once again to be correlated with opposition to policies to assist blacks and with support for negative images of blacks as lazy and irresponsible. The experimental results, however, pose fundamental challenges to symbolic and modem racism theories, which contend that there is a new kind of racism in America that takes the form of racial prejudice plus traditional, conservative values. The experimental results demonstrate, on the one hand, that conservatives are not more likely to refuse government help to blacks who have violated traditional values; on the other hand, the results demonstrate that conservatives are more likely to favor government help for blacks who have acted in accord with traditional values. The experimental results, moreover, identify a key condition for the expression of discrimination-a focus on group rather than individual claimants-and demonstrate that discrimination is not encouraged by a particular ideological outlook, conservative or liberal, but rather is most common in the absence of any ideological stance.
282 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the distribution of particularistic benefits in the context of a legislative model that reflects the sequential nature of proposal making and voting and characterized the set of distributive programs that a legislature will adopt in a perfect Nash equilibrium.
Abstract: Inherent in majority rule institutions is the incentive to particularize benefits and to collectivize costs, and this majoritarian incentive can lead to the adoption of economically inefficient distributive programs. These inefficient, or pork barrel, programs are often said to occur under a norm of universalism in which benefits are distributed among all legislative districts. The distribution of particularistic benefits is studied in the context of a legislative model that reflects the sequential nature of proposal making and voting. The set of distributive programs that a legislature will adopt in a perfect Nash equilibrium is characterized, and although inefficient programs will be adopted, the distribution of benefits is majoritarian and not universalistic. The set of programs that will be adopted depends on the amendment procedure used by the legislature, and the set corresponding to a closed rule that prohibits amendments includes very inefficient programs. Through the use of procedures, however, the legislature is able to control the extent of the inefficiency. For example, allowing amendments under an open rule limits, but does not eliminate, the inefficiency of the programs that would be adopted by the legislature. From an ex ante perspective, the legislature prefers an open rule to a closed rule for those policy jurisdictions in which inefficient programs can be expected to be proposed.
234 citations
TL;DR: A review of interest groups in political science can be found in this paper, where the authors focus on how interest groups influence policy in a democracy and how the institutions of government should be designed to encourage or control this influence.
Abstract: Classical pluralists, the authors of The Federalist Papers, and many modem scholars have emphasized the critical role of the interests in shaping policies. Still, in general, deductive theory has not provided the hypotheses and explanations offered by political science in studying interests. Economists studying interest groups have taken a more abstract, analytical approach, but this work is largely unknown in political science, perhaps because it is enshrouded in jargon and arcane terminology. We review this literature, using as our motivation two fundamental questions: First, how do interest groups influence policy in a democracy? Second, how should the institutions of government be designed to encourage or control this influence? The models we review are generally of a formal, mathematical nature, but we focus solely on their intuitive content and their contribution to our knowledge of democracy and representation.
225 citations
TL;DR: The authors examined the acquisition of partisanship by immigrants and subsequent generations of Latinos and Asian Americans and found that the longer Latino immigrants have been in the United States, the more likely they are to identify as Democrats and to have strong party preferences.
Abstract: In this paper we examine the acquisition of partisanship by immigrants and subsequent generations of Latinos and Asian Americans. The data we analyze are derived from a survey of California residents in late 1984. We find that the longer Latino immigrants have been in the United States, the more likely they are to identify as Democrats and to have strong party preferences. We find age-related gains in both Democratic support and in the strength of partisanship among subsequent generations of Latinos as well. In line with our hypotheses about their foreign policy concerns, the data also suggest that immigrants from China, Korea, and Southeast Asia become more Republican with increased exposure to American politics. Other Asian immigrants and subsequent generations of Asian Americans exhibit no such trends in either the direction of their party preferences or in partisan intensity.
211 citations
TL;DR: The authors examined variability in the impact of liberal-conservative identifications on citizens' issue attitudes using data from the 1984 CPS National Election Study, and it focused on two variables: education and level of conceptualization.
Abstract: This paper examines variability in the impact of liberal-conservative identifications on citizens' issue attitudes. The analysis uses data from the 1984 CPS National Election Study, and it focuses on two variables: education and level of conceptualization. The results show that both of these variables have positive effects on liberal-conservative thinking. They lead to substantial individual differences in the degree to which citizens orient their issue attitudes along ideological lines. The analysis has a number of important implications for our understanding of American public opinion.
211 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a model of the strategic calculus of voting that incorporates the behavior of groups is presented, showing that if candidates choose different positions, positive turnout is possible in (partial) equilibrium and is generally larger than that without group rationality.
Abstract: A model of the strategic calculus of voting that incorporates the behavior of groups is presented. If candidates choose different positions, positive turnout is possible in (partial) equilibrium and is generally larger than that without group rationality. Nevertheless, if candidates are probability maximizers and a unique (general) equilibrium exists, the candidates will choose equivalent positions and turnout will be zero even with group rationality. But if candidates care about both policy and winning, they will choose different positions and cause positive turnout. This turnout will be larger than that that would occur without group rationality. Group rationality, alone, cannot explain positive turnout in a (general) equilibrium theory of elections; it does imply larger turnout in conjunction with policy-oriented candidates than would be predicted solely by individualistic rational behavior.
206 citations
TL;DR: This article analyzed the asymptotic mean squared errors associated with the instrumental variables estimator when the instrument may not be perfectly exogenous and showed that even seemingly minor misspecifications can play havoc with statistical inferences based on "quasi-instrumental variable" estimators.
Abstract: The trade-off between the efficiency of an instrumental variable and its exogeneity is widely recognized but little understood. This paper specifies the terms of that trade-off by analyzing the asymptotic mean squared errors associated with the instrumental variables estimator when the instrument may not be perfectly exogenous. The analysis shows that even seemingly minor misspecifications can play havoc with statistical inferences based on "quasi-instrumental variable" estimators. Simple rules of thumb are derived by which intuition can be applied to choices among alternative estimators based on different instrumental variables, or between instrumental variable and ordinary least squares estimators. The theoretical analysis is applied to an example drawn from Jacobson's (1990) and Green and Krasno's (1990) work on congressional campaign spending and is bolstered by Monte Carlo simulations that, for the most part, reproduce the patterns of errors predicted by the asymptotic results.
194 citations
TL;DR: Kuklinski et al. as mentioned in this paper presented a survey of political science departments in the United States, including the University of Illinois, University of Kentucky, and the State University of New York at Stony Brook.
Abstract: James H. Kuklinski, Department of Political Science and Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois Ellen Riggle, Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky Victor Ottati, Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Stony Brook Norbert Schwarz, ZUMA, Mannheim, Federal Republic of Germany Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Department of Psychology, University of Illinois
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine expressed policy beliefs of organizational elites in the highly charged policy debate over outer continental shelf energy leasing from 1969 to 1987 and employ interrupted time series regression models, corrected for autocorrelation, to analyze the origins of defection from and to advocacy coalitions by the U.S. Department of Interior.
Abstract: The focus of this paper is on the processes by which change occurs in the structure and membership of policy subsystem coalitions. Employing longitudinal data derived from content analysis of congressional hearings, we examine expressed policy beliefs of organizational elites in the highly charged policy debate waged over outer continental shelf energy leasing from 1969 to 1987. Using the stated policy positions of representatives of organizations that are regular participants in the subsystem, we analyze differences in the level of constraint evident on the expression of policy positions by representatives of purposive and material groups. We then analyze the content and stability of advocacy coalitions within the policy subsystem, assessing the membership of coalitions and tracking defections to and from coalitions over the 1969-87 time period. Finally, we employ interrupted time series regression models, corrected for autocorrelation, to analyze the origins of defection from and to advocacy coalitions by the U.S. Department of Interior. Overall, our intent is to explain the internal workings of subsystems-and their responsiveness to exogenous events-in a highly polarized policy dispute in a manner that helps integrate our understanding of subsystem dynamics with theories of group representation and principal-agent behavior.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors extended and elaborated the power transition theory, applying the power equality argument to great powers and their alliance structure and adding a "satisfaction" index, applied at the state level.
Abstract: Recent studies of the power transition and hegemonic stability theory have focused on the power distribution, uneven growth of power, and the transition of power among great powers in the international system as main causes of major war. This paper extends and elaborates the power transition theory, applying the power equality argument to great powers and their alliance structure and adding a "satisfaction" index, applied at the state level. The theoretical development and the empirical findings in this essay suggest that the equality of power between the two great powers, after taking into account the effects of alliances, has a substantial impact on the outbreak of major wars: especially that major war is most likely when the power of the dissatisfied challenger, after considering its allies' support, approximates the power of the dominant nation and its allies who support the existing international order.
TL;DR: The authors presented a personal attributes theory of liberalism in the U.S. Supreme Court for the past seven decades that includes political, social cleavage, family origins, and career socialization variables.
Abstract: We discuss the circumstances under which analysts may expect statistical models to be time and content bound and suggest that conclusions that personal attributes models are powerful only for the postwar U.S. Supreme Court justices are premature. We present a personal attributes theory of liberalism in the U.S. Supreme Court for the past seven decades that includes political, social cleavage, family origins, and career socialization variables. We apply it to the behavior of the 46 justices serving from 1916 through 1988 (i.e., through Anthony Kennedy). Our theory-based models provide appealing and statistically robust explanations of the justices' behavior across the 72 years.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined not only the direct, immediate effects of defense spending but also the indirect impact of arms expenditures on education spending using data from 1953 to 1987 and found no negative short-term effects but do show significant indirect long-term trade-offs.
Abstract: Studies of the guns versus butter trade-off found no evidence for the existence of a trade-off in the pre-Reagan era (see Russett 1982; Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher 1983; Mintz 1989). This study extends prior research by examining not only the direct, immediate effects of defense spending but also the indirect impact of arms expenditures on education spending. A three-equation model is specified and empirically estimated using data from 1953 to 1987. The results show no negative short-term effects but do show significant indirect long-term trade-offs.
TL;DR: Based on unique time series data from 11 election studies (1956-88), about 49 out of 50 Swedes tell the truth when asked whether they voted as mentioned in this paper, but only 74% of the nonvoters say they did not vote.
Abstract: Based on unique time series data from 11 election studies (1956-88), about 49 out of 50 Swedes tell the truth when asked whether they voted. Over 99% of the voters say that they voted, but only 74% of the nonvoters say they did not vote. Similar to the results from voter validation studies in the United States, nonvoters in Sweden with characteristics predisposing them to vote are less likely to say they did not vote. Compared to false nonvoters (voted but said they did not), false voters (did not vote but said they did) are more likely to identify with a political party and to have expressed an intention to vote but are also less likely to have actually voted in the prior election.
TL;DR: This article examined the influence of the incumbency advantage on two features of the electoral system in U.S. House elections: electoral responsiveness and partisan bias using a district-level seats-votes model of House elections.
Abstract: The dramatic increase in the electoral advantage of incumbency has sparked widespread interest among congressional researchers over the last 15 years. Although many scholars have studied the advantages of incumbency for incumbents, few have analyzed its effects on the underlying electoral system. We examine the influence of the incumbency advantage on two features of the electoral system in U.S. House elections: electoral responsiveness and partisan bias. Using a district-level seats-votes model of House elections, we are able to distinguish systemic changes from unique, election-specific variations. Our results confirm the significant drop in responsiveness, and an even steeper decline outside the South, over the past 40 years. Contrary to expectations, we find that increased incumbency advantage explains less than a third of this trend, indicating that some other unknown factor is responsible. Moreover, our analysis also reveals another dramatic pattern, largely overlooked in the congressional literature: in the 1940s and 1950s the electoral system was severely biased in favor of the Republican party. The system shifted incrementally from this severe Republican bias over the next several decades to a moderate Democratic bias by the mid-1980s. Interestingly, changes in incumbency advantage explain virtually all of this trend in partisan bias since the 1940s. By removing incumbency advantage and the existing configuration of incumbents and challengers analytically, our analysis reveals an underlying electoral system that remains consistently biased in favor of the Republican party. Thus, our results indicate that incumbency advantage affects the underlying electoral system, but contrary to the conventional wisdom, this changes the trend in partisan bias more than electoral responsiveness.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors decomposed test-retest correlations between attitude reports into components due to attitude change and attitude measurement unreliability, and found that the persistence and potency of political attitudes vary more across citizens than they do across attitude object categories.
Abstract: It has often been argued that political attitudes vary along a continuum from highly symbolic to nonsymbolic and that symbolic political attitudes are more stable across the life cycle than are nonsymbolic political attitudes. The evidence used to support this contention shows that the overtime consistency of attitude reports is high for symbolic attitudes, such as political party affiliation, and low for nonsymbolic attitudes, such as attitudes toward specific government policies. This paper reports three investigations that decomposed test-retest correlations between attitude reports into components due to attitude change and attitude measurement unreliability. Data from 1956-60, 1972-76, and 1980 National Election Panel Studies (NES) revealed that reports of symbolic attitudes were more consistent over time because they contained less random measurement error, not because these attitudes were more persistent over time. The differences in measurement precision across attitude object categories appear to be due to differences in the format of the survey questions used to measure them. It therefore seems that the persistence and potency of political attitudes vary more across citizens than they do across attitude object categories. All of these findings suggest the need for revision of conventional wisdom about the viability of some central assertions of democratic theory.
TL;DR: In this article, a positive explanation of rulers' motivations to grant property rights and citizens' motivations for petitioning for them and to respect them is presented, along with a contemporary example to check against easily available detail.
Abstract: Property rights enable private persons or groups to control resources that might otherwise be controlled politically. That these rights (to use, sell, rent, profit from, and exclude others from) exist and are recognized means that rulers allow persons other than themselves to exercise control over valuables. In the abstract this is a puzzling fact. Why should rulers, with their supposed monopoly of force, leave great treasure in hands other than their own? Yet they do, and, presumably, they have good reason to do so. To identify their reason is to provide a partial explanation, at least, of the origin of property rights. Traditional justifications of property rights ordinarily include some reference to origins. Unfortunately, many descriptions of origins devised for justificatory purposes are not historically or scientifically convincing and thereby weaken the justifications. To remedy this weakness, we set forth a positive explanation of rulers' motivations to grant property rights and citizens' motivations to petition for them and to respect them. We illustrate our theory with a contemporary example so that it, unlike most other discussions of origins, can be checked against easily available detail. But first a caveat. Our purpose is not to debate the philosophical justification of rights. We recognize, of course, that despite our self-imposed restrictions, our theory may have implications for these justifications that depend crucially on incomplete descriptions of origins.
TL;DR: Using empirical evidence from 140 large urban school districts, this article found that political action can counter the perceived social-class biases of urban bureaucracies, and that politics is the major means available to minorities to influence policy implementation.
Abstract: One prominent finding of the urban services literature is that politics matters very little. Urban services are distributed according to bureaucratic decision rules that result in "unpatterned inequalities." This research challenges previous studies arguing that their findings are the function of narrow definitions, a neglect of the political process, unrealistic assumptions about citizen preferences, and failure to consider the nature of bureaucratic discretion. Using empirical evidence from 140 large urban school districts, this study finds that politics is the major means available to minorities to influence policy implementation. Political action can counter the perceived social-class biases of urban bureaucracies.
TL;DR: In this paper, a state-level model of presidential election outcomes is developed and empirically tested for the years 1960 to 1984, using pooled cross-sectional analysis, and the model specifies presidential elections as a function of long-term and short-term, political and economic, statelevel and national variables.
Abstract: In this study a state-level model of presidential election outcomes is developed and empirically tested for the years 1960 to 1984, using pooled cross-sectional analysis. The model specifies presidential elections as a function of long-term and short-term, political and economic, state-level and national variables. Several important findings emerge from the analysis. First, state-level presidential election outcomes are not responsive only to state or national factors but are reflections of both. The state of the national economy, presidential incumbency and popularity, state political ideology, and partisanship are found to be the most important determinants of presidential election outcomes. Second, although not as powerful, there is evidence of a fairly strong presidential home state advantage, as well as a somewhat weaker home region advantage. No such advantage is found for vicepresidential candidates. Finally, national factors are found to improve the accuracy of the model in some states (mostly Plains and Mountain West states) much more than in other states.
TL;DR: The authors examined the role of the English Court of Appeal in the English judicial system and examined the explanatory power of party capability theory in conjunction with other models that purport to explain the circumstances in which appellate courts intervene in lower court rulings.
Abstract: On the assumption that the theory and data used by social scientists to understand appellate courts in political systems are very much bound to the U.S. context and, hence, are not necessarily generalizable, this paper examines the role of the English Court of Appeal in the English judicial system. Party capability theory is the primary framework by which I explore the circumstances in which the Court of Appeal intervenes in decisions reached in lower forums by reversing and remanding appeals raised in civil cases. Bivariate and multivariate analyses are presented that examine the explanatory power of party capability theory in conjunction with other models that purport to explain the circumstances in which appellate courts intervene in lower court rulings. The paper concludes by examining the implications of party capability theory as a framework for understanding appellate courts cross-nationally.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the effectiveness of the veto weapon with a simple model of presidential powers that incorporates informal institutional structure into an otherwise standard agenda-control model of the formal institutional structure governing the legislative process.
Abstract: A president's power to veto is widely recognized as an important weapon in the struggle with Congress over legislation. In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of the veto weapon with a simple model of presidential powers that incorporates informal institutional structure-the president's unique position as the focus of public attention-into an otherwise standard agenda-control model of the formal institutional structure governing the legislative process. We show that the president can exploit this public attention to make commitments regarding his veto intentions that, given the formal institutional structure, will enhance the value of the veto. One implication of the model is that commitment over "principles" (e.g., no taxes) will sometimes be more effective than commitment over "degree" (e.g., 3.2% tax rate). In addition, a president can sometimes improve his utility by making commitments that ultimately lead to a veto that is overridden.
TL;DR: In this paper, a behavioral scale of evangelically oriented Catholicism and the distinctive political orientations of those who score high on it is presented. But the authors focus on the disjuncture between liberal and conservative positions on different sets of issues and the clarity of the message offered by Catholic religious leaders.
Abstract: As interest in the cultural bases of American political behavior increases, scholars are paying closer attention to the measurement of religiosity and to the mechanisms by which religious values become politically relevant. This research, based on a parish-connected sample of 2,667 Roman Catholics, enjoins the measurement issue by developing a behavioral scale of evangelically oriented Catholicism and shows the distinctive political orientations of those who score high on it. A striking disjuncture between liberal and conservative positions on different sets of issues is discussed in terms of dual reference groups-Catholics and evangelicals-and the clarity of the message offered by Catholic religious leaders.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compared interest group and institutional theories, using state telecommunications regulation after the AT&T divestiture in 1984 as a laboratory, and found that institutional factors, including regulatory resources, ideology, and legislative party control, have more influence than interest group pressure.
Abstract: Social scientists have not yet developed and tested a satisfactory explanation of the causes of deregulation of American industry because there are too few federal cases for quantitative analysis. This article compares interest group and institutional theories, using state telecommunications regulation after the AT&T divestiture in 1984 as a laboratory. All state public utility commissions faced similar policy choices in a short period of time. The logistic regression analyses of state decisions about rate structures and competitive entry show that institutional factors, including regulatory resources, ideology, and legislative party control, have more influence than interest group pressure. The article recommends using the larger number of cases and wider variance in state policies generally to understand institutional choice.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors reformulate the partisanship thesis in light of four claims leveled against it and conclude that the forms and institutional foundations of left partisan policies differ among democratic capitalist countries.
Abstract: We reformulate the partisanship thesis in light of four claims leveled against it. The reformulated version, ideological partisanship, is based upon the theory that similar rates of economic growth may follow from the different use of policy instruments. Owing to their role as determinants of investment and growth, interest rates, business taxation rates, and the redistribution of the tax burden between capital gains and earned income are examined. We advance models that take into account other views of politics beside the partisan one, and test for political influences. The United States is characterized by very pronounced partisan differences in national economic policy with Democratic administrations seeking to promote growth through a consumption driven, while Republican administrations promote an investment-driven strategy. Democratic administrations also seek to shift the tax burden toward corporations and owners of capital. These findings are examined in light of the comparative political economy literature. We conclude that the forms and institutional foundations of left partisan policies differ among democratic capitalist countries.
TL;DR: This article used the Australian party system as a case study to test two hypotheses to explain the role of political factions and tendencies in the Australian political system and found that their influence is primarily on party activists and members.
Abstract: Although they are traditionally viewed as destabilizing influences, political factions and tendencies perform important adaptative functions in party systems. Using the Australian party system as a case study, this paper tests two hypotheses to explain their adaptative role. An electoral hypothesis proposes that factions and tendencies have broadened their respective party's electoral appeal, while an organizational hypothesis suggests that their influence is primarily on party activists and members. The results from a matched sample of candidates and voters collected during the 1987 Australian federal election reject the electoral hypothesis but give support to the organizational hypothesis. The implications of these findings for the study of political parties in advanced industrial society is discussed.
TL;DR: Luskin's article in this article provides a useful service by appropriately qualifying several points I made in my 1986 American Journal of Political Science article Whereas I focused on how to avoid common mistakes in quantitative political science, Luskin clarifies ways to extract some useful information from usually problematic statistics: correlation coefficients, standardized coefficients, and especially RZ Since these three statistics are very closely related (and indeed deterministic functions of one another in some cases), I focus in this discussion primarily on R2, the most widely used and abused
Abstract: Robert Luskin's article in this issue provides a useful service by appropriately qualifying several points I made in my 1986 American Journal of Political Science article Whereas I focused on how to avoid common mistakes in quantitative political science, Luskin clarifies ways to extract some useful information from usually problematic statistics: correlation coefficients, standardized coefficients, and especially RZ Since these three statistics are very closely related (and indeed deterministic functions of one another in some cases), I focus in this discussion primarily on R2, the most widely used and abused Luskin also widens the discussion to various kinds of specification tests, a general issue I also address In fact, as Beck (1991) reports, a large number of formal specification tests are just functions of R2, with differences among them primarily due to how much each statistic penalizes one for including extra parameters and fewer observations Reasons for Concern about Model Specification Quantitative political scientists often worry about model selection and specification, asking questions about parameter identification, autocorrelated or heteroscedastic disturbances, parameter constancy, variable choice, measurement error, endogeneity, functional forms, stochastic assumptions, and selection bias, among numerous others These model specification questions are all important, but we may have forgotten why we pose them Political scientists commonly give three reasons: (I) finding the "true" model, or the "full" explanation; (2) prediction; and (3) estimating specific causal effects I argue here that (1) is used the most but useful the least; (2) is very useful but not usually in political science where forecasting is not often a central concern; and (3) correctly represents the goals of political scientists and should form the basis of most of our quantitative empirical work
TL;DR: In this paper, the connection between deterrence stability and threat credibility is examined conceptually and theoretically, and the strategic implications of this notion of credibility are explored, as well as the critical role played by uncertainty in deterrence.
Abstract: In this paper the connection between deterrence stability and threat credibility is examined conceptually and theoretically. We formulate as a model of bilateral deterrence a game of incomplete information in which each player is uncertain about its opponent's preferences should it unilaterally alter the status quo. Uncertainty about the preferences of one's opponent leads to uncertainty about the opponent's willingness to retaliate. By identifying the credibility of each player's retaliatory threat with the probability that a player prefers retaliation to capitulation, we maintain consistency with both the traditional strategic literature, where credibility usually means believability, and with game theory, where credibility is usually synonymous with sequential rationality (i.e., subgame perfect equilibrium). We analyze formally the strategic implications of this conception of credibility and thus explore the critical role played by uncertainty in deterrence. By explicitly modeling uncertainty, we are able to understand the role of threats in contributing to, or detracting from, the robustness of a deterrence relationship.
TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of local economic development policy on manufacturing activity for 212 cities were estimated with a disequilibrium adjustment model, and the results provide evidence that local policies have positive effects on capital investment but little effect on employment.
Abstract: This article, after examining the evidence for the conventional wisdom that development policies are ineffective, reports the results of an empirical analysis of the effects of local policies on manufacturing growth in U.S. cities. In response to design difficulties in previous studies, the effects of local economic development policy on manufacturing activity for 212 cities were estimated with a disequilibrium adjustment model. The results provide evidence that local policies have positive effects on capital investment but little effect on employment.