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Showing papers in "American Political Science Review in 1992"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a series of experiments exploring covenants alone (both one-shot and repeated communication opportunities), swords alone (repeated opportunities to sanction each other), and covenants combined with an internal sword are presented.
Abstract: Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by an external agent. One such situation may occur in relation to common pool resources, which are natural or man-made resources whose yield is subtractable and whose exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible). Examples include fisheries, forests, grazing ranges, irrigation systems, and groundwater basins. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that appropriators in common pool resources develop credible commitments in many cases without relying on external authorities. We present findings from a series of experiments exploring (1) covenants alone (both one-shot and repeated communication opportunities); (2) swords alone (repeated opportunities to sanction each other); and (3) covenants combined with an internal sword (one-shot communication followed by repeated opportunities to sanction each other).

1,926 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors used the components, both retrospective and prospective, of the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) as intervening variables between economic conditions and approval, and found that the prospective component fully accounts for the presidential approval time series.
Abstract: T | 'he usual model of electoral reaction to economic conditions assumes the "retrospective" economic voter who bases expectations solely on recent economic performance or personal economic experience (voter as "peasant"). A second model assumes a "sophisticated" economic voter who incorporates new information about the future into personal economic expectations (voter as "banker"). Using the components, both retrospective and prospective, of the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) as intervening variables between economic conditions and approval, we find that the prospective component fully accounts for the presidential approval time series. With aggregate consumer expectations about long-term business conditions in the approval equation, neither the usual economic indicators not the other ICS components matter. Moreover, short-term changes in consumer expectations respond more to current forecasts than to the current economy. The qualitative result is a rational expectations outcome: the electorate anticipates the economic future and rewards or punishes the president for economic events before they happen. Economics moves political behavior. With hard times, administrations lose support; with good times, they gain it. We know this to be true. But when we ask how-by what processes-the political translation of economic experience occurs, the an

1,033 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article examined the role of democratic politics and political institutions in shaping social welfare spending in 18 contemporary capitalist democracies and found that both partisan and nonpartisan facets of political and economic institutions shape contemporary social welfare effort.
Abstract: We examine the roles of democratic politics and political institutions in shaping social welfare spending in 18 contemporary capitalist democracies. We explore the social spending consequences of government partisanship, electoral competition and turnout, and the self-interested behaviors of politicians and bureaucrats, as well as such relatively durable facets of political institutions as neocorporatism, state centralization, and traditionalist policy legacies. Pooled time series analyses of welfare effort in 18 nations during the 1960–82 period show that electoral turnout, as well as left and center governments increase welfare effort; that the welfare efforts of governments led by particular types of parties show significant differences and vary notably with the strength of oppositional (and junior coalitional) parties; and that relatively neocorporatist, centralized, and traditionalistic polities are high on welfare effort. Overall, our findings suggest that contrary to many claims, both partisan and nonpartisan facets of democratic politics and political institutions shape contemporary social welfare effort.

691 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other and are also more likely to prevail in wars with autocratic states as discussed by the authors, which is also the case of the United States.
Abstract: Democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other. They are also more likely to prevail in wars with autocratic states. I offer an explanation of this syndrome of powerful pacifism drawn from the microeconomic theory of the state. State rent seeking creates an imperialist bias in a country's foreign policy. This bias is smallest in democracies, where the costs to society of controlling the state are relatively low, and greatest in autocracies, where the costs are higher. As a result of this bias, autocracies will be more expansionist and, in turn, war-prone. In their relations with each other, where the absence of this imperialist bias is manifest, the relative pacifism of democracies appears. In addition, democracies, constrained by their societies from earning rents, will devote greater absolute resources to security, enjoy greater societal support for their policies, and tend to form overwhelming countercoalitions against expansionist autocracies. It follows that democracies will be more likely to win wars.

624 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present formal measurement models for both conventional and revised conceptualizations of legitimacy orientations and compare the fit of the two models systematically on data from the U.S. electorate.
Abstract: Political legitimacy is a key concept in both macro and micro theories. Pioneers in survey-based research on alienation and system support envisioned addressing macro questions about legitimacy with the sophisticated empiricism of individual-level methodology but failed; and a succession of innovations in item wording and questionnaire construction only led to an excessive concern with measurement issues at the individual level. I return to an enumeration of the informational requirements for assessing legitimacy in hopes of finding a conceptualization that better utilizes available survey indicators to tap relevant macro dimensions. I specify formal measurement models for both conventional and revised conceptualizations of legitimacy orientations and compare the fit of the two models systematically on data from the U.S. electorate. The revised model appears preferable on both theoretical and empirical grounds.

444 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors synthesize aspects of an economic approach to entrepreneurship with concepts used in political science, and then tie these theoretical observations to the emergence of entrepreneurs in local governments and test components of their theory using observations from a large set of suburban municipal governments.
Abstract: Political scientists have been increasingly interested in entrepreneurs—individuals who change the direction and flow of politics. In this research note, we synthesize aspects of an economic approach to entrepreneurship with concepts used in political science. We then tie these theoretical observations to the emergence of entrepreneurs in local governments and test components of our theory using observations from a large set of suburban municipal governments. Empirically, we identify several conditions that affect the probability that an entrepreneur will emerge in a local government, especially slack budgetary resources that the political entrepreneur can reallocate. We also find that the probability with which an entrepreneur is found in local government is a function of the difficulty of overcoming collective action problems in a community.

380 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Yoav Peled1
TL;DR: The Arab citizenship status, while much more restricted than the Jewish, has both induced and enabled Arabs to conduct their political struggles within the framework of the law, in sharp contrast to the noncitizen Arabs of the occupied territories as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The citizenship status of its Arab citizens is the key to Israel's ability to function as an ethnic democracy, that is, a political system combining democratic institutions with the dominance of one ethnic group. The confluence of republicanism and ethnonationalism with liberalism, as principles of legitimation, has resulted in two types of citizenship: republican for Jews and liberal for Arabs. Thus, Arab citizens enjoy civil and political rights but are barred from attending to the common good.The Arab citizenship status, while much more restricted than the Jewish, has both induced and enabled Arabs to conduct their political struggles within the framework of the law, in sharp contrast to the noncitizen Arabs of the occupied territories. It may thus serve as a model for other dominant ethnic groups seeking to maintain both their dominance and a democratic system of government.

367 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors address several questions regarding party mobilization efforts, such as: Whom do the parties seek to mobilize? What are the individual and aggregate characteristics and criteria that shape party mobilization? And what are the intended and unintended consequences of partisan mobilization, both for individual voters and for the electorate more generally?
Abstract: As agents of electoral mobilization, political parties occupy an important role in the social flow of political communication. We address several questions regarding party mobilization efforts. Whom do the parties seek to mobilize? What are the individual and aggregate characteristics and criteria that shape party mobilization efforts? What are the intended and unintended consequences of partisan mobilization, both for individual voters and for the electorate more generally? In answering these questions we make several arguments. First, party efforts at electoral mobilization inevitably depend upon a process of social diffusion and informal persuasion, so that the party canvass serves as a catalyst aimed at stimulating a cascading mobilization process. Second, party mobilization is best seen as being environmentally contingent upon institutional arrangements, locally defined strategic constraints, and partisan divisions within particular electorates. Finally, the efforts of party organizations generate a layer of political structure within the electorate that sometimes competes with social structure and often exists independently from it.

346 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the content and internal logic of the Essence of Decision (EoD) models, and concluded that the models require substantial reformulation, and that the EoD models require a systematic critical analysis.
Abstract: The ideas in Graham Allison's Essence of Decision (1971) have had an enormous impact on the study and teaching of bureaucracy and foreign policy making. While Allison's work has received considerable critical attention, there has been surprisingly little examination of the content and internal logic of his models. We subject each of Allison's three models to a systematic critical analysis. Our conclusion is that the models require substantial reformulation.

324 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper investigated the presence of sophisticated voting in the 1988 presidential primaries, using data from the National Election Study's Super Tuesday survey, and found that respondents' choices were consistent with the calculus of voting and thus with sophisticated voting.
Abstract: Voters in multicandidate contests may confront circumstances under which it is in their interest to vote for a second- or even lower-ranked candidate. The U.S. electoral system, typically offering a choice between only two major contenders, rarely presents opportunities for this “sophisticated” voting. In presidential primaries, however, many plausible candidates may compete. We investigate the presence of sophisticated voting in the 1988 presidential primaries, using data from the National Election Study's Super Tuesday survey. We examine patterns of voting types based on ordinal measures of preferences among candidates and assessments of their chances of winning their party's nomination and estimate several models of choice, testing the multicandidate calculus of voting. Among both Republicans and Democrats, respondents' choices were consistent with the calculus of voting and thus with sophisticated voting.

301 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors used the U.S. Supreme Court cases involving the imposition of the death penalty since 1972 and estimated and evaluated the models' success in accounting for decisional outcomes, concluding that the legal perspective overpredicted liberal outcomes, the extralegal model conservative ones.
Abstract: How does the U.S. Supreme Court reach decisions? Since the 1940s, scholars have focused on two distinct explanations. The legal model suggests that the rule of law (stare decisis) is the key determinant. The extralegal model posits that an array of sociological, psychological, and political factors produce judicial outcomes. To determine which model better accounted for judicial decisions, we used Supreme Court cases involving the imposition of the death penalty since 1972 and estimated and evaluated the models' success in accounting for decisional outcomes. Although both models performed quite satisfactorily, they possessed disturbing weaknesses. The legal perspective overpredicted liberal outcomes, the extralegal model conservative ones. Given these results, we tested another proposition, namely that extralegal and legal frameworks present codependent, not mutually exclusive, explanations of decision making. Based on these results, we offer an integrated model of Supreme Court decision making that contemplates a range of political and environmental forces and doctrinal constraints.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors sketch an approach that distinguishes classes of interests according to their potentials for democratic transformation, and strengthen transformative expectations in democratic theory, and highlight how standard assumptions about the self help to justify limits to democratic participation.
Abstract: Democratic theories that argue for expanding the scope and domain of democracy assume that democratic experiences will transform individuals in democratic ways. Individuals are likely to become more public-spirited, tolerant, knowledgeable, and self-reflective than they would otherwise be. This assumption depends on viewing the self as socially and discursively constituted, a view that contrasts with the standard liberal-democratic view of the self as prepolitically constituted and narrowly self-interested. The importance of the social and discursive view of the self is that it highlights how standard assumptions about the self help to justify limits to democratic participation. As now conceptualized, however, the transformational assumption does not meet standard objections to expanding democracy. I sketch an approach that distinguishes classes of interests according to their potentials for democratic transformation, and strengthens—by qualifying—transformative expectations in democratic theory.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This work develops a model of two-party spatial elections that departs from the standard model in three respects: parties' information about voters' preferences is limited to polls, and parties are not perfect optimizers, that is, they are modelled as boundedly rational adaptive actors.
Abstract: We develop a model of two-party spatial elections that departs from the standard model in three respects: parties' information about voters' preferences is limited to polls; parties can be either office-seeking or ideological; and parties are not perfect optimizers, that is, they are modelled as boundedly rational adaptive actors. We employ computer search algorithms to model the adaptive behavior of parties and show that three distinct search algorithms lead to similar results. Our findings suggest that convergence in spatial voting models is robust to variations in the intelligence of parties. We also find that an adaptive party in a complex issue space may not be able to defeat a well-positioned incumbent.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors found that international wars can, under specified conditions, have domestically instigated consequences for violent regime change in the political systems of the participants, and that domestic politics play a larger role in national security policy than is generally believed by realist or neorealist theorists.
Abstract: Governments are likely to be held accountable for the success or failure of their foreign policies. Consequently, we claim that international wars can, under specified conditions, have domestically instigated consequences for violent regime change in the political systems of the participants. Drawing upon all international war participation between 1816 and 1975, we seek to answer the question, Do wars lead to violent changes of regime and if so, under what conditions? Three hypotheses set out the expected associations of a nation's initiator or target role in a war, the war outcome, and the costs of the war with domestically instigated violent changes of regime. Direct relationships are found for all three and hold even against possible threats to their validity and robustness. The results suggest that domestic politics play a larger role in national security policy than is generally believed by realist or neorealist theorists.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article developed a generalizable agenda control model that takes as given the observation that most voters are not naturally inclined to invest in political information, and provided a dynamic description of how voters and political elites can adapt to the information problems that characterize political decision making.
Abstract: T he correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes is often affected by the existence of information asymmetries among electoral participants and the presence of individuals or groups who exercise some form of agenda control. While the effects of agenda control in political decision making are widely recognized, the effects of information asymmetries are not as well understood. Since information asymmetries are fundamental characteristics of most elections, a deep understanding of the correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes requires a serious consideration of the "effects" of information. I develop a generalizable agenda control model that takes as given the observation that most voters are not naturally inclined to invest in political information. The model allows me to provide a dynamic description of how voters and political elites can adapt to the information problems that characterize political decision making. It also allows me to demonstrate the effect of these adaptations on electoral outcomes.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the effect of economic adversity depends upon the degree of welfare state development, and the relationship is argued to be nonlinear, so that mobilization occurs at either extreme while withdrawal obtains in the middle range.
Abstract: While the economic voting literature is voluminous, comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of how—or whether—the economy affects turnout. I address this issue by examining national elections in 29 countries. Using time series data, the initial findings are replicated by a case study of American presidential and midterm elections since 1896. It is argued that the effect of economic adversity depends upon the degree of welfare state development. This relationship is argued to be nonlinear, so that mobilization occurs at either extreme while withdrawal obtains in the middle range. The importance to democratic theory, the study of elections, and the politics of welfare policy are discussed.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors analyzed the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey and the National Election Studies for seven consecutive presidential elections, 1964-88, and found that there has been almost no change in class bias in the electorate since 1964.
Abstract: We address the question of whether class bias in the American electorate has increased since 1964. We analyze the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey and the National Election Studies for seven consecutive presidential elections, 1964–88. Our results show that conclusions regarding changes in class bias are sensitive to which measure of socioeconomic class is used—income, education, or occupation. We argue that income is the appropriate measure since government policies that discriminate based on socioeconomic class are most likely to do so based on income and there are measurement problems associated with using either education or occupation over time. Our analysis shows that there has been almost no change in class bias in the electorate since 1964.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored the morality and rationality issue from an Axelrod-type perspective, and argued that intuitive notions of rationality and morality can be shown to be mutually compatible if two assumptions are made: (1) that morality is specified as a general behavioral disposition or program whose rationality is to be determined in comparison to alternative behavioral programs and (2) that the recurrent game is defined as a prisoner's dilemma game with an exit option.
Abstract: The morality and rationality issue is explored from an Axelrod-type perspective; that is, it is discussed in terms of recurrent-prisoner's-dilemma-type games and behavioral strategies or programs for playing them. We argue that intuitive notions of rationality and morality can be shown to be mutually compatible if two assumptions are made: (1) that morality is specified as a general behavioral disposition or program whose rationality is to be determined in comparison to alternative behavioral programs and (2) that the recurrent game is specified as a prisoner's dilemma game with an exit option. The results of a simulation experiment are presented, showing that a “moral program” (specified as one that never defects, but exits in response to an opponents defection) is successful in competition with a variety of alternative programs, including Tit for Tat.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper measured the extent to which military spending policy reflects public opinion, while controlling for other reasonable influences on policy, and found evidence that changes in public opinion consistently exert an effect on changes in military spending.
Abstract: We measure the extent to which military spending policy reflects public opinion, while controlling for other reasonable influences on policy. We use survey data as an indicator of aggregate public opinion on military spending and find evidence that changes in public opinion consistently exert an effect on changes in military spending. The influence of public opinion is less important than either Soviet military spending or the gap between U.S. and Soviet military spending and more important than the deficit and the balance of Soviet conflict/cooperation with the United States. We also examine the hypothesis that public opinion does not influence the government but that the government systematically manipulates public opinion. We find no evidence to support this hypothesis.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the impact of litigant status and the changing ideology of the U.S. Supreme Court on differences in the success rates of direct parties before the Court.
Abstract: A substantial literature on lower federal courts and state courts suggests that the "haves" usually come out ahead in litigation because they possess superior resources for it and they reap advantages from their repeat player status. We investigate the success of 10 categories of litigants before the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts to determine whether the resources or experience of litigants has effects on Supreme Court outcomes paralleling those found in the courts below. While different categories of litigants are found to have very different rates of success, those differences do not consistently favor litigants with greater resources. A time series analysis of the success of different categories of litigants over the 36 years studied suggests that the changing ideological complexion of the Court has a greater impact on the success of litigants than differences among litigants in resources and experience. W e examine the impact of litigant status and the changing ideology of the U.S. Supreme Court on differences in the success rates of direct parties before the Court. Simply, we seek to explain why some categories of litigants win more frequently than others when appearing before the Court. Previous explanations have attributed differential success rates in lower federal courts to, inter alia, disparities between litigants of different status in judicial experience and resources. We argue, however, that differential success rates in Supreme Court decisions have more to do with the ideological composition of the Court and the Court's receptivity to the different types of legal claims made by litigants of different status. Previous research indicates that the status of litigants before American courts has substantial influence on judicial outcomes. Higher-status parties enjoy significant advantages in appellate courts and usually win. This has been demonstrated in the U.S. courts of appeals (Sheehan and Songer 1989) and, to a lesser degree, in state supreme courts (Wheeler et al. 1987). Curiously, the impact of litigant status on

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors explored two attitudes relevant to the revolutionary changes there: attitudes toward change and political democracy and attitudes toward a core component of socialist ideology, the locus of responsibility for social well-being (the state or individuals).
Abstract: Using data from a national public opinion survey carried out in the Soviet Union during November and December 1989, we explore two attitudes relevant to the revolutionary changes there: (1) attitudes toward change and political democracy and (2) attitudes toward a core component of socialist ideology, the locus of responsibility for social well-being (the state or individuals?). These variables are unrelated, with the sample relatively evenly divided among the intersecting cells of a cross tabulation. While social conflict may be mitigated by the small sizes of absolutely opposing groups, consensus may also be hard to reach. Ethnicity, education, income, age, party membership, and life satisfaction have important effects on these attitudes. We discuss how attitude patterns in our data may be related to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and to problems faced by the independent successor states as they develop new institutions and foster new values.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors demonstrate that the intolerance of ordinary citizens matters for real politics even if strong linkages to policy outputs do not exist, and that cultural intolerance constrains the liberty of individual citizens.
Abstract: I demonstrate that the intolerance of ordinary citizens matters for real politics even if strong linkages to policy outputs do not exist. In particular, the model I test posits that cultural intolerance constrains the liberty of individual citizens. Focusing on how people perceive political freedom, several hypotheses coupling tolerance and freedom are explored. Data from a national survey show that tolerance and freedom are connected. Those who do not feel free to express themselves politically are more likely to be intolerant of others, to have less heterogeneous peer groups and less tolerant spouses, and to live in less tolerant communities. Ultimately, the importance of mass political intolerance in the United States is that it establishes a culture of conformity that seems to constrain individual political liberty in many important ways.

Journal ArticleDOI
Duane Swank1
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore empirically a central claim of the structural dependence thesis, namely that capitalists' ability to disinvest fundamentally conditions policy choices in democratic capitalist systems and find that low rates of business investment are associated with reductions in corporate tax burdens and that these reductions are more pronounced in periods of economic crisis.
Abstract: I explore empirically a central claim of the structural dependence thesis, namely, that capitalists' ability to disinvest fundamentally conditions policy choices in democratic capitalist systems. Utilizing time-series data for 16 affluent democracies from 1965 to 1984, I find that, indeed, low rates of business investment are associated with reductions in corporate tax burdens and that these reductions are more pronounced in periods of economic crisis. Moreover, low rates of capital formation engender cuts in personal income taxes during periods of economic stress. However, I also find that the magnitude of responsiveness of taxation to low rates of investment is relatively small and that analyses of the political context of investment and taxation indicate that governments have choices. The responsiveness of corporate tax burdens to capital formation may, under some governments, be part of a policy mix designed to maintain adequate investment and to address the demands of core constituencies.

Journal ArticleDOI
Dana Villa1
TL;DR: The authors argue that the public realm theory of Arendt and Habermas is less concerned with the question of legitimation than with the theorization of an agonistic political subjectivity.
Abstract: The idea of the public sphere, of an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction, is central to democratic theory and practice. The modern age has, however, witnessed the erosion of a public realm distinct from the state and the market. In response to this erosion, public realm theory, notably the work of Arendt and Habermas, attempts to theorize the minimal conditions necessary for a discursive realm free of structural coercion or manipulation. The resulting normative conception of the public sphere has come under sharp attack by postmodern theorists, including Foucault, Lyotard, and Baudrillard, who question the basic presuppositions of public realm theory. I examine their objections and show how the public realm theory of Arendt can be viewed as motivated by concerns similar to the postmoderns'. Against Habermas, I argue that Arendt's public realm theory is less concerned with the question of legitimation than with the theorization of an agonistic political subjectivity.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Following Leviathan too closely results in three principal consequences: failure to catch and evaluate the replacement of law by economics as the language of the state, loss of passion in political science discourse, and failure of political science to appreciate the significance of ideological sea changes accompanying regime changes as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: American political science is a product of the American state. There are political reasons why particular subdisciplines became hegemonic with the emergence of the “Second Republic” after World War II. The three hegemonic subdisciplines of our time are public opinion, public policy, and public choice. Each is a case study of consonance with the thought-ways and methods of a modern bureaucratized government committed to scientific decision making. Following Leviathan too closely results in three principal consequences: (1) failure to catch and evaluate the replacement of law by economics as the language of the state, (2) the loss of passion in political science discourse, and (3) the failure of political science to appreciate the significance of ideological sea changes accompanying regime changes.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper examined the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth in the United States from 1948 to 1990, in order to gauge the potential peace dividend and found that military spending is a significant drain on the economy.
Abstract: We examine the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth in the United States from 1948 to 1990, in order to gauge the potential peace dividend. Our main results suggest that military spending is a significant drain on the economy. We then examine the implications of a restructured international system for U.S. military expenditures and their resultant impact on economic growth in the 1990s. Simulations of Democratic and Republican proposals for cuts in defense spending suggest increases in economic output of between 2.5% and 4.5% over the period 1993–96.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a stochastic game model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system is presented, where the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents are modeled in an infinitely repeated divide the dollar game.
Abstract: We construct a stochastic game model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents in an infinitely repeated divide the dollar game Each legislative session must make a decision on redistributional issues, modeled as a divide the dollar game However, each session begins with a vote in which the legislators decide, by majority rule, whether or not to impose on themselves a seniority system Legislative decisions on the redistributional issues are made by the Baron-Ferejohn rule: an agenda setter is selected by a random recognition rule (which in our model is a function of the seniority system selected), the agenda setter makes a proposal on redistributional issues, and the legislature then votes whether to accept or reject the agenda setters proposal If the legislature rejects the proposal, another agenda setter is randomly selected, and the process is repeated If the legislature accepts the proposal, the legislative session ends, and the voters in each legislative district vote whether to retain their legislator or throw it out of office The voters' verdict determines the seniority structure of the next period legislature We find a stationary equilibrium to the game having the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non trivial seniority system, and that legislators are always reelected

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The value of cross-national quantitative studies of the relationship between mass political violence and land inequality is challenged along three lines: gross and systematic errors in the political violence data of the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators render them worthless for Central America at least and probably much of the Third World as well.
Abstract: The value of cross-national quantitative studies of the relationship between mass political violence and land inequality is challenged along three lines. First, gross and systematic errors in the political violence data of the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (the usual data source for empirical studies) render them worthless for Central America at least and probably much of the Third World as well. Second, conceptualizations of land inequality have been too simplistic to be of much theoretical value. Third, the temporal nature of this relationship has been inadequately considered. Responding to such deficiencies, I elaborate a broader understanding of land inequality and provide a fuller discussion of the temporal nature of its relationship to political violence. Throughout, the five nations of Central America are utilized for appropriate case material.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Faces of Fraternalism: Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan as discussed by the authors, by Paul Brooker and Guiseppe Di Palma. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Abstract: The Faces of Fraternalism: Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan. By Paul Brooker. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 397p. $69.00. To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions. By Guiseppe Di Palma. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. 248p. $35.00 cloth. $11.95 paper. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. By Samuel P. Huntington. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 366p. $24.95. Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe. By Gregory M. Luebbert. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 416p. $49.95 cloth, $19.95 paper. Capitalist Development and Democracy. By Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 387p. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.