Showing papers in "American Political Science Review in 1996"
TL;DR: In this article, a social matching game model is used to explain the norm of interethnic peace and how it occasionally breaks down, arguing that formal and informal institutions usually work to contain or "cauterize" disputes between individual members of different groups.
Abstract: Though both journalists and the academic literature on ethnic conflict give the opposite impression, peaceful and even cooperative relations between ethnic groups are far more common than is large-scale violence. We seek to explain this norm of interethnic peace and how it occasionally breaks down, arguing that formal and informal institutions usually work to contain or “cauterize” disputes between individual members of different groups. Using a social matching game model, we show that local-level interethnic cooperation can be supported in essentially two ways. In spiral equilibria, disputes between individuals are correctly expected to spiral rapidly beyond the two parties, and fear of this induces cooperation “on the equilibrium path.” In in-group policing equilibria, individuals ignore transgressions by members of the other group, correctly expecting that the culprits will be identified and sanctioned by their own ethnic brethren. A range of examples suggests that both equilibria occur empirically and have properties expected from the theoretical analysis.
1,347 citations
TL;DR: The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred Most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote "sincerely" in the collective decision making, a seemingly innocuous assumption, given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative However, in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference In particular, sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium A satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably "do better" than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived
948 citations
TL;DR: Tarrow argues that institutional differences shaped distinctive political cultures as discussed by the authors and that these institutional differences are long-standing, stemming from differences in civic republicanism in the late medieval period that persist into the present.
Abstract: Tarrow initially provides a synopsis of Putnam’s widely heralded Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993 and with Leonardi and Nanetti). He is encouraging about Putnam’s early narrower project (see Putnam with Leonardi and Nanetti 1988), which shows how a 1970s central political reform was realized quite differently in the distinctive political cultures of northern and southern Italy. Tarrow agrees that this part of Putnam’s study demonstrates that distinctive political cultures are apt to shape initially similar institutions quite differently over time. So in this regard culture shapes political institutions. However, Putnam extended the initial scope of his analysis to inquire into the origins of these distinctive regional cultures, concluding that these regional peculiarities are long-standing, stemming from differences in civic republicanism (social capital or civil society) in the late medieval period that persist into the present. Thus, once again, Putnam portrays culture as shaping political institutions: Civic republicanism produces more thorough democracy. Tarrow disagrees with the causal flow Putnam suggests in his expanded project. Tarrow argues instead that, across this lengthy period, institutional differences shaped distinctive political cultures. Tarrow also thinks that Putnam’s operationalization of democracy has limitations, and we might add that Putnam’s indices of culture lack a theoretical superstructure.
533 citations
TL;DR: The authors assess the extent to which white Americans' opposition to welfare is rooted in their attitudes toward blacks and find that racial attitudes are the single most important influence on whites' welfare views.
Abstract: Crime and welfare are now widely viewed as “coded” issues that activate white Americans' negative views of blacks without explicitly raising the “race card.” But does the desire of whites to combat crime or curtail welfare really stem from their dislike of blacks? Are these not pressing problems about which Americans rightly should be concerned—apart from any associations these issues may have with race? In this paper I assess the extent to which white Americans' opposition to welfare is rooted in their attitudes toward blacks. Using conventional survey modeling techniques and a randomized survey-based experiment from a national telephone survey, I find that racial attitudes are the single most important influence on whites' welfare views. I also show that whites hold similar views of comparably described black and white welfare mothers, but that negative views of black welfare mothers are more politically potent, generating greater opposition to welfare than comparable views of white welfare mothers.
444 citations
424 citations
TL;DR: In fact, India is not a deviant case for consociational theory but, instead, an impressive confirming case as discussed by the authors, which reveals that Indian democracy has displayed all four crucial elements of power-sharing theory during its first two decades.
Abstract: India has been the one major deviant case for consociational (power-sharing) theory, and its sheer size makes the exception especially damaging. A deeply divided society with, supposedly, a mainly majoritarian type of democracy, India nevertheless has been able to maintain its democratic system. Careful examination reveals, however, that Indian democracy has displayed all four crucial elements of power-sharing theory. In fact, it was a perfectly and thoroughly consociational system during its first two decades. From the late 1960s on, although India has remained basically consociational, some of its power-sharing elements have weakened under the pressure of greater mass mobilization. Concomitantly, in accordance with consociational theory, intergroup hostility and violence have increased. Therefore, India is not a deviant case for consociational theory but, instead, an impressive confirming case.
397 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a trade-off between increasing the number of minority officeholders and enacting legislation that furthers the interests of the minority community was explored, and it was shown that such a tradeoff does exist.
Abstract: Majority-minority voting districts have been advanced as a remedy to the underrepresentation of minority interests in the political process. Yet, their efficacy in furthering the substantive goals of minority constituents has been questioned because they may dilute minority influence in surrounding areas and lead to an overall decrease in support for minority-sponsored legislation. Thus, there may be a trade-off between increasing the number of minority officeholders and enacting legislation that furthers the interests of the minority community. Using nonlinear estimation techniques, we simulate the districting strategies that maximize substantive minority representation, and find that such a trade-off does exist. We also find that, outside of the South, dividing minority voters equally across districts maximizes substantive representation; inside the South the optimal scheme creates concentrated districts on the order of 47% black voting age population. In addition, minority candidates may have a substantial chance of being elected from districts with less than 50% minority voters.
396 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a formal model of the confidence vote procedure, an institutional arrangement that permits a prime minister to attach the fate of a particular policy to a vote on government survival.
Abstract: I present a formal model of the confidence vote procedure, an institutional arrangement that permits a prime minister to attach the fate of a particular policy to a vote on government survival. The analysis indicates that confidence vote procedures make it possible for prime ministers to exercise significant control over the nature of policy outcomes, even when these procedures are not actually invoked. Neither cabinet ministers, through their authority over specific portfolios, nor members of parliament, through the use of no-confidence motions, can counteract the prime minister's policy control on the floor of parliament. The analysis also illuminates the circumstances under which prime ministers should invoke confidence vote procedures, focusing attention on the position-taking incentives of the parties that support the government, rather than on the level of policy conflict between the government and parliament.
379 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors make a distinction between the implicit theories and conceptual frameworks used to establish salience or produce commonsensical explanations in historical monographs and present a selection bias in the selection of historical sources.
Abstract: Social scientists who use history as a laboratory for theory development use the work of historians to construct background narratives which can then be coded according to theoretically relevant categories. Yet, virtually no attention has been paid to how these historical monographs are to be chosen. On most periods and themes of interest available accounts differ, not only substantively but also with respect to the implicit theories and conceptual frameworks used to establish salience or produce commonsensical explanations. Unself-conscious use of historical monographs thus easily results in selection bias. Social scientists are bound to be more attracted to and convinced by accounts that accord with the expectations about events contained in the concepts they deploy and the theories they seek to test. Consideration of recent developments in historiographical theory supports the argument that responsible techniques for using historical sources are available, but they require understanding the extent to which patterns within historiography, rather than “History,” must be the direct focus of investigation and explanation. Such an approach has the added advantage of helping to generate historically based studies where observations or cases outnumber variables.
320 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the conditions for authentic as opposed to symbolic inclusion are quite demanding and that benign inclusion in the state can sometimes occur, but any such move should also produce exclusions that both facilitate future democratization and guard against any reversal of democratic commitment in state and society.
Abstract: Once universal adult citizenship rights have been secured in a society, democratization is mostly a matter of the more authentic political inclusion of different groups and categories, for which formal political equality can hide continued exclusion or oppression. It is important, however, to distinguish between inclusion in the state and inclusion in the polity more generally. Democratic theorists who advocate a strategy of progressive inclusion of as many groups as possible in the state fail to recognize that the conditions for authentic as opposed to symbolic inclusion are quite demanding. History shows that benign inclusion in the state is possible only when (a) a group's defining concern can be assimilated to an established or emerging state imperative, and (b) civil society is not unduly depleted by the group's entry into the state. Absent such conditions, oppositional civil society may be a better focus for democratization than is the state. A flourishing oppositional sphere, and therefore the conditions for democratization itself, may actually be facilitated by a passively exclusive state, the main contemporary form of which is corporatism. Benign inclusion in the state can sometimes occur, but any such move should also produce exclusions that both facilitate future democratization and guard against any reversal of democratic commitment in state and society. These considerations have substantial implications for the strategic choices of social movements.
300 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a model of war duration which incorporates both realpolitik and domestic political variables, such as strategy, terrain, capabilities, and government type, among other variables, to determine the duration of war.
Abstract: We present a model of war duration which incorporates both realpolitik and domestic political variables. We hypothesize that strategy, terrain, capabilities, and government type, among other variables, will play key roles in determining the duration of war. We test these hypotheses using hazard analysis and find empirical support for our key arguments. We find that the realpolitik variables play a greater role than regime behavior and type in determining war duration. We also find that historically, on average, mobilization and strategic surprise have little effect on war duration and that wars are not duration dependent.
TL;DR: The authors assesses whether the democratic peace is a purely dyadic, a monadic, or perhaps a mixed dyadic and monadic effect and conclude that the initiation of violence within crises is predominantly a dyadic phenomenon.
Abstract: The literature on the democratic peace has emerged from two empirical claims: (1) Democracies are unlikely to conflict with one another, and (2) democracies are as prone to conflict with nondemocracies as nondemocracies are with one another. Together these assertions imply that the democratic peace is a dyadic phenomenon. There is strong support for the first observation, but much recent scholarship contravenes the second. This paper assesses whether the democratic peace is a purely dyadic, a monadic, or perhaps a mixed dyadic and monadic effect. Our analysis offers two important advances. First, our model directly compares the dyadic and monadic explanations by using the state as the unit of analysis rather than the potentially problematic dyad. Second, our model controls for an important but overlooked confounding variable: satisfaction with the status quo. Our results indicate that the initiation of violence within crises is predominantly a dyadic phenomenon, but we also find evidence suggesting a strong monadic effect regarding the emergence of crises.
TL;DR: The authors used data from the 103rd U.S. House of Representatives to show that the timing of legislators' cosponsorship decisions are more supportive of bill c-osponsorship as intralegislative signaling than as extralegal position taking, and that policy extremists on both sides of the political spectrum are more likely than moderates to be initial endorsers of legislative initiatives.
Abstract: Electoral-connection theories of legislative politics view bill cosponsorship as low-cost position taking by rational legislators who communicate with target audiences (e.g., constituents) external to the legislature. Legislative signaling games suggest a view of bill cosponsorship in which early cosponsors attempt to communicate to target audiences (e.g., the median voter) within the legislature. Using data from the 103rd U.S. House of Representatives, we show that the timing of legislators' cosponsorship decisions are more supportive of cosponsorship as intralegislative signaling than as extralegislative position taking. First, policy extremists on both sides of the political spectrum are more likely than moderates to be initial endorsers of legislative initiatives. Second, extremist-moderate differences diminish over the course of bill histories.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue for an inherently democratic conception of authority, in large part by examining and rejecting the view that authority involves a surrender of judgment by those subject to authority.
Abstract: The topic of authority only rarely figures into theories of deliberative democracy, no doubt owing to the widely held view that authority is inherently undemocratic. But deliberative democrats need a concept of authoritative decision making, not least because the scale and complexity of contemporary societies radically limit the numbers of decisions that can be made by deliberatively democratic means. I argue for an inherently democratic conception of authority, in large part by examining and rejecting the view—held by radical democrats, conservatives, and most liberals—that authority involves a surrender of judgment by those subject to authority. In contrast, I develop the view that authority, particularly in posttraditional contexts, involves a limited suspension of judgment enabled by a context of democratic challenge and public accountability. An important point is that democratic authority supports robust deliberative decision making by enabling individuals to allocate their time, energy, and knowledge to the issues most significant to them.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a dynamic theory of the legislative choice of collective goods programs based on a sequential model of proposal-making and voting in a majority-rule legislature where the status quo in a session is given by the program last enacted.
Abstract: A collective goods program, such as an entitlement program, distributes benefits and costs according to constituents' characteristics. This paper presents a dynamic theory of the legislative choice of collective goods programs based on a sequential model of proposal-making and voting in a majority-rule legislature where the status quo in a session is given by the program last enacted. A stationary Markov perfect equilibrium is characterized for a unidimensional collective goods program and yields a generalized median voter theorem, comparative statics on preferences and legislative procedures, and a characterization of the dynamics of such programs. Equilibrium programs can expand or contract over time, but they ultimately converge to the median. On the path to that point, legislators may act strategically to address the durability problem—that a future legislature can undo the actions of the present legislature—by strategically positioning the status quo to limit the changes that future legislatures can make.
TL;DR: This article analyzed a set of survey data to describe and explain the connection between village leaders and those who choose them, in terms of orientation to the role of the state in the economy.
Abstract: A 1987 law established popularly elected village committees in the Chinese countryside. This article analyzes a unique set of survey data to describe and explain the connection between village leaders and those who choose them, in terms of orientation to the role of the state in the economy. It compares positions of village leaders with positions of respondents sampled from their selectorates of township-level leaders and electorates of ordinary villagers. Results of multivariate regression analyses indicate that: (1) village leaders are responsive to both old and newly emerging constituencies, as reflected in significant congruence between village leaders and their selectorates above and electorates below; (2) congruence between village leaders and their electorates is not exclusively the result of shared local environment, informal influence, or socialization but is significantly associated with the electoral process; and (3) the causal mechanism underlying the electoral connection in the Chinese countryside is the familiar one of voter choice.
TL;DR: In this article, an explanation for organizational cultures of bureaucracies and the influence of cultural forces in state preference formation and international cooperation is presented, where the conventional wisdom expects external material, not internal cultural, concerns to dominate.
Abstract: Rational choice analyses of international cooperation have slighted the effect of state preference formation and the influence of cultural forces in that process. This article addresses these gaps by developing an explanation that specifies how organizational cultures of bureaucracies shape state aims and international outcomes. This approach is evaluated in a set of least likely cases—decisions on the use of force in war—where the conventional wisdom expects external material, not internal cultural, concerns to dominate. Before World War II, countries agreed to limit the use of three types of warfare, but during that conflict mutual restraint was maintained in only one. I show how this variation is best understood as a product of state preference dynamics, shaped largely by the collective beliefs and customs of military services. This result suggests ways to rethink the use of the preferences-interaction model and the role of cultural factors in that framework.
TL;DR: In this article, an accurate modeling of the cooperation procedure as stated in Article 189c of the Treaty of the European Community and as applied in practice changes the results considerably, and an explanation of why the European Parliament sometimes can make successful amendments.
Abstract: Tsebelis (1994) argues in the American Political Science Review that the European Parliament has important power due to its right as a conditional agenda setter. I claim that Tsebelis' argument is based either on an incomplete analysis or on inaccurately specified decision rules. An accurate modeling of the cooperation procedure as stated in Article 189c of the Treaty of the European Community and as applied in practice changes the results considerably. Based on such a model, I provide an explanation of why the European Parliament sometimes can make successful amendments.
TL;DR: This paper examined committee tenure patterns before and after a major, exogenous change in the electoral system-the states' rapid adoption of Australian ballot laws in the early 1890s, and demonstrated a marked increase in assignment stability after 1892, by which time a majority of states had put the new ballot laws into force and earlier than previous studies have suggested.
Abstract: Most scholars agree that members of Congress are strongly motivated by their desire for reelection. This assumption implies that members of Congress adopt institutions, rules, and norms of behavior in part to serve their electoral interests. Direct tests of the electoral connection are rare, however, because
significant, exogenous changes in the electoral environment are difficult to identify. We develop and test an electoral rationale for the norm of committee assignment "property rights." We examine committee tenure patterns before and after a major, exogenous change in the electoral system-the states' rapid adoption of Australian ballot laws in the early 1890s. The ballot changes, we argue, induced new "personal vote” electoral incentives which contributed to the adoption of "modern" congressional institutions such as property rights to committee assignments. We demonstrate a marked increase in assignment stability after 1892, by which time
a majority of states had put the new ballot laws into force, and earlier than previous studies have suggested.
TL;DR: The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements as discussed by the authors, by J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds., 1998. 476p.
Abstract: Political Protest and Social Change: Analyzing Politics. By Charles F. Andrain and David E. Apter. New York: New York University Press, 1996. 387p. $50.00 cloth, $19.95 paper. The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements. By J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995. 381p. $49.95 cloth, $19.95 paper. New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. By Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995. 310p. $54.95 cloth, $21.95 paper. Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor. By Elizabeth J. Perry. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993. 327p. $42.50 cloth, $16.95 paper. Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834. By Charles Tilly. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1995. 476p. $49.95. Ikki: Social Conflict and Political Protest in Early Modern Japan. By James W. White. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press. 1995. 348p. $39.95.
TL;DR: In this paper, a stochastic process model of adaptive signal processing by a hierarchical agency is proposed to investigate the causal mechanism of political influence in regulatory decision making. But the model is limited to the case of a single agency.
Abstract: Control over agency budgets is a critical tool of political influence in regulatory decision making, yet the causal mechanism of budgetary control is unclear. Do budgetary manipulations influence agencies by imposing resource constraints or by transmitting powerful signals to the agency? I advance and test a stochastic process model of adaptive signal processing by a hierarchical agency to address this question. The principal findings of the paper are two. First, presidents and congressional committees achieve budgetary control over agencies not by manipulating aggregate resource constraints but by transmitting powerful signals through budget shifts. Second, bureaucratic hierarchy increases the agency's response time in processing budgetary signals, limiting the efficacy of the budget as a device of political control. I also show that the magnitude of agency response to budgetary signals increased for executive-branch agencies after 1970 due to executive oversight reforms. I conclude by discussing the limits of budgetary manipulations as a device of political control and the response of elected authorities to adaptive signal processing by agencies.
TL;DR: In this article, a contrast between the participatory process and the sample survey is used to highlight the nature of the bias in the former and demonstrate the importance of the latter in the latter.
Abstract: Citizen participation is the main way in which the public communicates its needs and preferences to the government and induces the government to be responsive. Since participation depends on resources and resources are unequally distributed, the resulting communication is a biased representation of the public. Thus, the democratic ideal of equal consideration is violated. Sample surveys provide the closest approximation to an unbiased representation of the public because participation in a survey requires no resources and because surveys eliminate the selection bias inherent in the fact that participants in politics are self-selected. The contrast between the participatory process and the sample survey is used to highlight the nature of the bias in the former. Surveys, however, are not seen as a practical way of providing more equal representation.
TL;DR: The authors identify a set of ideal types that capture the essential arguments made about individual-level party identification and combine the behavioral assumptions for each type with existing results on statistical aggregation to deduce the specific temporal pattern that each type implies for aggregate levels of partisanship.
Abstract: Despite extensive research on party identification, links between partisanship at the individual and aggregate level have largely been ignored. This leaves a gap in our understanding of the dynamics of aggregate partisanship. To remedy this, we identify a set of ideal types that capture the essential arguments made about individual-level party identification. We then combine the behavioral assumptions for each type with existing results on statistical aggregation to deduce the specific temporal pattern that each type implies for aggregate levels of partisanship. Using new diagnostic tests and a highly general time series model, we find that aggregate measures of partisanship from 1953 through 1992 are fractionally integrated. Our evidence that the effects of a shock to aggregate partisanship last for years—not months or decades—challenges previous work by party systems theorists and students of “macropartisanship.” Our arguments and empirical evidence provide a conceptually richer and more precise basis for theories of issue evolution or endogenous preferences—in which partisanship plays a central role.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that Moser's conclusions about the strategic implications of Article 189a(1) of the Maastricht Treaty (an article also present in the Single European Act and the Treaty of Rome) are mistaken, and that the European Parliament plays no role in decision making except in the second round of the cooperation procedure.
Abstract: Moser analyzes the cooperation procedure using a model that assumes (1) one dimension and (2) complete information. I show that because of these two restrictive assumptions and his misunderstanding of the strategic implications of Article 189a(1) of the Maastricht Treaty (an article also present in the Single European Act and the Treaty of Rome), Moser's conclusions are mistaken. In particular, his predicted outcomes are incorrect, and his major institutional prediction (that the European Parliament plays no role in decision making except in the second round of the cooperation procedure) is contradicted by thousands of parliamentary amendments, the major part of which are accepted in the first round.
TL;DR: In this article, the logic of The Federalist arguably defends it, in ways heretofore unappreciated, by appeal to a least-common-denominator definition of the "public interest", and alternative political structures are assessed against the public interest criterion to which it appeals.
Abstract: Many bemoan divided government and the consequent deadlock of democracy. The logic of The Federalist arguably defends it, in ways heretofore unappreciated, by appeal to a least-common-denominator definition of the “public interest.” That quasi-Federalist logic is explored, and alternative political structures are assessed against the public interest criterion to which it appeals. Another and more defensible notion of the public interest is introduced, and its very different political styles, institutions, and policies are adduced.
TL;DR: In this article, the influence of partisan and nonpartisan factors on changes in minority procedural rights in the House between 1789 and 1990 was assessed using an original data set of changes in House rules, and they found that short-term partisan goals shape both the creation and suppression of rights for partisan and political minorities.
Abstract: Conventional accounts of the institutional development of Congress suggest that expansion of the size and workload of the House led members to distribute parliamentary rights narrowly: Majority party leaders accrued strong procedural powers while minority parties lost many of their parliamentary rights. I offer an alternative, partisan basis of procedural choice. Using an original data set of changes in House rules, I present a statistical model to assess the influence of partisan and nonpartisan factors on changes in minority procedural rights in the House between 1789 and 1990. I find that short-term partisan goals—constrained by inherited rules—shape both the creation and suppression of rights for partisan and political minorities. Collective institutional concerns and longer-term calculations about future parliamentary needs have little impact on changes in minority rights. The findings have important theoretical implications for explaining both the development of Congress and the nature of institutional change more generally.
TL;DR: In a comprehensive analysis of these statewide elections since 1928, this paper found that the conventional theory was true outside the South through 1964, but since 1965 the overall relationship between turnout and partisan outcomes has been insignificant.
Abstract: Conventional wisdom holds that higher turnout favors Democrats. Previous studies of this hypothesis rely on presidential and House elections or on survey data, but senatorial and gubernatorial elections offer better conditions for directly testing turnout effects in U.S. politics. In a comprehensive analysis of these statewide elections since 1928, we find that the conventional theory was true outside the South through 1964, but since 1965 the overall relationship between turnout and partisan outcomes has been insignificant. Even before the mid-1960s, the turnout effect outside the South was strongest in Republican states and insignificant or negative in heavily Democratic states. A similar but weaker pattern obtains after 1964. In the South, which we analyze only since 1966, higher turnout helped Republicans until 1990, but in 1990–94 the effect became pro-Democratic. The conventional theory cannot account for these complex patterns, but they are impressively consistent with DeNardo's (1980) theory.
TL;DR: The authors argue that the costs of making, breaking, and maintaining coalitions depend on political institutions and on the array of parties and voters in policy space, and that politicians' purposive actions can reduce costs of coalition.
Abstract: Governments in Italy both change and remain the same. From 1946 to 1992 the Christian Democratic Party always held governing power. But almost no cabinet stayed in office more than a few years, and many governments collapsed after only a few months. How can instability coexist with stability in this way? How can governments break up at such low cost and with so little effect on alternation? These questions are rooted in—but not resolved by—the available game-theoretic literature on coalitional behavior. My answer is that politicians' purposive actions can reduce the costs of coalition. I argue that the costs of making, breaking, and maintaining coalitions depend on political institutions and on the array of parties and voters in policy space. Institutional and spatial conditions structure politicians' opportunities and attempts to lower costs. Under some conditions, as I show, coalitions are cheap, and politicians can easily make coalitions even cheaper. The inference is that this framework comprehends both Italy's extremes and the degrees of stability found in other parliamentary democracies.
TL;DR: In this article, a situation in which a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state is stylized as a situation where the declining state prefers to appease the rising state's demands rather than go to war to oppose them.
Abstract: Great Britain faced an immensely complicated strategic problem in the 1930s, and important aspects of it can be stylized as a situation in which a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state. If those aims are limited, then the declining state prefers to appease the rising state's demands rather than go to war to oppose them. If, however, the rising state's demands are unlimited, then the declining state prefers fighting. And, given that the declining state is becoming weaker over time, it prefers fighting sooner rather than later if there is to be a war. This situation creates a trade-off: The earlier a state stands firm, the stronger it will be if war ensues, but the higher the chance of fighting an unnecessary war. In equilibrium, the declining state generally tries to appease the rising state by making a series of concessions.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the consequences of veto power in committees are analyzed using the appro ach of non-cooperative bargaining theory, and the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players are analyzed.
Abstract: The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the appro ach of noncooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, that is, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game, nonveto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, I study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players. Quantitative results are given for the case of the UN Security Council.