Showing papers in "American Political Science Review in 1997"
TL;DR: In this article, a multivariate regression analysis of international financial regulation is conducted using a quantitative measure of the regulation of International Financial transactions. The measure was created by coding the laws of 64 nations.
Abstract: With which political and economic variables is change in international financial regulation robustly associated? I undertook multivariate regression analysis of this question using a quantitative measure of the regulation of international financial transactions. The measure was created by coding the laws of 64 nations. The associations between change in international financial regulation and measures of long-run economic growth, corporate taxation, government expenditures, and income inequality are estimated, using the models, methods, and data of Batro (1991), Deininger and Squire (1996a), Leamer (1983, 1985), and Levine and Renelt (1992). The findings point to a new agenda for research on international financial regulation.
1,366 citations
TL;DR: This paper examined how local television news outlets framed a specific, dramatic event: a demonstration and rally by the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in a small Ohio city, and explored the effect of alternative news frames for this event on tolerance for KKK activities.
Abstract: public controversy. In the present research, we examine how local television news outlets framed a specific, dramatic event: a demonstration and rally by the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in a small Ohio city. We explore the effect of alternative news frames for this event on tolerance for KKK activities. We also test contrasting hypotheses about how viewers psychologically process news frames, and how such frames ultimately affect viewers' thoughts about political controversies.
1,322 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop a game-theoretic approach to the problem of political officials' respect for political and economic rights of citizens, and apply it to a range of topics such as democratic stability, plural societies, and elite pacts.
Abstract: This paper develops a game-theoretic approach to the problem of political officials' respect for political and economic rights of citizens. It models the policing of rights as a coordination problem among citizens, but one with asymmetries difficult to resolve in a decentralized manner. The paper shows that democratic stability depends on a self-enforcing equilibrium: It must be in the interests of political officials to respect democracy's limits on their behavior. The concept of self-enforcing limits on the state illuminates a diverse set of problems and thus serves as a potential basis for integrating the literature. The framework is applied to a range of topics, such as democratic stability, plural societies, and elite pacts. The paper also applies its lessons to the case of the Glorious Revolution in seventeenth-century England.
1,163 citations
TL;DR: Turnout in U.S. voter turnout is especially low, but, measured as percent of voting-age population, it is also relatively low in most other countries as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Low voter turnout is a serious democratic problem for five reasons: (1) It means unequal turnout that is systematically biased against less well-to-do citizens. (2) Unequal turnout spells unequal political influence. (3) U.S. voter turnout is especially low, but, measured as percent of voting-age population, it is also relatively low in most other countries. (4) Turnout in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections—less salient but by no means unimportant elections—tends to be especially poor. (5) Turnout appears to be declining everywhere. The problem of inequality can be solved by institutional mechanisms that maximize turnout. One option is the combination of voter-friendly registration rules, proportional representation, infrequent elections, weekend voting, and holding less salient elections concurrently with the most important national elections. The other option, which can maximize turnout by itself, is compulsory voting. Its advantages far outweigh the normative and practical objections to it.
1,053 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used cross-sectional survey data for eleven European democracies together with data on the type of democracy in which individuals live to demonstrate that the nature of representative democratic institutions mediates the relationship between a person's status as part of the political minority or majority and his or her satisfaction with the way the system works.
Abstract: Do political institutions affect citizen satisfaction with democracy? If so, how? Using cross-sectional survey data for eleven European democracies together with data on the type of democracy in which individuals live, we demonstrate that the nature of representative democratic institutions (measured by Arend Lijphart's consensus-majority index of democracies) mediates the relationship between a person's status as part of the political minority or majority and his or her satisfaction with the way the system works. Specifically, we find that (1) the losers of democratic competition show lower levels of satisfaction than do those in the majority and (2) losers in systems that are more consensual display higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than do losers in systems with majoritarian characteristics. Conversely, winners tend to be more satisfied with democracy the more a country's political institutions approximate pure majoritarian government.
886 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that the pre-adolescent socialization of longstanding, stable predispositions is catalyzed by exogenous political events; such events socialize attitudes selectively, only in the specific domains they make salient; and so longstanding predisposition tend to be socialized episodically rather than incrementally.
Abstract: We propose that (1) the preadult socialization of longstanding, stable predispositions is catalyzed by exogenous political events; (2) such events socialize attitudes selectively, only in the specific domains they make salient; and so (3) longstanding predispositions tend to be socialized episodically rather than incrementally. This theory is applied to the socialization of partisanship during a presidential campaign, examining gains in information, affective expression, and attitude crystallization. Adolescents (aged 10 to 17) and their parents were interviewed in a three-wave panel study, at the beginning of a presidential campaign, at the end, and a year later. The campaign induced substantial preadult socialization gains regarding attitude objects central to the campaign (candidates and parties), particularly in the stability of preadults' partisanship. There were few gains in attitude domains peripheral to the campaign or during the postcampaign period. These findings suggest that periodic political events catalyze preadult socialization, generating predispositions that persist into later life stages.
413 citations
292 citations
TL;DR: The authors apply Lakatos's criterion that a series of related theories must produce problemshifts that are progressive rather than degenerating to appraise the adequacy of realist-based theories on the balancing of power advanced by neotraditionalists.
Abstract: Several analysts argue that, despite anomalies, the realist paradigm is dominant because it is more fertile than its rivals. While the ability of the realist paradigm to reformulate its theories in light of criticism accounts for its persistence, it is argued that the proliferation of emendations exposes a degenerating tendency in the paradigm's research program. This article applies Lakatos's criterion that a series of related theories must produce problemshifts that are progressive rather than degenerating to appraise the adequacy of realist-based theories on the balancing of power advanced by neotraditionalists. This research program is seen as degenerating because of (1) the protean character of its theoretical development, (2) an unwillingness to specify what constitutes the true theory, which if falsified would lead to a rejection of the paradigm, (3) a continual adoption of auxiliary propositions to explain away flaws, and (4) a dearth of strong research findings.
277 citations
TL;DR: The hallmark of the new positive theories of the judiciary is that Supreme Court justices will frequently defer to the preferences of Congress when making decisions, particularly in statutory cases in which it is purportedly easy for Congress to reverse the Court as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The hallmark of the new positive theories of the judiciary is that Supreme Court justices will frequently defer to the preferences of Congress when making decisions, particularly in statutory cases in which it is purportedly easy for Congress to reverse the Court. Alternatively, judicial attitudinalists argue that the institutional structures facing the Court allow the justices to vote their sincere policy preferences. This paper compares these sincere and sophisticated models of voting behavior by Supreme Court justices. Using a variety of tests on the votes of Supreme Court justices in statutory cases decided between 1947 and 1992, I find some evidence of sophisticated behavior, but most tests suggest otherwise. Moreover, direct comparisons between the two models unambiguously favor the attitudinal model. I conclude that the justices overwhelmingly engage in rationally sincere behavior.
265 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that duality in citizenship engenders conflict over democracy and results in ethnic coalitions disagreeing over which institutions are appropriate for a multiethnic state.
Abstract: In some African countries, democratic openings have intensified ethnic competition and led to protracted transitions or outright conflict. In Kenya, I argue, the stalled transition reflects the effects of republican citizenship in ethnic political communities and liberal citizenship in the national political community. This duality in citizenship engenders conflict over democracy—conceived as liberal majoritarian democracy—and results in ethnic coalitions disagreeing over which institutions are appropriate for a multiethnic state. I provide evidence from discourses over institutions from two transition periods in Kenya: at independence and in the recent shift from one-party rule. This study makes two contributions. First, it adds to current citizenship theory, which is largely derived from Western experience, by demonstrating that republican and liberal citizenships are not necessarily compatible and that the modern nation-state is not the only relevant community for forming citizens. Second, it adds to studies of African transitions by highlighting citizenship issues in institutional design with regard to ethnicity in Kenya.
260 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that giving parents greater choice over the public schools their children attend creates incentives for parents as "citizen/consumers" to engage in activities that build social capital.
Abstract: While the possible decline in the level of social capital in the United States has received considerable attention by scholars such as Putnam and Fukuyama, less attention has been paid to the local activities of citizens that help define a nation's stock of social capital. Scholars have paid even less attention to how institutional arrangements affect levels of social capital. We argue that giving parents greater choice over the public schools their children attend creates incentives for parents as “citizen/consumers” to engage in activities that build social capital. Our empirical analysis employs a quasi-experimental approach comparing parental behavior in two pairs of demographically similar school districts that vary on the degree of parental choice over the schools their children attend. Our data show that, controlling for many other factors, parents who choose when given the opportunity are higher on all the indicators of social capital analyzed. Fukuyama has argued that it is easier for governments to decrease social capital than to increase it. We argue, however, that the design of government institutions can create incentives for individuals to engage in activities that increase social capital.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the dynamics of the "wasted vote" phenomenon and Duverger's Law in a Bayesian game model of strategic voting, and they showed that in a two-party election, non-Duvergerian equilibria are unstable, while two party equilibrium are not.
Abstract: This paper investigates the dynamics of the “wasted vote” phenomenon and Duverger's Law. I construct a theoretical model in order to consider how preelection polls serve to inform the electorate about the relative chances of the candidates and how that information acts over time to decrease the support of the trailing candidate. The results shed light on how public opinion polls can aggregate information in the electorate and coordinate voters on the viable candidates in the election. Specifically, I show that in a Bayesian game model of strategic voting there exist non-Duvergerian equilibria in which all three candidates receive votes (in the limit). These equilibria require extreme coordination, however, and any variation in beliefs leads voters away from them to one of the Duvergerian equilibria. Thus, non-Duvergerian equilibria are unstable, while two-party equilibria are not. In addition, I describe how preelection polls provide information to voters about the viability of candidates and can thus be used by voters to coordinate on a Duvergerian outcome.
TL;DR: In an extensive series of articles, Rabinowitz, Macdonald, and Listhaug as discussed by the authors have launched a new, directional theory of electoral choice, which is superior to the classical Downsian proximity model.
Abstract: In an extensive series of articles, Rabinowitz, Macdonald, and Listhaug have launched a new, directional theory of electoral choice. According to their claims, the new theory is superior to the classical Downsian proximity model. Such a conclusion, however, is not tenable. First, it fails to take proper account of the lower falsifiability of the directional model. Second, it rests on empirical analyses that do not test the two theories on the predictions they actually make. Both are theories of individual choice, which implies intrapersonal comparisons of utility. Prior tests, however, have predominantly taken the form of interpersonal comparisons. A reanalysis based on the proper type of comparison yields an outcome diametrically opposed to that previously obtained. It also reveals an eccentricity effect that largely accounts for the apparent success of the directional model.
TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on bilateral trade flows are analyzed and the authors argue that the interaction between them is central to explaining patterns of commerce, and that parties to a common preferential trading arrangement and a common alliance engage in markedly greater trade than do members of either type of institution but not both.
Abstract: We analyze the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on bilateral trade flows. Both factors are likely to promote trade among members, but we argue that the interaction between them is central to explaining patterns of commerce. The combination of an alliance, which creates political incentives for participants to engage in trade, and a commercial institution, which liberalizes trade among members, is expected to provide a considerable impetus to commerce among parties to both. The results of our quantitative analyses support these arguments. Both alliances and preferential trading arrangements strongly affected trade from 1960 to 1990, and allies that included a major power conducted considerably more trade than their nonmajor-power counterparts. Moreover, the interaction between alliances and preferential trading arrangements is fundamental to explaining patterns of bilateral commerce: Parties to a common preferential trading arrangement and a common alliance engage in markedly greater trade than do members of either type of institution but not both.
TL;DR: Douglas and Wildavsky as discussed by the authors argue that environmental activism is rooted in an egalitarian cultural bias and that environmental commitments and concerns are autonomous from conventional left-right distributive concerns.
Abstract: Douglas and Wildavsky argue that environmental activism is rooted in an egalitarian cultural bias. Others, like Paehlke, counter that environmental commitments and concerns are autonomous from redistributive concerns. Students of the “New Politics” agree that environmentalism is autonomous from conventional left-right distributive concerns but also argue that environmental attitudes and beliefs are embedded in “postmaterial” values, such as citizen participation. Still other scholars emphasize a cultural consensus around environmental values and beliefs. What distinguishes environmental activists, in this view, is less what they believe than their willingness to make sacrifices for those values and beliefs. Drawing upon several surveys of environmental groups and the mass public in the Pacific Northwest, we test these four hypotheses and find that the Douglas-Wildavsky “cultural theory,” although not without its limitations, appears to provide the more satisfactory account of environmental preferences.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that political behavior in postcommunist societies is fundamentally structured by interpretations of the transition histories, which were centrally constitutive events, and propose a structural equation model in which understandings of the past mediate the relationship between personal circumstances and satisfaction with economic reforms.
Abstract: Electorates in several East European countries have thrown their support behind reconstructed communist parties. Is personal economic hardship driving this phenomenon? We argue that political behavior in postcommunist societies is fundamentally structured by interpretations of the transition histories, which were centrally constitutive events. We propose a structural equation model in which understandings of the past mediate the relationship between personal circumstances and satisfaction with economic reforms. We analyze cross-sectional data collected in Poland immediately after the 1993 parliamentary elections and find, consistent with our hypotheses, that understandings of the past exert as much of an effect on attitudes toward reforms as do personal economic assessments. We use multinomial logit to analyze vote choice and find that personal economic circumstances are of little importance. Attitudes toward economic reforms have a limited effect on voting behavior, but their importance is eclipsed by understandings of the past and other factors, such as religion.
TL;DR: The question is not whether states balance or bandwagon as discussed by the authors, but rather under what conditions states choose one strategy or the other, and it is worth noting that history clearly shows that they do both.
Abstract: Realism is both a scientific research program and, more traditionally, a political philosophy. All realists share a pessimistic worldview that posits perpetual struggle among groups for security, prestige, and power and that denies the capacity of human reason to create a world of peace and harmony. Recent research by so-called neotraditional realists does not disconfirm Waltz's balancing proposition. Instead, these works have tended to add unit-level variables in order to transform Waltz's theory of international politics into one of foreign policy. The question is not whether states balance or bandwagon—history clearly shows that they do both—but rather under what conditions states choose one strategy or the other.
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that the most robust strategies of conditional cooperation are the ones that support the smallest frequency to stabilize under a standard evolutionary dynamic, and the less efficient a strategy, the larger is its minimal stabilizing frequency; Hobbesian strategies are the least robust.
Abstract: Is cooperation without central authority stable? If so, how robust is it? Despite what might be the conventional wisdom, The Evolution of Cooperation did not solve this problem deductively. In fact, results obtained later by others seem to have contradicted the book's main message. Reexamining this exceptionally influential work yields a new picture. Part of Axelrod's evolutionary story turns out to be false. But the main intuition, that retaliatory strategies of conditional cooperation are somehow advantaged, proves correct in one specific and significant sense: Under a standard evolutionary dynamic these strategies require the minimal frequency to stabilize. Hence, they support the most robust evolutionary equilibrium: the easiest to reach and retain. Moreover, the less efficient a strategy, the larger is its minimal stabilizing frequency; Hobbesian strategies of pure defection are the least robust. Our main theorems hold for a large class of games that pose diverse cooperation problems: prisoner's dilemma, chicken, stag hunt, and many others.
TL;DR: This paper analyzed the use of reciprocity or inverse response (bullying) in the Bosnia conflict from 1992 to 1995 using machine-coded events data and identified several important patterns of strategic response, both reciprocal and inverse.
Abstract: Although the role of reciprocity in international cooperation is central to neoliberal institutionalism, empirical understanding of the concept remains weak. We analyze strategic response patterns—the use of reciprocity or inverse response (bullying)—in the Bosnia conflict from 1992 to 1995. We construct weekly time series of conflict and cooperation among the parties to the Bosnia war, using machine-coded events data. Time-series statistical analysis identifies several important patterns of strategic response, both reciprocal and inverse. These include bilateral responses, which are central to the concepts of reciprocity and evolution of cooperation, and triangular responses, which are central to the debates on containment versus accommodation in regional conflicts. Specifically, Serb forces displayed inverse triangular response, cooperating toward Bosnia after being punished by NATO. Outside powers displayed triangular reciprocity, increasing hostility toward Serb forces after Serbian attacks on the Bosnian government.
TL;DR: The results show that national security decision makers use a mixture of strategies in arriving at a decision, and strategy selection and choice are significantly influenced by the structure of the choice set (static versus dynamic).
Abstract: Previous studies of political decision making have used only “static” choice sets, where alternatives are “fixed” and are a priori known to the decision maker. We assess the effect of a dynamic choice set (new alternatives appear during the decision process) on strategy selection and choice in international politics. We suggest that decision makers use a mixture of decision strategies when making decisions in a two-stage process consisting of an initial screening of available alternatives, and a selection of the best one from the subset of remaining alternatives. To test the effects of dynamic and static choice sets on the decision process we introduce a computer-based “process tracer” in a study of top-ranking officers in the U.S. Air Force. The results show that (1) national security decision makers use a mixture of strategies in arriving at a decision, and (2) strategy selection and choice are significantly influenced by the structure of the choice set (static versus dynamic).
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show a nonmonotonic relationship between observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis, as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement, and derive four hypotheses, testing them against crises in Europe between 1815 and 1970.
Abstract: The evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty. We model crises as a game of two-sided incomplete information. Players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities. We derive four hypotheses, testing them against crises in Europe between 1815 and 1970. We show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ante observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis, as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We answer five questions: (1) How do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence? (2) How do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence? (3) What do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises? (4) Under what conditions can deterrence succeed? (5) Under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis?
TL;DR: This article used regression analysis of data from a telephone survey of 380 married couples to subject to rare empirical test the contention that women are unequal at home, they cannot be equal in the polity.
Abstract: T r This study uses regression analysis of data from a telephone survey of 380 married couples to subject to rare empirical test the contention that, because women are unequal at home, they cannot be equal in the polity. The argument is often made that wives' disadvantage in comparison to their husbands with respect to control over family income, availability of free time, power over decisions, or mutual respect dampens their ability to participate fully in politics. In fact, domestic inequalities do have implications for political activity, but these effects differ from what is usually posited by being stronger for husbands than for wives. For husbands, control over major financial decisions and autonomy in using small amounts of time enhance their ability to participate in politics beyond what would be expected on the basis of their other characteristics. In short, being boss at home is politically empowering to husbands.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors posit a dynamic model of strategic position announcement based on signaling theories of legislative politics and find that members who receive clear signals from constituents, interest groups, and policy leaders will announce their positions earlier.
Abstract: A critical element of decision making is the timing of choices political actors make; often when a decision is made is as critical as the decision itself. We posit a dynamic model of strategic position announcement based on signaling theories of legislative politics. We suggest that members who receive clear signals from constituents, interest groups, and policy leaders will announce their positions earlier. Those with conflicting signals will seek more information, delaying their announcement. We test several expectations by examining data on when members of the House of Representatives announced their positions on the North American Free Trade Agreement. We also contrast the timing model with a vote model, and find that there are meaningful differences between the factors influencing the timing of position announcements and vote choice. Our research allows analysts to interpret the process leading up to the House action and the end state of that process.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explored some major modes of participation, issues motivating participation, and the determinants of participation and found that participants pursued selective and collective goods and were strategic in combining particular modes with particular problem areas.
Abstract: The topic of grass-roots participation in China has acquired special interest in light of the local economic and political reforms introduced in the post-Mao period. This paper explores some major modes of participation, issues motivating participation, and the determinants of participation. The findings are based on interviews held in early 1990 with probability samples drawn from four countryside counties. The analysis emphasizes three modes of “autonomous” participation: cooperative actions, voicing opinions to cadres, and contacting representatives. Participants pursued selective and collective goods and were strategic in combining particular modes with particular problem areas. Determinants of participation included traditional resource model predictors but also unique predictors in the form of holding a second occupation, being a party member, and residing in a specific county. Local activists appear to be using new and traditional methods in moving toward more proactive, collective, and strategic forms of behavior.
TL;DR: Vasquez's assessment of realism suffers from three serious flaws as discussed by the authors : his reliance on Imre Lakatos's (1970) model of scientific progress is problematic, because the Lakatosian model has been largely rejected by contemporary historians and philosophers of science.
Abstract: John Vasquez's assessment of realism suffers from three serious flaws. First, his reliance on Imre Lakatos's (1970) model of scientific progress is problematic, because the Lakatosian model has been largely rejected by contemporary historians and philosophers of science. Second, Vasquez understates the range and diversity of the realist research program and mistakenly sees disagreements among realists as evidence of theoretical degeneration. Finally, he overlooks the progressive character of contemporary realist theory, largely because he does not consider all the relevant literature. Disagreements within and across competing research programs are essential to progress and should be welcomed, but Vasquez's effort suggests that criticism will be most helpful when it seeks to do more than merely delegitimate a particular research tradition.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the construction of norms in the settlements of security-related disputes and the effects these settlements have on subsequent militarized interactions and find strong support for the hypothesis that states can and do construct normative standards that guide their behavior in international crises, whereas realist theory receives only mixed support.
Abstract: In this work I test the proposition that normative standards of behavior can influence state actions in security-related conflicts. Specifically, I examine the construction of norms in the settlements of security-related disputes and the effects these settlements have on subsequent militarized interactions. I argue that dispute settlements alter subsequent crisis bargaining in two important ways. First, they act as normative referents that alter the interpretation of subsequent crisis bargaining behavior both by identifying a solution to the dispute which alleviates fears of demands for future concessions and by defining a set of acts which both sides consider illegitimate. Second, in combination with the response to their violation, dispute settlements inflict reputational costs on states that violate them. I test these arguments against a realist theory of crisis bargaining through an analysis of 122 reinitiated international crises between 1929 and 1979. I find strong support for the hypothesis that states can and do construct normative standards that guide their behavior in international crises, whereas realist theory receives only mixed support.
TL;DR: The attempted coup in August 1991 provides an acid test of whether a democratic political culture is emerging in the former Soviet Union as mentioned in this paper, and the hypothesis that active resistance to the coup was partly a function of attachments to democracy.
Abstract: The attempted coup in August 1991 provides an acid test of whether a democratic political culture is emerging in the former Soviet Union. This paper considers the hypothesis that active resistance to the coup was partly a function of attachments to democracy. Relying heavily on earlier models of collective action, and based on a 1992 survey of mass opinion in all the republics, this hypothesis is tested within a broader theory of rational choice and expectancy theory. Generally, it seems that reactions to the coup were not based on strictly rational calculations and that basic commitments to the collective good of democracy motivated resistance. My general conclusion is that a mass culture has emerged in Russia that nurtures democracy. The 1991 coup demonstrates that for many people in the former Soviet states there is little alternative to democratic politics.
TL;DR: In this paper, prospect theory is used to model a broader set of state behavior in an empirical world in which states exhibit both relative and absolute gains pursuit, and the model accurately predicts the timing and content of shifts in EC preferences, suggesting that a synthesis of realist and liberal approaches is possible.
Abstract: The theoretical bifurcation of international relations theory into (neo)realist and (neo)liberal camps has resulted in a “gains debate” that says little about an empirical world in which states exhibit both relative and absolute gains pursuit. This article deploys prospect theory in an attempt to move beyond the gains debate. The intent here is synthetic. By bringing the predictions of both perspectives under a single theoretical umbrella, we can model a broader set of state behavior. The thesis developed demonstrates that states in a gains frame pursue absolute gains and are risk averse, while states in a losses frame pursue relative gains and are risk acceptant. This hypothesis is assessed against the behavior of the European Community in the formation of the Montreal Protocol, a regime intended to protect the earth's protective ozone shield. The new model accurately predicts the timing and content of shifts in EC preferences, suggesting that a synthesis of realist and liberal approaches is possible.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine this renaissance of interest in Aristotelian prudence through a study of the works of several leading democratic theorists and Aristotle scholars and conclude that they stop short of some of the very elements of Aristotle's thought that can assist us in promoting prudence.
Abstract: Renewed interest in the concept of political judgment—a mode of reasoning that steers a middle way between abstract, technical reasoning and willful self-assertion—frequently takes the form of a return, qualified in various ways, to Aristotle's concept of phronesis or prudence. I examine this renaissance of interest in Aristotelian prudence through a study of the works of several leading democratic theorists and Aristotle scholars and conclude that they stop short of some of the very elements of Aristotle's thought that can assist us in promoting prudence. In particular, I try to show that these contemporary advocates of political judgment undermine the case for political science (Aristotle's primary concern) and thereby risk losing the independent judgment that Aristotelian political science supports. They fail to give sufficient weight to Aristotle's claim that phronesis, while distinguishable from scientific reason or philosophy, functions best even as a practical science when it accepts certain of philosophy's guiding insights.
TL;DR: This argument meets Imre Lakatos's criteria for a progressive problem shift insofar as it explains more than the original theory, does so parsimoniously, has been successfully applied to new domains, and does not introduce new assumptions that contradict the core of the original Theory.
Abstract: Our article (1990) on alliance dynamics in multipolarity, which John Vasquez criticizes, differs from some neorealist approaches by incorporating variables from the theory of the security dilemma, including perceptual factors. Nonetheless, our argument meets Imre Lakatos's criteria for a progressive problem shift insofar as it explains more than the original theory, does so parsimoniously, has been successfully applied to new domains, and does not introduce new assumptions that contradict the core of the original theory.