Showing papers in "American Political Science Review in 2006"
TL;DR: This paper showed that the electoral system plays a key role in the distribution of redistributions in the United States and Sweden, and that redistribution is much more prevalent in democracies than in non-democratic countries.
Abstract: Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies. We develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions, hence redistribution. Our argument implies (1) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, whereas center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems; and (2) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies. W hy do some countries redistribute more than others? Most work on the politics of redistribution starts from the premise that democratic institutions empower those who stand to benefit from redistribution. The basic logic is succinctly captured in the Meltzer‐Richard (1981) model, where the voter with the median income is also the decisive voter. With a typical right-skewed distribution of income, the median voter will push for redistributive spending up to the point where the benefit of such spending to the median voter is outweighed by the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation. This argument implies that redistibution is much greater in democracies than in nondemocracies (at least of the right-authoritarian variety), and that, among the latter, inegalitarian societies redistribute more than egalitarian ones. There is some evidence to supportthefirstimplication,althoughitisdisputed(see Ross 2005), but most of the variance in redistribution is probably within the same regime type. According to datafromtheLuxembourgIncomeStudy,forexample, the reduction in the poverty rate in United States as a result of taxation and transfers was 13% in 1994, whereas the comparable figure for Sweden was 82% (thepovertyrateisthepercentageofhouseholdsbelow 50% of the median income). To explain this variance, we have to look at political and economic differences
946 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors model the behavior of professional lobbyists not as exchange (vote buying) or persuasion (informative signaling) but as a form of legislative subsidy, a matching grant of policy information, political intelligence and legislative labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators.
Abstract: Professional lobbyists are among the most experienced, knowledgeable, and strategic actors one can find in the everyday practice of politics. Nonetheless, their behavioral patterns often appear anomalous when viewed in the light of existing theories. We revisit these anomalies in search of an alternative theory. We model lobbying not as exchange (vote buying) or persuasion (informative signaling) but as a form of legislative subsidy—a matching grant of policy information, political intelligence, and legislative labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators. The proximate political objective of this strategy is not to change legislators' minds but to assist natural allies in achieving their own, coincident objectives. The theory is simple in form, realistic in its principal assumptions, and counterintuitive in its main implications. Empirically, the model renders otherwise anomalous regularities comprehensible and predictable. In a later section, we briefly bring preferences back in, examining the important but relatively uncommon conditions under which preference-centered lobbying should occur.
776 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed the determinants of the tactics, strategies, and behaviors that warring factions employ in their relationships with non-combatants, and found that high levels of abuse are exhibited by warring groups that are unable to police the behavior of their members.
Abstract: The toll of civil conflict is largely borne by civilian populations, as warring factions target non-combatants through campaigns of violence. But significant variation exists in the extent to which warring groups abuse the civilian population: across conflicts, across groups, and within countries geographically and over time. Using a new dataset on fighting groups in Sierra Leone, this article analyzes the determinants of the tactics, strategies, and behaviors that warring factions employ in their relationships with noncombatants. We first describe a simple logic of extraction which we use to generate hypotheses about variation in levels of abuse across fighting units. We then show that the most important determinants of civilian abuse are internal to the structure of the faction. High levels of abuse are exhibited by warring factions that are unable to police the behavior of their members because they are more ethnically fragmented, rely on material incentives to recruit participants, and lack mechanisms for punishing indiscipline. Explanations that emphasize the importance of local community ties and contestation do not find strong support in the data.
445 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop a theory of inefficient government policies and institutions and show that changes in institutions or the introduction of new technologies often create turbulence, eroding the political advantages and future economic rents of incumbent elites.
Abstract: Government policies and institutions shape economic incentives, and via this channel, have a first-order impact on economic development. Why, then, do many societies adopt policies that discourage investment and maintain institutions that cause economic backwardness? Perhaps, politically powerful groups (elites) are not in favor of economic growth. But why? It would appear that economic growth would provide more resources for these groups to take over or tax, increasing their economic returns. So why don’t powerful groups always support economic development? In this paper, we develop a theory of inefficient government policies and institutions. All else equal, politically powerful groups would welcome superior institutions and technologies. But in practice all else is not equal, because superior institutions and technologies may reduce their political power and make it more likely that they will be replaced. At the center of our theory is therefore the idea that changes in institutions or the introduction of new technologies often create turbulence, eroding the political advantages and future economic rents of incumbent elites. Alternatively, new technologies may enrich competing groups, increasing their threat to incumbents. These considerations make politically powerful groups fear losing power and oppose economic and political change, even when such change will benefit society as a whole. To understand the mechanism at work and its potential applications, consider a concrete example: industrialization in the nineteenth century. Bairoch (1982) estimates that between 1830 and 1913, world manufacturing output increased by a factor of 5 (see Table 1 Panel A). Nevertheless, this process was highly uneven across regions and countries. Bairoch also calculates that over the same period manufacturing output in developed countries (Europe and North America) increasedbyafactorofover10,whereasitdeclinedinthe Third World. Among developed countries, there were
420 citations
TL;DR: The citation count for this article is more likely due to our being in the right place (that is, the right part of the discipline) at the right time as discussed by the authors, rather than the brilliance and clarity of our argument.
Abstract: Much as we would like to believe that the high citation count for this article is due to the brilliance and clarity of our argument, it is more likely that the count is due to our being in the right place (that is, the right part of the discipline) at the right time. In the 1960s and 1970s, serious quantitative analysis was used primarily in the study of American politics. But since the 1980s it has spread to the study of both comparative politics and international relations. In comparative politics we see in the 20 most cited Review articles Hibbs's (1977) and Cameron's (1978) quantitative analyses of the political economy of advanced industrial societies; in international relations we see Maoz and Russett's (1993) analysis of the democratic peace; and these studies have been followed by myriad others. Our article contributed to the methodology for analyzing what has become the principal type of data used in the study of comparative politics; a related article (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998), which has also had a good citation history, dealt with analyzing this type of data with a binary dependent variable, data heavily used in conflict studies similar to that of Maoz and Russett's. Thus the citations to our methodological discussions reflect the huge amount of work now being done in the quantitative analysis of both comparative politics and international relations.
355 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that democracy has contradictory effects on different types of trade policies because electoral competition generates more information about some than about others, and they conclude that democracy promotes optimal obfuscation that allows politicians to protect their markets while maintaining a veneer of liberalization.
Abstract: A growing body of research shows that democracies have more liberal trade policies than do autocracies. I argue, in contrast, that democracy has contradictory effects on different types of trade policies because electoral competition generates more information about some than about others. It generates considerable information about policies whose effects on consumer welfare are easy to explain to voters, but less information about policies whose effects are more complex. By increasing the transparency of some policies relative to others, democracy induces politicians to reduce transparent trade barriers but also to replace them with less transparent ones. I test this hypothesis by examining the impact of democracy on tariffs, “core” nontariff barriers (NTBs) such as quotas, and “quality” NTBs such as product standards in 75 countries in the 1990s. I find that democracy leads to lower tariffs, higher core NTBs, and even higher quality NTBs. I conclude that democracy promotes “optimal obfuscation” that allows politicians to protect their markets while maintaining a veneer of liberalization.
322 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, an analysis of the first hundred volumes of the American Political Science Review reveals that randomized experiments have grown in impact and prominence over the last century, and demonstrate the growing influence of laboratory, survey, and field experiments.
Abstract: Although political scientists have long expressed skepticism about the prospects for experimental science, an analysis of the first hundred volumes of the American Political Science Review reveals that randomized experiments have grown in impact and prominence. We document how thinking about experimentation has evolved over the century, and demonstrate the growing influence of laboratory, survey, and field experiments. A number of experiments have transformed how political scientists think about causal relationships in specific substantive areas. There are limits to the kinds of questions that experiments can address, but experiments have made important contributions in an array of political science subfields.
315 citations
TL;DR: This paper showed that uncertainty about individuals' private preferences is necessary for full information sharing and demonstrated in a very general setting that the condition under which unanimity can support full information revelation in debate amounts to it being common knowledge that all committee members invariably share identical preferences over the alternatives.
Abstract: A deliberative committee is a group of at least two individuals who first debate about what alternative to choose prior to these same individuals voting to determine the choice. We argue, first, that uncertainty about individuals' private preferences is necessary for full information sharing and, second, demonstrate in a very general setting that the condition under which unanimity can support full information revelation in debate amounts to it being common knowledge that all committee members invariably share identical preferences over the alternatives. It follows that if ever there exists an equilibrium with fully revealing debate under unanimity rule, there exists an equilibrium with fully revealing debate under any voting rule. Moreover, the converse is not true of majority rule if there is uncertainty about individuals' preferences.
257 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a model where groups attempt to influence policies using both bribes and the threat of punishment, and use it to make predictions about the quality of a country's public officials and to understand the role of institutions granting politicians with immunity from legal prosecution.
Abstract: We present a model where groups attempt to influence policies using both bribes (plata, Spanish for silver) and the threat of punishment (plomo, Spanish for lead). We then use it to make predictions about the quality of a country’s public officials and to understand the role of institutions granting politicians with immunity from legal prosecution. The use of punishment lowers the returns from public office and reduces the incentives of high-ability citizens to enter public life. Cheaper plomo and more resources subject to official discretion are associated with more frequent corruption and less able politicians. This predicts that violence in a country will typically go together with corruption and worse politicians. Moreover, the possibility of punishment changes the nature of the influence game, so that even cheaper plata can lower the ability of public officials. Protecting officials from accusations of corruption (immunity) will decrease the frequency of corruption if the judiciary is weak and may increase the quality of politicians. These predictions cannot emerge from a traditional model where only bribes are used. The positive evils and dangers of the representative, as of every other form of government, may be reduced to two heads: first, general ignorance and incapacity, or, to speak more moderately, insufficient mental qualifications, in the controlling body; secondly, the danger of its being under the influence of interests not identical with the general welfare of the community.
208 citations
TL;DR: The authors developed a two-stage model of progressive behavior that distinguishes between the formation of ambition for higher office and the decision to enter a particular race using data from a survey of state legislators.
Abstract: The health of any democratic system depends on political ambition to generate a steady supply of quality candidates for office. Because most models of candidate entry assume ambition rather than model it, previous research fails to understand its roots in individual and institutional characteristics. We develop a two-stage model of progressive behavior that distinguishes between the formation of ambition for higher office and the decision to enter a particular race. Using data from a survey of state legislators, we demonstrate that the intrinsic costs and benefits associated with running for and holding higher office shape ambitions but do not influence the decision to run. For progressively ambitious legislators, the second-stage decision is a strategic choice about when to run rather than whether to run. Our research highlights how institutional characteristics that foster progressive ambition also increase the likelihood that national or local political conditions will be translated into meaningful choices at the ballot box.
194 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the conditions under which mediators can facilitate cooperation by building trust between two parties, assuming mediators have no intrinsic commitment to honesty, and they can be credible trust builders in one-round interactions only if they care about the issue at stake, have a moderate ideal point, and do not find conflict to be too costly.
Abstract: Mediation is one of the most widespread techniques for preventing conflict and promoting cooperation. I examine the conditions under which mediators can facilitate cooperation by building trust between two parties. Assuming mediators have no intrinsic commitment to honesty, they can be credible trust builders in one-round interactions only if they care about the issue at stake, have a moderate ideal point, and do not find conflict to be too costly. A mediator that is solely interested in promoting cooperation, or one that is biased toward one side, will be ineffective. A desire to preserve a reputation for honesty can overcome a limited amount of bias or issue indifference.
TL;DR: The authors traces the use of the concept in the Review since its launch in 1906 and reveals changing fashions in the connotation of the term, but suggests an underlying agreement on the essential components of ideology.
Abstract: Ideology has been the subject of a surprising amount of attention during the last half of the twentieth century. Although it has been argued that the term has been “thoroughly muddied by diverse uses” (Converse 1964, 207), an empirical investigation of the pages of the Review reveals substantial convergence among political scientists over time on a core definition. This essay traces the use of the concept in the Review since its launch in 1906. It reveals changing fashions in the connotation of the term, but suggests an underlying agreement on the essential components—coherence, stability and contrast—and underlines the centrality of the concept of ideology in political science.
TL;DR: This article developed and tested a general argument about the conditions under which state leaders are most likely to choose legal dispute resolution over bilateral negotiations as a means to settle international disputes and found that leaders who anticipate significant domestic audience costs for the making of voluntary, negotiated concessions are likely to seek the "political cover" of an international legal ruling.
Abstract: We develop and test a general argument about the conditions under which state leaders are most likely to choose legal dispute resolution over bilateral negotiations as a means to settle international disputes. Our central claim is that leaders who anticipate significant domestic audience costs for the making of voluntary, negotiated concessions are likely to seek the “political cover” of an international legal ruling. In such cases, it will be easier for leaders to justify the making of concessions if they are mandated as part of a ruling by an international court or arbitration body. We test a series of domestic-level hypotheses using a dataset comprised of nearly 1,500 rounds of talks concerning disputed territorial claims. Our multivariate analyses indicate that state leaders opt for legal dispute resolution when they are highly accountable to domestic political opposition, as well as when the dispute is highly salient to domestic audiences.
TL;DR: This article explored the evolving status of religion in political science by examining patterns of scholarly inquiry in the discipline's flagship journal, The American Political Science Review (APSPR), and found that despite the resurgence of scholarly interest in religion during the 1980s, the status of the subfield remains tenuous because of the intellectual isolation of research on the topic.
Abstract: To judge by the absence of religion from the pages of the American Political Science Review in its first century, most political scientists have embraced a secular understanding of the political world We explore the evolving status of religion in the discipline by examining patterns of scholarly inquiry in the discipline's flagship journal After finding religion an (at best) marginal topic and rejecting some plausible hypotheses for this outcome, we examine the major reasons religion has received so little attention—the intellectual origins of the discipline, the social background of practitioners, the complexity of religious measurements, and the event-driven agenda of political science Despite the resurgence of scholarly interest in religion during the 1980s, the status of the subfield remains tenuous because of the intellectual isolation of research on the topic
TL;DR: In this article, partial public financing through matching funds improves voter welfare in districts that have advertising under the decentralized system, while it can reduce welfare in other districts, and the optimal policy must strike a balance between these two effects.
Abstract: Two candidates compete for elective office. Each candidate has information she would like to reveal to the voters, but this requires costly advertising. The candidates can solicit contributions from interest groups to finance such advertising. These contributions are secured by promises to perform favors for the contributors, should the candidate win the election. Voters understand this and elect the candidate they like best, taking into account their expectations about promises to special interests. There is an incumbency advantage in fundraising, which is sometimes so great that the incumbent faces no serious opposition at all. Introducing partial public financing through matching funds improves voter welfare in districts that have advertising under the decentralized system, while it can reduce welfare in other districts. The optimal policy must strike a balance between these two effects.
TL;DR: This paper explored the etiology of ideological constraint in the United States and focused on a provocative new theory put forward by cognitive linguist George Lakoff, arguing that many people reflexively envision proper power relations between citizens and government based on their understanding of proper power relation between children and parents.
Abstract: This paper explores the etiology of ideological constraint in the United States. In an effort to gain understanding of the ideational elements of political socialization, we concentrate on a provocative new theory put forward by cognitive linguist George Lakoff. Lakoff argues that many people reflexively envision proper power relations between citizens and government based on their understanding of proper power relations between children and parents: “nurturant” visions of parental roles engender egalitarian and humanitarian political values, whereas “disciplinarian” visions of proper parenting predict political individualism and traditionalism. Using data obtained from the 2000 National Election Study, we consider the empirical mettle of this account.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a critical account of a key concept in democratic theory, "rule", via an unorthodox interpretation of Hannah Arendt's work, and draw attention to an important dimension of political activity that lies off these axes of opposition, shedding new light on democratic agency and the forces that obstruct it.
Abstract: This article presents a novel critical account of a key concept in democratic theory, “rule,” via an unorthodox interpretation of Hannah Arendt's work. Many theorists treat democracy as one type of regime; others, stressing the importance of unruliness to democratic politics, challenge the reduction of democracy to a form of rule. Although this debate remains caught within conventional oppositions between order, closure, and continuity; and interruption, openness, and novelty, Arendt shows this whole matrix of oppositions to be an artifact of the dominance of a hierarchical understanding of rule. Her unusual critique of rule and her distinctive account of the meaning of “beginning” draw attention to an important dimension of political activity that lies off these axes of opposition, shedding new light on democratic agency and the forces that obstruct it.
TL;DR: In this article, an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system is presented, showing that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label.
Abstract: How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan’s mixedmember electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party’s overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany’s compensatory mixed-member system, Japan’s parallel system (combined with a “best loser” or “zombie” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.
TL;DR: This article showed that the probability of a justice voting for a litigant's lawyer increases dramatically if that litigants' lawyer presents better oral arguments than the competing counsel, and that this element of the Court's decisional process affects final votes on the merits.
Abstract: We posit that Supreme Court oral arguments provide justices with useful information that influences their final votes on the merits. To examine the role of these proceedings, we ask the following questions: (1) what factors influence the quality of arguments presented to the Court; and, more importantly, (2) does the quality of a lawyer's oral argument affect the justices' final votes on the merits? We answer these questions by utilizing a unique data source—evaluations Justice Blackmun made of the quality of oral arguments presented to the justices. Our analysis shows that Justice Blackmun's grading of attorneys is somewhat influenced by conventional indicators of the credibility of attorneys and are not simply the product of Justice Blackmun's ideological leanings. We thus suggest they can plausibly be seen as measuring the quality of oral argument. We further show that the probability of a justice voting for a litigant increases dramatically if that litigant's lawyer presents better oral arguments than the competing counsel. These results therefore indicate that this element of the Court's decisional process affects final votes on the merits, and it has implications for how other elite decision makers evaluate and use information.
TL;DR: In this article, the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout was investigated in a participation game, in which each late voter is told about one early voter's turnout decision and the early voters strategically try to use their first mover position and late voters respond to this.
Abstract: We study the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout by investigating the role of information about other voters' decisions. We do so in a participation game, in which we distinguish between early and late voters. Each late voter is told about one early voter's turnout decision. Cases are distinguished where the voters are allies (support the same group) or adversaries (with opposing preferences) and where they are uncertain about each other's preferences. Our experimental results show that the social embeddedness matters: this information increases aggregate turnout by approximately 50%. The largest effect is observed for allies. Early voters strategically try to use their first mover position and late voters respond to this.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors highlight three forgotten practices that facilitate popular control of both economic and political elites: magistrate appointment procedures combining lottery and election, offices or assemblies excluding the wealthy from eligibility, and political trials enlisting the entire citizenry in prosecutions and appeals.
Abstract: Modern republics neglect to establish formal institutions that prevent wealthy citizens from exerting excessive political influence and they abandon extra-electoral techniques traditionally employed to keep office-holders accountable. Inspired by Guicciardini's and Machiavelli's reflections on the Roman, Venetian, and Florentine constitutions, this article highlights three forgotten practices that facilitate popular control of both economic and political elites: magistrate appointment procedures combining lottery and election, offices or assemblies excluding the wealthy from eligibility, and political trials enlisting the entire citizenry in prosecutions and appeals. I present a typology of regimes that evaluates the wealth containment potential of various magistrate selection methods, and propose a hypothetical reform supplying the U.S. Constitution with a “Tribunate” reminiscent of elite-accountability institutions in pre-eighteenth-century popular governments.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the impact of the form of government (presidential or parliamentary) on economic outcomes in democratic systems and show that the gross domestic product ratio of the central government budget balance is higher in presidential than in parliamentary democracies, and that this impact is not due to the fact that presidential systems are not subject to the costs of coalition that allegedly afflict parliamentary democracies.
Abstract: This paper examines the impact of the form of government— –presidential or parliamentary— –on fiscal outcomes in democratic systems. Based on data for democracies in 98 countries between 1970 and 2002, it shows that the gross domestic product ratio of the central government budget balance is higher in presidential than in parliamentary democracies. It also shows that this impact is not due to the fact that presidential systems are not subject to the “costs of coalition” that allegedly afflict parliamentary democracies: the coalition and status of the government are of no consequence for budget balances in either presidential or parliamentary systems. Presidential systems matter for budget balances because they generate relatively high incentives for governments to keep budgets under control. They do so because in presidential systems, unlike in parliamentary systems, voters are by design able to identify and punish those responsible for economic policies. Presidents, however, vary in their capacity to affect budget policies. This paper demonstrates that presidential systems in which presidents are constitutionally able to dominate the budget process or to effectively veto legislation tend to have higher budget balances than those in which the budget process is dominated by the legislature or the president is unable to exercise existing veto powers. oes the form of democratic government matter for economic outcomes? Specifically, does it matter for economic performance whether a country has a presidential or a parliamentary constitution? In this paper I show that it does, at least when it comes to fiscal outcomes: on balance, budget deficits are smaller in presidential than in parliamentary democracies. The reason, I suggest, has to do with the way presidential constitutions define the relationship between the voters and the government; specifically with the fact that electoral identifiability— –the ability of voters to identify and punish those responsible for economic policies— –is by design high in presidential systems, thus generating incentives for the president— –the head of the government— –to keep budgets under control. Moreover, I show that, given their incentives to control budget deficits, presidents vary in their capacity to do so. Most of the comparative studies of presidentialism have focused on the impact that a system in which the executive and the legislature are independent from one another might have on the survival of democracy. There were empirical and theoretical reasons for this concern. A cursory look around the world shows that there is only one long-living democracy that is also presidential— –the United States. At the same time, Latin America, the region of the world where presidential institutions have dominated since the 19th century, is also the region with the highest level of regime instability, understood here as shifts between dictatorship and democracy: whereas the 18 countries that comprise
TL;DR: For example, this article found that African Americans are least responsive to changes in economic circumstances because they are on the whole more pessimistic about their life prospects and more likely to encounter discrimination.
Abstract: We propose and test a theory of opportunities that explains the conditions in which economic status affects support for racial and ethnic group interests among African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. Using data from a 2001 Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University national survey, our analysis finds that, for all minority groups, the effect of economic status on support for group interests is mediated by the socioeconomic experiences of individuals. Intergroup differences therefore result from varying experiences and perceptions of discrimination among minority groups rather than from group-specific theoretical processes. Compared to Latinos and Asian Americans, African Americans are least responsive to changes in economic circumstances because they are on the whole more pessimistic about their life prospects and more likely to encounter discrimination. But we find in general that, among those minority individuals who perceive equal opportunity and experience less discrimination, higher economic status often leads to a reduced emphasis on race and ethnicity. These results demonstrate that the incorporation of a minority group into American society depends not only on the actions of group members but also on the fair treatment of that group by the majority population.
TL;DR: The policy scientist of democracy was a model for engaged scholarship invented and embodied by Harold D. Lasswell as discussed by the authors, who believed that political science has a unique ability and even perhaps a special obligation to engage with issues of democratic choice that fundamentally affect the life circumstances of citizens.
Abstract: The “policy scientist of democracy” was a model for engaged scholarship invented and embodied by Harold D. Lasswell. This disciplinary persona emerged in Lasswell's writings and wartime consultancies during the 1940s, well before he announced in his APSA presidential address, printed in the Review precisely 50 years ago, that political science was “the policy science par excellence.” The policy scientist of democracy knew all about the process of elite decision making, and he put his knowledge into practice by advising those in power, sharing in important decisions, and furthering the cause of dignity. Although Lasswell formulated this ambitious vision near the zenith of his influence, the discipline accorded the ideal—and Lasswell—a mixed reception. Some heralded the policy scientist of democracy; others observed a contradictory figure, at once positivist and value-laden, elitist and democratic, heroic and implausible. The conflicted response exemplifies Lasswell's legacy. The policy scientist of democracy was—and is—too demanding and too contradictory a hero. But the vital questions Lasswell grappled with still must be asked a century into the discipline's development: what is the role of the political scientist in a democratic society? Do political scientists have any obligation to inform or shape policy? Are there democratic values that political science should serve, and if so, what are they? Lasswell never satisfactorily answered these questions. But in asking and trying to answer them—in his writings and in his own career—he was guided by a profound and inspiring conviction: Political science has a unique ability, and even perhaps a special obligation, to engage with issues of democratic choice that fundamentally affect the life circumstances of citizens.
TL;DR: The authors argue that comparative politics has been shaped by two "great punctuations" that, on each occasion, transformed our conceptions of what the subfield is and what we do, and draw on probability theory to argue that the desire to be a predictive science causes us to imagine the world to be far more predictable than it actually is.
Abstract: I argue that comparative politics has been shaped by two “Great Punctuations” that, on each occasion, transformed our conceptions of what the subfield is and what we do. Just before a punctuation occurs, the subfield seems especially coherent, united by a set of common assumptions, methods, theories, and so on, which are then punctuated by a series of events that destroys faith in them. The subfield then reconstitutes itself around new assumptions, until, just as coherence is achieved, the next punctuation occurs. To demonstrate why the sub-field has evolved in this way, I draw on probability theory to argue that the desire to be a predictive science causes us to imagine the world to be far more predictable than it actually is. This results in the development of theories that are surprised by events; hence the peculiar trajectory of the subfield.
TL;DR: This article argued that dependence and insecurity are the chief obstacles to happiness and have been the hallmarks of most of human history, and that the alleviation of these ills in commercial society constitutes a great step forward.
Abstract: Adam Smith is almost certainly history's most famous advocate of commercial society, but he frankly admits that the relentless pursuit of wealth is a major obstacle to tranquility and contentment and hence that, at first glance, the higher living standards that people “enjoy” in commercial society seem to come only at the cost of their happiness. I argue that the solution to this apparent paradox can be found in Smith's account of the positive political effects of commerce: dependence and insecurity are the chief obstacles to happiness and have been the hallmarks of most of human history, and so the alleviation of these ills in commercial society constitutes a great step forward. Money really cannot buy happiness, but the liberty and security that commercial societies tend to provide help to assuage the greatest sources of misery.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that when a single party controlled the districting process, they used districting to systematically engineer a favorable partisan bias and that these partisan biases affected the partisan composition of state congressional delegations and at times even helped determine party control of the House of Representatives.
Abstract: Considerable debate exists over the impact of redistricting on the partisan composition of the U.S. Congress. I address this debate by turning to an era of congressional redistricting that has received little systematic attention—the politics of gerrymandering in the 19th century. Using statewide-, county-, and ward-level electoral data from 1870 to 1900, I show that when a single party controlled the districting process, they used districting to systematically engineer a favorable partisan bias. These partisan biases affected the partisan composition of state congressional delegations and at times even helped determine party control of the House of Representatives.
TL;DR: This paper examined political science as a gendered institution across three critical time periods: the founding era of the discipline, the 1970s and 1980s, and the present, assessing the presence, position, and experiences of women in the profession; the norms of gender within the discipline; and the way political science deals with women and gender as subject matter.
Abstract: Political science has mirrored the political culture even as it has explained it, and at critical times the gendering of political science has left it unprepared to explain notable changes in political life. Here, we examine political science as a gendered institution across three critical time periods: the founding era of the discipline, the 1970s and 1980s, and the present. For each period, we assess the presence, position, and experiences of women in the profession; the norms of gender within the discipline; and the way political science deals with women and gender as subject matter. In general, the position of women in the discipline has improved dramatically over the course of the discipline's first century, and gender-related research has become more institutionalized. Nevertheless, political science has not yet developed a full appreciation of gender as an analytical construct.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that the presence of a small centrist third party can influence the major parties to propose policies that are much more divergent than without the third party.
Abstract: Plurality-based elections between two major parties or candidates sometimes feature small, cen trist, third parties. We modify the standard two-party spatial model of policy-seeking parties to incorporate a centrist third party, and we show that the presence of such a party?even if it has no chance of winning?motivates the major parties to propose policies that are much more divergent than without the third party. We derive explicit formulas for party locations at a three-party equilibrium and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence ofthat equilibrium. We show that, over time, the major parties can be expected to shift their policies in the same direction relative to each other but in the opposite direction relative to the minor party. The predictions of this model are compared with estimates of party policy locations during appropriate periods in postwar Britain. For the past half-century, a small British party? first the Liberals, now the Liberal Demo crats?has occupied a policy position in between the two major British parties: Labour and the Con servatives. During much of the same period, the Free Democrats in Germany have held a similar posi tion between the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats. In addition, recent American presidential elections have featured the candidates John Anderson (in 1980) and Ross Perot (in 1992 and 1996), who had no realistic chance of winning and who were arguably located between the Democratic and Republican nom inees.1 What are the policy consequences of the existence of such small, centrist parties or candidates? On what political institutions do these consequences depend? Do these consequences benefit the policy aspirations of the centrist party or do they undermine these goals? Under proportional representation, it is well known that a small centrist party such as the Free Democrats in Germany may hold the balance of power, bargaining with each of the major players as they attempt to form governing coalitions. But in a plurality-based system as in Britain or the United States, the consequences are far
TL;DR: The American Political Science Review (APRS) as mentioned in this paper was the first journal devoted to political science research, reviews, and news of the profession, and it was published from 1906 to 1970.
Abstract: In November of 1906, the 3-year-old American Political Science Association, boasting a membership of “nearly four hundred” (Shaw 1907, 185), launched a journal devoted to scholarship, reviews, and news of the profession. The fledgling American Political Science Review was not the first political science journal, having been preceded by Political Science Quarterly (founded in 1886) and the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (1890). Nor, at first, was it even the foremost political science journal. Its founding editor, W. W. Willoughby of Johns Hopkins (1906–1916), and his immediate successor, John A. Fairlie of the University of Illinois (1917–1925), faced numerous challenges, not least that of finding enough papers to fill each issue; even after two decades the Review was still publishing “nearly all of the papers which have come to the editor…as well as articles from other sources” (Fairlie 1926, 182). For some time thereafter, Fairlie's successor, Frederic A. Ogg of the University of Wisconsin, handled just three dozen or so manuscripts per year (Patterson 1994, 6).