Showing papers in "American Psychologist in 1984"

Social psychological aspects of computer-mediated communication.

Abstract: As more and more people use computers for communicating, the behavioral and societal effects of computer-mediated communication are becoming critical research topics. This article describes some of the issues raised by electronic communication, illustrates one empirical approach for investigating its social psychological effects, and discusses why social psychological research might contribute to a deeper understanding of computer-mediated communication specifically and of computers and technological change in society more generally. One objective of our research is to explore how people participate in computer-mediated communication and how computerization affects group efforts to reach consensus. In experiments, we have shown differences in participation, decisions, and interaction among groups meeting face to face and in simultaneous computer-linked discourse and communication by electronic mail. We discuss these results and the design of subsequent research to highlight the many researchable social psychological issues raised by computing and technological change. Computer technologies are improving so swiftly these days that few of us comprehend even a small part of the change. Computers are transforming work and, in some cases, lives. Whether eager for this or resistant, many people believe the organizational, social, and personal effects of computers will be deeply felt (De Sola Poole, 1977; Hiltz & Turoff, 1978; Kling, 1980). Today, no one can predict in any detail the nature of the transformations that computers will bring, but one aspect of life that will certainly be affected is communication. The use of electronic mail and messages, long-distance blackboards, computer bulletin boards, instantaneously transferable data banks, and simultaneous computer conferences is reportedly advancing "like an avalanche" (Stockton, 1981; also see Kraemer, 1981). The U.S. federal judiciary, for example, is using electronic mail to speed the circulation of appellate opinion drafts among panels of judges (Weis, 1983). Computer conferences are being used for such legal proceedings as admission of evidence, trial scheduling, giving parties access to documents, and expert interrogation (Bentz & Potrykus, 1976; "Party-Line Plea," 1981). Other government agencies, such as the Department of Defense, as well as private firms, such as Westinghouse Corporation and Xerox Corporation, and some universities, use computer-mediated communication extensively for both routine transfer of data and nonroutine interpersonal communication and project work (e.g., Licklider & Vezza, 1978; U.S. Department of Commerce, 1977; Wang Corporation, 1982). Computer-mediated communication was once confined to technical users and was considered somewhat arcane. This no longer holds true. Computer-mediated communication is a key component of the emerging technology of computer networks. In networks, people can exchange, store, edit, broadcast, and copy any written document. They can send data and messages instantaneously, easily, at low cost, and over long distances. Two or more people can look at a document and revise it together, consult with each other on critical matters without meeting together or setting up a telephone conference, or ask for and give assistance interactively (Hiltz & Turoff, 1978; Williams, 1977). Networks, and hence computer-mediated communications, are proliferating at a tremendous rate. In addition to the older long-distance networks that connect thousands of scientists, professionals, and managers (e.g., the Department of Defense's ARPANET, GTE's TELENET), there are more and more local-area networks that link up computers within a region, city, or organization (e.g., Nestar System's CLUSTERBUS, Xerox's ETHERNET, Ford Aerospace's FLASHNET, and Wang Laboratories' WANGNET). Stimulating this growth are the decreasing costs and the advantages of networks over stand-alone systems, such as sharing high-speed printers and access to a common interface for otherwise incompatible equipment. The future of this technology cannot be foretold, but it is far from arcane. The functions and impact of computer-mediated communication are still poorly understood. Critical information (such as who uses it for what purposes) October 1984 • American Psychologist Copyright 1984 by the American Psychological Aisociation, Inc. Vol. 39, No. 10, 1123-1134 1123 is lacking, and the social psychological significance is controversial (see, e.g., Turoff, 1982). Computers could make communication easier, just as the canning of perishables and the development of can openers made food preparation easier, or they could have much more complex implications. For instance, access to electronic communication may change the flow of information within organizations, altering status relations and organizational hierarchy. When a manager can receive electronic mail from 10,000 employees, what happens to existing controls over participation and information? When people can publish and distribute their own electronic newspaper at no cost, does the distribution of power change too? When communication is rapid and purely textual, do working groups find it easier or harder to resolve conflict? These unanswered questions illustrate that, although the technology may be impressive, little systematic research exists on its psychological, social, and cultural significance. Given such conditions it seems sensible to try to understand the fundamental behavioral, social, and organizational processes that surround computer-mediated communication. We believe that ideas and approaches from social psychology and other areas of behavioral science can be applied to these questions. This article is meant to describe some of the issues raised by electronic communication; to illustrate, from our own work, one empirical approach for investigating them; and to show why social psychological research might contribute to a deeper understanding of electronic communication specifically and of computers and technological change in society more generally. We begin by citing some existing research on computer-mediated communication. Most of this research addresses the technical capabilities of the electronic technologies. Next, we consider the possible social psychological impact, and we discuss some hypotheses and some possible implications for the outcomes of communication. Finally, we describe some of our own experiments on social psychological aspects of computer-mediated communication, using these to indicate potential lines of future research.

On the primacy of affect.

Abstract: Lazarus has challenged the view that there are circumstances under which affect precedes cognition and that affective arousal that does not entail prior cognitive appraisal exists. His argument, however, is based entirely on an arbitrary definition of emotion that requires cognitive appraisal as a necessary precondition. To satisfy this concept of emotion, Lazarus has broadened the definition of cognitive appraisal to include even the most primitive forms of sensory excitation, thus obliterating all distinction between cognition, sensation, and perception. No empirical evidence is offered to document the principle of cognitive appraisal as a necessary precondition for emotional arousal. The contrasting view of an affective primacy and independence, however, is derived from a series of findings and phenomena, including the existence of neuroanatomical structures allowing for independent affective process. Only a few years ago I published a rather speculative article entitled \"Feeling and Thinking\" (Zajonc, 1980). The title also included the provocative subtitle \"Preferences Need No Inferences,\" deliberately suggesting an occasional independence of emotion from cognition. In this article I tried to appeal for a more concentrated study of affective phenomena that have been ignored for decades, and at the same time to ease the heavy reliance on cognitive functions for the explanation of affect. The argument began with the general hypothesis that affect and cognition are separate and partially independent systems and that although they ordinarily function conjointly, affect could be generated without a prior cognitive process. It could, therefore, at times precede cognition in a behavioral chain, I based this proposition on a number of diverse findings and phenomena, none of which alone could clinch the argument, but all of which taken together pointed to a clear possibility of an affective independence and primacy. This idea was first advanced by Wundt (1907) and later reiterated by others (e.g., Izard, 1984). Lazarus (1982) takes a very strong issue with all of this and almost categorically rejects the likelihood of the independence of affect of cognition, let alone the possibility of an affective primacy. In this article I will review Lazarus's position and contrast it with mine. Lazarus employs two definitions, one for emotion and one for cognition. All of his inferences are based on these two definitions. Lazarus's definition of emotion (which requires cognition as a necessary precondition) is central to his position. On the basis of this definition alone, therefore, the argument is unassailable. If Lazarus insists on his definition, as he has the right to do, we must agree that affect cannot be independent of cognition because by definition cognition is a necessary precondition for affective

Education and Thinking: The Role of Knowledge.

Abstract: : Psychological science is obtaining increased understanding of the nature of human thinking and problem solving. This report addresses the question of how this understanding contributes to instructional practices that might foster these higher order abilities. A brief discussion of the implications of past theories for the teaching of thinking introduces a description of a sample of current programs for improving reasoning and problem-solving skills and related learning abilities. These efforts are then considered in the light of current theory and findigns in cognitive science, developmental psychology, and the study of human intelligence. The interaction between the development of problem-solving and learning skills and the acquisition of structures of domain- specific knowledge is discussed. Suggestions are made for developing thinking abilities in the context of the acquisition of knowledge and skill.

On the Primacy of Cognition.

Abstract: Zajonc and I differ greatly in our conceptualization of emotion and its relations with cognition, as well as in our evaluation of the evidence. My reply is in two parts. First, I discuss the boundaries of emotion as a phenomenon and whether sensory preferences can be regarded as emotions; second, I make an analysis of the evidence Zajonc regards as supporting his claims for the independence of cognition and emotion and the primacy of emotion. My aims are to sharpen the philosophical and empirical issues that underlie our disagreement and to emphasize the indeterminancy of the issue of cognitive versus emotional primacy. This latter issue is less important than the task of exploring the cognitive contents or meanings that shape each kind of emotional reaction. Finally, I offer a brief programmatic statement about what cognitivists can do to advance our understanding of emotion over the life course. The latest riposte by Zajonc (1984) has, in my view, not helped to clarify our understanding of the relationship between cognition and emotion. Zajonc takes my reasoning (Lazarus, 1982) to task in two major ways. First he complains that my position cannot be falsified because I defined emotion as requiring cognitive appraisal, then that I have ignored the evidence that emotion can occur without cognitive activity, which he cites. I believe he is wrong about my epistemological position and wrong that the evidence supports the primacy of emotion or its independence from cognition. The body of this reply consists of a discussion of the definitional issue and why I think the empirical case he makes is specious. My objective is to sharpen the issue and sustain my position and that of like-minded cognitivists. The Definitional Issue Definitions do not arise out of the blue; they are an integral part of a theory that helps delimit the phenomena of interest and organize observations. In my view, emotion reflects a constantly changing personenvironment relationship. When central life agendas (e.g., biological survival, personal and social values and goals) are engaged, this relationship becomes a source of emotion. Therefore, an emotional experience cannot be understood solely in terms of what happens inside the person or in the brain, but grows out of ongoing transactions with the environment that are evaluated. Cognitive activity is a necessary precondition of emotion because to experience an emotion, people must comprehend—whether in the form of a primitive evaluative perception or a highly differentiated symbolic process—that their well-being is implicated in a transaction, for better or worse. A creature that is oblivious to the significance of what is happening for its well-being does not react with an emotion. This same point has been stated cogently in various ways by numerous multidisciplinary scholars who responded recently to an article on a general psychobiological theory of emotions by Panksepp (1982) appearing in The Behavioral and Brain Sciences. The conception that the meaning or significance of a transaction is crucial to emotion forces us to restrict its definition to some psychophysiological phenomena and to reject others as outside its purview. The searching question is what an emotion is or is not. Zajonc evades this question. Thus, he takes me to task for doing what any good theorist should do with definitions, but he does not do himself—namely, specify the phenomena of interest. Emotion, for example, is not just physiological arousal, though such arousal is one of the traditional defining attributes. Arousal can be produced by exercising vigorously or entering a hot or cold room. Doing this will produce an emotion only if we appraise the encounter (e.g., the physical and social conditions and the bodily state it produces) as having a bearing on our well-being, as when, for example, it presents some physical danger or brings blissful relief from discomfort. Startle is a reaction that has long but erroneously been included under the rubric of emotion. Ekman (in press) presents new experimental evidence that startle might better be regarded as a reflex, like the knee jerk, because it does not behave as do other reactions we call emotions. He examined facial and bodily responses under four conditions: when subjects did not know at what moment a blank pistol would be fired; when they did know the moment; when they tried to inhibit the startle reaction; and when they attempted to simulate a genuine startle. Ekman contrasted emotions with startle. He found that the startle was easy to elicit and was consistently the initial response to a gunshot; in contrast, there is no single elicitor that will always call forth the same emotion in adults. Moreover, the startle response could not 124 February 1984 • American Psychologist Copyright 1984 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. Vol. 39, No. 2, 124-129 be totally inhibited; in contrast, emotions can. Nor could the startle be simulated correctly by any subject. On the basis of these findings, the startle response seems fixed and rigid in comparison to emotions, and once elicited it seems to run its course. Thus, from the perspective of a relational and cognitive conceptualization of emotion, I think we should exclude startle from the rubric of emotion, as I advocated in my earlier discussion in this journal (Lazarus, 1982). Historically, there has been much concern about diverse phenomena for which emotion terms are employed, such as moods, sentiments, emotion traits, and actual emotional reactions (cf. Ortony & Clore, 1981). Moods usually refer to sustained general states, such as sadness and contentment, that may or may not be considered emotions depending on theoretical and definitional conventions. Sentiments refer to characteristic ways a person evaluates an object (person, idea, thing); they operate as dispositions to react emotionally to that object but are not in themselves emotions. Another questionable category of emotion consists of personality traits, such as cheerful, which could in some instances describe an actual emotion, as in \"I feel cheerful,\" but could in other instances describe a trait, not an actual emotional response, as in \"I am a cheerful person.\" Some emotion terms are heavily detached, lukewarm, or cold, such as interested, whereas others, such as enraged, are hot. As Ortony and Clore pointed out, it makes a considerable difference how such terms are used by subjects in emotion research. In the 1940s and 1950s, a period characterized by the scientific outlook sometimes called logical positivism, the dominant view in psychology was that emotions could not be defined and studied as such but represented intervening variables (cf. Brown & Farber, 1951; Lazarus, 1968; Lazarus, Kanner, & Folkman, 1980). Although similar attitudes still exist, the more restrictive treatment of emotions in the past has given way to a view that allows much greater latitude in their study; this view depends heavily on what subjects report, but can be supplemented by simultaneous assessments of behavioral and physiological response variables. Emotions are commonly conceptualized and studied as an organic mix of action impulses and bodily expressions, diverse positive or dysphoric (subjective) cognitive-affective states, and physiological disturbances. Although there are arguments about whether these physiological disturbances are diffuse or patterned, an emotion is not I acknowledge with appreciation several valued colleagues who carefully read, criticized, and made suggestions on an earlier draft of this article. They include Paul Ekman, Susan Folkman, Barbara Mellers, and Philip Tetlock; Carol Carr warrants special mention for her skilled editorial assistance. Regrettably, acute limitations in our resources dictate that reprints will not be available. definable solely by behavior, subjective reports, or physiological changes; its identification requires all three components, since each one can be generated by conditions that do not necessarily elicit emotion, as in the example of arousal by exercise given above. An emotion researcher must worry about which response states or processes can be called emotions and which cannot; meeting one or even two of the three response criteria is not enough. With respect to the debate between Zajonc and me, a critical question is, On what basis should preferences (e.g., for taste, smell, or photographs of faces) be regarded as emotions? We must ask a similar question about aesthetic reactions to a pretty picture, a pleasing sunset, a stirring piece of music, or a fine piece of literature. Some years ago, while examining emotion and feeling in psychology and art, Arnheim (1958) pointed out that emotion in artistic experience is not merely a passive receipt or apprehension of information, but requires active, involved participation. As with sensory preferences, what may pass for an emotional (aesthetic) response may be nothing more than a pro forma statement that implies emotion but does not necessarily reflect it, as when one casually says, \"That's a pretty picture\" in a manner more indicative of labeling than emotion. Although preferences can involve emotions, even strong ones, they often seem to fall at the ambiguous borderline between emotion and nonemotion. On the one hand, statements of preference can be \"cold cognitions\" expressing merely a social requirement to make a choice, or on the other hand, they can be expressions of genuine emotional involvement. In the research Zajonc cites, we do not know whether in expressing a preference (e.g., \"I like him more\") subjects are experiencing an emotion, as indicated by multileveled response criteria, or merely expressing an intellectual choice. If the latter, then preferences must be excluded from the category of emotions; if the former, they fall under the rubric of emotion. Zajonc fails to come to grips with this problem, and he makes no mention of the alternative st

Small wins: Redefining the scale of social problems.

Abstract: The massive scale on which social problems are conceived precludes innovative action because bounded rationality is exceeded and dysfunctional levels of arousal are induced. Reformulation of social issues as mere problems allows for a strategy of small wins wherein a series of concrete, complete outcomes of moderate importance build a pattern that attracts allies and deters opponents. The strategy of small wins incorporates sound psychology and is sensitive to the pragmatics of policymaking. There is widespread agreement that social science research has done relatively little to solve social problems (Berger, 1976; Cook, 1979; Kohn, 1976). Common to these assessments is the assumption that social science is best suited to generate solutions, when in fact it may be better equipped to address how problems get denned in the first place. A shift of attention away from outcomes toward inputs is not trivial, because the content of appropriate solutions is often implied by the definition of what needs to be solved. To focus on the process of problem definition is to incorporate a more substantial portion of psychology, specifically, its understanding of processes of appraisal, social construction of reality, problem finding, and definition of the situation. Whether social problems are perceived as phenomena that have a serious negative impact on sizable segments of society (Kohn, 1976, p. 94), as substantial discrepancies between widely shared social standards and actual conditions of life (Merton, 1971), or as assertions of grievances or claims with respect to alleged conditions (Spector & Kitsuse, 1977, p. 75), there is agreement that they are big problems. And that's the problem. The massive scale on which social problems are conceived often precludes innovative action because the limits of bounded rationality are exceeded and arousal is raised to dysfunctionally high levels. People often define social problems in ways that overwhelm their ability to do anything about them. To understand this phenomenon, consider the following descriptions of the problems of hunger, crime, heart disease, traffic congestion, and pollution. To reduce domestic hunger we grow more food, which requires greater use of energy for farm equipment, fertilizers, and transportation, adding to the price of energy, which raises the cost of food, putting it out of the price range of the needy. To solve the problem of soaring crime rates, cities expand the enforcement establishment, which draws funds away from other services such as schools, welfare, and job training, which leads to more poverty, addiction, prostitution, and more crime. To ward off coronary heart disease, people who live in cities spend more time jogging and cycling, which exposes their lungs to more air pollution than normal, increasing the risk of coronary illness. To ease traffic congestion, multilane highways are built, which draws people away from mass transit so that the new road soon becomes as overcrowded as the old road. To reduce energy use and pollution, cities invest in mass transit, which raises municipal debt, leading to a reduction in frequency and quality of service and an increase in fares, which reduces ridership, which further raises the municipal debt (Sale, 1980). When social problems are described this way, efforts to convey their gravity disable the very resources of thought and action necessary to change them. When the magnitude of problems is scaled upward in the interest of mobilizing action, the quality of thought and action declines, because processes such as frustration, arousal, and helplessness are activated. Ironically, people often can't solve problems unless they think they aren't problems. If heightened arousal interferes with diagnosis and action, then attacking a less arousing \"mere problem\" should allow attention to be broader and action to be more complex. Responses that are more complex, more recently learned, and more responsive to more stimuli in changing situations usually have a better chance of producing a lasting change in dynamic problems. To recast larger problems into smaller, less arousing problems, people can identify a series of controllable opportunities of modest size that produce visible results and that can be gathered into synoptic solutions. This strategy of small wins addresses social problems by working directly on their construction and indirectly on their resolution. Problems are constructed to stabilize arousal at moderate intensities where its contribution to performance of complex tasks is most beneficial. 40 January 1984 • American Psychologist Copyright 1984 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. Vol. 39, No. I, 40-49 Arousal and Social Problems The following analysis of small wins assumes that arousal varies among people concerned with social problems, but tends to be relatively high, which affects the quality of performance directed at these problems. Arousal is treated as a generic concept under which is assembled a variety of findings that cohere because of their mutual relevance to the Yerkes-Dodson Law (Broadhurst, 1959). Although arousal mechanisms are neither simple nor unidimensional, they do seem to be localized in at least two physiological sites (reticular formation, limbic system), are visible under conditions of sensory deprivation, produce differences in the quality of learning and performance, and have observable physiological effects. The specific effects of arousal on performance associated with the Yerkes-Dodson Law are that (a) there is an inverted-U relationship between arousal and the efficiency of performance with increasing levels of arousal, first improving and then impairing performance and (b) the optimal level of arousal for performance varies inversely with task difficulty. Even though these coarse propositions have been amended, tuned more finely, and differentiated, they remain basic principles in which an analysis of social problem solving can be anchored. Key assertions for the present analysis culled from previous investigations of arousal and performance include the following: 1. Arousal coincides with variation in degrees of activation and varies along at least two dimensions, energy-sleep and tension-placidity (Eysenck, 1982; Thayer, 1978a, 1978b). 2. As arousal increases, attention to cues becomes more selective and this editing is especially detrimental to performance of difficult tasks (Easterbrook, 1959, although this generalization has received mixed support. See Baddeley, 1972; Pearson & Lane, 1983; Weltman, Smith, & Egstrom, 1971, for representative work). 3. At relatively high levels of arousal, coping responses become more primitive in at least three ways (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981): (a) people who try to cope with problems often revert to more dominant, first learned actions; (b) patterns of responding that have been learned recently are the first Tom Peters's (1977) original description of small wins was a crucial point of departure for this formulation. Subsequent discussions with Peters, as well as with Linda Pike, Richard Thaler, Joseph McGrath, Sharon McCarthy, David Anderson, Marianne LaFrance, and students and faculty of the Psychology Department at Rice University contributed to my understanding of this phenomenon and I am grateful to all of them for their help. Requests for reprints should be sent to Karl E. Weick, Cornell University, Graduate School of Administration, Malott Hall, Ithaca, New York 14853. ones to disappear, which means that those responses that are most finely tuned to the current environment are the first ones to go; and (c) people treat novel stimuli as if they are more similar to older stimuli than in fact they are, so that clues indicating change are missed. To invert this list, highly aroused people find it difficult to learn a novel response, to brainstorm, to concentrate, to resist old categories, to perform complex responses, to delegate, and to resist information that supports positions they have taken (Holsti, 1978). When these findings are focused on problem solving, they suggest that to call a problem serious is to raise arousal, which is appropriate if people know what to do and have a well-developed response to deal with the problem. This is analogous to the situation of a simple task, the performance of which improves over a considerable range of activation because selective attention does not delete the few cues that are essential for performance. High arousal can improve performance if it occurs after a person has decided what to do and after she or he has overlearned how to do it. To call a problem minor rather than serious is to lower arousal, which is also appropriate if people don't know what to do or are unable to do it. If we assume that most people overlook the fine-grain detail of problems, think only in terms offeree as a response (Nettler, 1980), and overlook minor leverage points from which the problem might be attacked, then it is clear they have neither the diagnoses nor the responses to cope. This means that people need lower arousal to keep diagnostic interference at a minimum and to allow for the practice of relatively complex skills. To keep problem-related arousal at modest intensities, people need to work for small wins. Sometimes problem solving suffers from too little arousal. When people think too much or feel too powerless, issues become depersonalized. This lowers arousal, leading to inactivity or apathetic performance. The prospect of a small win has an immediacy, tangibility, and controllability that could reverse these effects. Alinsky (1972, pp. 114-115) persuaded a demoralized neighborhood group to picket for reinstatement of Infant Medical Care, which he knew would be granted if they merely asked. Organizing for the protest, making the demand, and then receiving what they asked for energized people who had basically given up. Examples of Small Wins Small wins have been designed a

Standing out and standing in: The psychology of control in America and Japan.

Abstract: There are at least two general paths to a feeling of control. In primary control, individuals enhance their rewards by influencing existing realities (e.g., other people, circumstances, symptoms, or behavior problems). In secondary control, individuals enhance their rewards by accommodating to existing realities and maximizing satisfaction or goodness of fit with things as they are. American psychologists have written extensively about control, but have generally defined it only in terms of its primary form. This, we argue, reflects a cultural context in which primary control is heavily emphasized and highly valued. In Japan, by contrast, primary control has traditionally been less highly valued and less often anticipated, and secondary control has assumed a more central role in everyday life than in our own culture. To illustrate this cross-cultural difference, we contrast Japanese and American perspectives and practices in child rearing, socialization, religion and philosophy, work, and psychotherapy. These Japanese-American comparisons reveal some key benefits, and some costs, of both primary and secondary approaches to control. In the process, the comparisons reveal the disadvantages of a one-sided pursuit of either form of control. They suggest that an important goal, both for individuals and for cultures, is an optimally adaptive blend of primary and secondary control, a goal best achieved with one's cultural blinders removed. In most American theory and research on the psychology of control, a common theme can be identified; the view that perceived control obtains when individuals shape existing physical, social, or behavioral realities to fit their perceptions, goals, or wishes. According to this view, individuals who do not act to influence such realities may be suffering from learned helplessness (see, e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978), defects in "self-efficacy" (Bandura, 1977), perceptions of self as a "pawn" (deCharms, 1979), or some form of relinquished control (see, e.g., Langer, 1979). Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder (1982) recently spelled out a somewhat broader view. They acknowledged that people do often attempt to gain control by influencing existing realities, often via acts involving personal agency, dominance, or even aggression. Rothbaum et al. labeled this process "primary control." But they argued that control is often sought via alternative paths, which they collectively labeled "secondary control." In secondary control, individuals attempt to align themselves with existing realities, leaving them unchanged but exerting control over their personal psychological impact. Table 1 gives an overview of these two forms of control. Rothbaum et al. reviewed evidence indicating that secondary control often involves behaviors that American investigators have typically classified as signs of relinquished control. For example: 1. Attributing outcomes to low ability combined with behaving in a passive and withdrawn manner, is often labeled helplessness; yet, this combination may often represent an attempt to inhibit unfulfillable expectations, thus preparing oneself for future events and thereby gaining predictive secondary control (e.g., Averill, 1973; Lazarus, 1966; Miller & Grant, 1980), Lefcourt (1973) has reviewed several studies suggesting that prediction allows people to prepare themselves for future events and thus to gain control over the psychological impact of those events. 2. When people attribute outcomes to powerful others and show submissive behavior, they are often thought to have abandoned the pursuit of perceived control; yet, this pattern may foster enhanced identification with the powerful others and thus promote vicarious secondary control (e.g., Hetherington & Frankie, 1967; Johnson & Downing, 1979). Fromm (1941) has written about the human inclination to align oneself with powerful entities (e.g., individuals, groups, or institutions) outside the self in order to enhance one's sense of strength or power. 3. The attribution of outcomes to chance, luck, or fate combined with passivity in or withdrawal from certain competitive skill situations is frequently taken as evidence of relinquished control. However, the combination may often reflect an attempt to be September 1984 • American Psychologist Copyright 1984 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. Vol. 39, No. 9, 955-969 955 Table 1 Primary and Secondary Control: An Overview Type of control General strategy Typical targets for causal influence Overall intent

Automatic processing of fundamental information: the case of frequency of occurrence.

Abstract: One view of memory supposes that several fundamental aspects of experience are stored in memory by an implicit or automatic encoding process. In this article we review the evidence that suggests that information about frequency of occur- rence is encoded in such a manner. This evidence shows that frequency information is stored for a wide variety of naturally occurring events. Laboratory research shows that usually powerful task variables (for example, instructions, practice) and subject vari- ables (for example, age, ability) do not influence the encoding process. Evidence is also reviewed that either directly or indirectly implicates the use of frequency information across issues in psychology ranging from the acquisition and representation of knowledge domains to decision making to sex role development.

Reflections on perfection

Abstract: Ces reflexions sur la perfection et les tendances perfectionnistes se fondent sur la litterature sur la question ainsi que sur l'experience clinique personnelle de l'auteur

Approaches to personality inventory construction: A comparison of merits.

Abstract: The three major approaches to personality scale construction, the external, inductive, and deductive strategies, are discussed and their rationales compared. It is suggested that all scales should possess validity, communicability, and economy. The relative importance of these characteristics, however, varies with the purpose for which the instrument is being constructed. A review of more than a dozen comparative studies revealed no consistent superiority of any strategy in terms of validity or predictive effectiveness. But deductive scales normally communicate information more directly to an assessor, and they are definitely more economical to build and to administer. Thus, wherever there is a genuine choice, the simple deductive approach is recommended. Furthermore, self-rating scales narrowly but consistently outdo questionnaire scales in terms of validity and are clearly superior in terms of communicability and economy. There may not be many situations in which the widespread preference for questionnaires is justified. It is concluded that the more commonsensical approaches to personality measurement have a lot to offer. Anyone who is bold enough today to develop a general-purpose personality inventory has basically three options for how to go about it. They are the external approach (also called "empirical," or "criterion group"), the inductive approach (also called "internal," "internal consistency," or "itemetric"), and the deductive approach (also called "rational," "intuitive," or "theoretical"). This article reviews their respective merits on both a priori and empirical grounds. For clarity's sake I will exaggerate the differences between the philosophies associated with these three approaches.

Learning outcomes and their effects: Useful categories of human performance.

Abstract: The outcomes of learning are persistent states that make possible a variety of human performances. While learning results are specific to the task undertaken, learning investigators have sought to identify broader categories of learning outcomes in order to foresee to what extent their findings can be generalized. Five varieties of learning outcomes have been distinguished and appear to be widely accepted. The categories are (a) intellectual skills (procedural knowledge), (b) verbal information (declarative knowledge), (c) cognitive strategies (executive control processes), (d) motor skills, and (e) attitudes. Each of these categories may be seen to encompass a broad variety of human activities. It is held that results indicating the effects on learning of most principal independent variables can be generalized within these categories but not between them. This article identifies additional effects of each type of learning outcome and discusses the current state of knowledge about them. The question of understanding how human beings learn has been a central theme of psychological research since the time of the English associationist philosophers Hobbes, Locke, and Mill, and the experimental work of Ebbinghaus( 1913) in 1885. From that time until the present day, learning has been understood as a change of state of the human being that is remembered and that makes possible a corresponding change in the individual's behavior in a given type of situation. This change of state must, of course, be distinguished from others that may be effected by innate forces, by maturation, or by other physiological influences. Instead, learning is brought about by one or more experiences that are either the same as or that somehow represent the situation in which the newly acquired behavior is exhibited. Psychologists who have studied the phenomenon of learning have sometimes confined their observations to human learning. Such learning was studied by the followers of the Ebbinghaus tradition and was usually referred to as verbal learning. Verbal learning was studied by such investigators as Robinson (1932), McGeoch (1932), Melton (1963), Postman (1961), and Underwood (1957), among others. Many students of learning, however, did not hesitate to study the behavior of animals as well as humans nor to relate the phenomena observed across the species gap. Pioneers in this tradition include Thorndike (1898), Guthrie (1935), Tolman (1932), and Hull (1943). Other differences in fundamental approaches to the study of human learning arose from points of view noted by Bower and Hilgard (1981) as empiricism versus rationalism, contiguity versus reinforcement, and gradual increments versus all-or-none spurts. These issues persist down to the present day and cannot be said to have been resolved in the sense of having attained a consensus of scientists. Perhaps, though, the most distinctive differences among studies of learning, as reported to us by various investigators, are differences in the behavior-in-situation that identifies the new learning. This is often referred to as the learning task, a phrase that implies that its specification includes both the external situation and the behavior that interacts with it. This tendency to identify learning with the situation is reflected in texts having learning as a subject, such as Hulse, Deese, and Egeth (1975), or Hill (1981). When Melton (1964) assembled chapters in Categories of Human Learning, they dealt with such familiar situations as the classically conditioned eye blink, operant conditioning of pigeons, rote learning of verbal associates, incidental learning of word pairs, and perceptual-motor skills learning. Even when theories of learning are addressed directly, as by Bower and Hilgard (1981), we find the theoretical ideas tied to situations such as dogs salivating to the sight of food, pigeons pecking at circular spots, rats running to food boxes, or people learning paired associates. The advent of the cognitive psychology of learning, as represented in books done by Klatzky (1980), Bransford (1979), and Anderson (1980), among others, has broadened the situations employed for the study of learning. Thus, we now have insightful studies of the learning of elementary arithmetic (Resnick & Ford, 1981), of constructing geometric proofs (Greeno, 1978b), of story comprehension (Stein & Trabasso, 1982), and of the prediction of rainfall (Stevens & Collins, 1982). Most surely, it is a welcome change to find investigators of human learning choosing schoolroom situations for learning or at least sitApril 1984 • American Psychologist Copyright 1984 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. Vol. 39, No. 4, 377-385 377 uations that have what might be called "face validity" with tasks encountered by students. The greater diversity of such situations, as contrasted with the narrowly denned learning of paired associates on a memory drum, is a welcome change. If there are cautions to be noted, they may be expressed in the hope that these new school-learning tasks will not themselves become frozen into narrow channels of study, so that we end up with the "psychology of arithmetic learning," the "psychology of reading learning," the "psychology of geometry learning," and the like. I do not think this will necessarily happen. Nevertheless, in our enthusiasm for a newly found freedom from a set of traditional learning tasks, we should, I think, keep firmly in mind that a psychology of learning seeks generalizations that are not tied to particular learning situations. The history of paired-associate learning should help us remember this lesson. For many years, studies of paired associates sought to discover general principles about the learning of associations. As understanding increased, however, such studies came to be seen as dealing with a very particular kind of learning task called "paired-associate learning." Many, perhaps most, of the results obtained apply only to that specific learning task. Should the study of learning continue to be situation bound? Of course, the conceptions of Skinner (1969) offer a way out. Those who view learning as a matter of arranging contingencies of reinforcement can demonstrate how that principle applies to virtually every situation. The case for application of reinforcement techniques as a way of arranging situations for learning is entirely convincing; it is indeed difficult to find contrary evidence. Yet the tendency of learning investigators to seek more detailed specifications for learning situations, from mazes to geometry, implies that reinforcement contingencies are not enough. Greater specificity continues to be sought in the description of the interaction between learner and environment—in the task, in other words. Students of learning phenomena continue to find dimensions of the learning situation that do not contradict the operation of reinforcement but that must be described in greater detail. This article was originally presented as a Distinguished Scientific Award for the Applications of Psychology address at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Anaheim, California,

Dyads and triads at 35,000 feet: Factors affecting group process and aircrew performance

Abstract: The task of flying a multipilot transport aircraft is a classic small-group performance situation where a number of social, organizational, and personality factors are relevant to important outcome variables such as safety. The aviation community is becoming increasingly aware of the importance of these factors but is hampered in its efforts to improve the system because of research psychology's problems in defining the nature of the group process. This article identifies some of the problem areas as well as methods used to address these issues. It is argued that high fidelity flight simulators provide an environment that offers unique opportunities for work meeting both basic and applied research criteria.

Predicting the vocational capacity of the chronically mentally ill. Research and policy implications.

Abstract: In response to the growing recognition that adequately trained personnel and appropriate in- tervention techniques were not available to meet the rehabilitation needs of psychiatrical ly disabled per- sons, the first Rehabilitation Research and Training Center in Mental Health was established in August 1979. Because the Center's mandate is to focus on problems of national scope and because the chronically mentally ill have recently been severely adversely af- fected by Social Security Administration actions that have terminated disability benefits, a review of the research literature surrounding the vocational capacity of psychiatrical ly disabled persons was undertaken. This article details results of that review, identifies needed research in the area of employability of the chronically mentally ill, and notes implications for policy.

Promoting social bonding: Strategies for helping the lonely and socially isolated.

Abstract: Les auteurs proposent un cadre general pour conceptualiser les solutions a l'isolement, ainsi que des interventions specifiques au niveau des personnes isolees ou de leur environnement social

Health Status and the Use of Outpatient Mental Health Services

Abstract: Using data from the RAND Corporation's Health Insurance Study, the authors have linked mental health status (self-reported psychological distress and psychological well-being) to the subsequent use outpatient mental health services delivered by formally trained mental health specialists and general medical providers.

The Shame of American Education.

Abstract: Recent analyses of American schools and proposals for school reform have missed an essential point: Most current problems could be solved if students learned twice as much in the same time and with the same effort. It has been shown that they can do so (a) when the goals of education are clarified, (b) when each student is permitted to advance at his or her own pace, and (c) when the problem of motivation is solved with programmed instructional materials, so designed that students are very often right and learn at once that they are. The theories of human behavior most often taught in schools of education stand in the way of this solution to the problem of American education, but the proposal that schools of education simply be disbanded is a step in the wrong direction. Teachers need to be taught how to teach, and a technology is now available that will permit them to teach much more effectively. On a morning in October 1957, Americans were awakened by the beeping of a satellite. It was a Russian satellite, Sputnik. Why was it not American? Was something wrong with American education? Evidently so, and money was quickly voted to improve American schools, Now we are being awakened by the beepings of Japanese cars, Japanese radios, phonographs, and television sets, and Japanese wristwatch alarms, and again questions are being asked about American education, especially in science and mathematics. Something does seem to be wrong. According to a-recent report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983), for example, the average achievement of our high-school students on standardized tests is now lower than it was a quarter of a century ago, and students in American schools compare poorly with those in other nations in many fields. As the commission put it, America is threatened by \"a rising tide of mediocrity.\" The first wave of reform is usually rhetorical. To improve education we are said to need \"imaginative innovations,\" a \"broad national effort\" leading to a \"deep and lasting change,\" and a \"commitment to excellence.\" More specific suggestions have been made, however. To get better teachers we should pay them more, possibly according to merit. They should be certified to teach the subjects they teach. To get better students, scholarship standards should be raised. The school day should be extended from 6 to 7 hours, more time should be spent on homework, and the school year should be lengthened from 180 to 200, or even 220, days. We should change what we are teaching. Social studies are all very well, but they should not take time away from basics, especially mathematics. As many of us have learned to expect, there is a curious omission in that list: It contains no suggestion that teaching be improved. There is a conspiracy of silence about teaching as a skill. The New York Times publishes a quarterly survey of education. Three recent issues (Fisk, 1982, 1983a, 1983b) contained 18 articles about the kinds of things being taught in schools; 11 articles about the financial problems of students and schools; 10 articles about the needs of special students, from the gifted to the disadvantaged; and smaller numbers of articles about the selection of students, professional problems of teachers, and sports and other extracurricular activities. Of about 70 articles, only 2 had anything to do with how students are taught or how they could be taught better. Pedagogy is a dirty word. In January 1981, Frederick Mosteller, president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, gave an address called \"Innovation and Evaluation\" (Mosteller, 1981). He began with an example of the time which can pass between a scientific discovery and its practical use. The fact that lemon juice cures scurvy was discovered in 1601, but more than 190 years passed before the British navy began to use citrus juice on a regular basis and another 70 before scurvy was wiped out in the mercantile marine—a lag of 264 years. Lags have grown shorter but, as Mosteller pointed out, are often still too long. Perhaps unwittingly he gave another example. He called for initiatives in science and engineering education and said that a major theme of the 1982 meeting of the association would be a \"national commitment to educational excellence in science and engineering for all Americans\" (p. 886), When Mosteller's address was published in Science, I wrote a letter to the editor (Skinner, 1981) calling attention to an experiment in teaching algebra in a school in Roanoke, Virginia (Rushton, 1965). In this experiment an eighth-grade class using simple teaching machines and hastily composed instructional programs went through all of ninth-grade September 1984 • American Psychologist Copyright 1984 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. Vol. 39, No. 9, 947-954 947 algebra in half a year. Their grades met ninth-grade norms, and when tested a year later the students remembered rather more than usual. Had American educators decided that that was the way to teach algebra? They had not. The experiment was done in 1960, but education had not yet made any use of it. The lag was already 21 years long. A month or so later I ran into Mosteller. \"Did you see my letter in Science about teaching machines?\" I asked. \"Teaching machines?\" he said, puzzled. \"Oh, you mean computers—teaching machines to you.\" And, of course, he was right. Computer is the current word. But is it the right one? Computers are now badly misnamed. They were designed to compute, but they are not computing when they are processing words, or displaying PacMan, or aiding instruction (unless the instruction is in computing). \"Computer\" has all the respectability of the white-collar executive, whereas \"machine\" is definitely blue-collar, but let us call things by their right names. Instruction may be \"computer aided,\" and all good instruction must be \"interactive,\" but machines that teach are teaching machines. I liked the Roanoke experiment because it confirmed something I had said a few years earlier to the effect that with teaching machines and programmed instruction one could teach what is now taught in American schools in half the time with half the effort. I shall not review other evidence that that is true. Instead I shall demonstrate my faith in a technology of teaching by going out on a limb. I claim that the school system of any large American city could be so redesigned, at little or no additional cost, that students would come to school and apply themselves to their work with a minimum of punitive coercion and, with very rare exceptions, learn to read with reasonable ease, express themselves well in speech and writing, and solve a fair range of mathematical problems. I want to talk about why this has not been done. The teaching machines of 25 years ago were crude, of course, but that is scarcely an explanation. The calculating machines were crude, too, yet they were used until they could be replaced by something better. The hardware problem has now been solved, but resistance to a technology of teaching survives. The rank commercialism which quickly engulfed the field of teaching machines is another possible explanation. Too many people rushed in to write bad programs and make promises that could not be An earlier version of this article was given as the Bode Lecture at Ohio State University, April 8, 1981. Requests for reprints should be sent to B. F. Skinner, Harvard University, Department of Psychology and Social Relations, William James Hall, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. kept. But that should not have concealed the value of programmed instruction for so many years. There is more than that to be said for the marketplace in the selection of a better mousetrap. Psychological Roadblocks I shall argue that educators have not seized this chance to solve their problems because the solution conflicts with deeply entrenched views of human behavior, and that these views are too strongly supported by current psychology. Humanistic psychologists, for example, tend to feel threatened by any kind of scientific analysis of human behavior, particularly if it leads to a \"technology\" that can be used to intervene in people's lives. A technology of teaching is especially threatening. Carl Rogers has said that teaching is vastly overrated, and Ivan Illich has called for the de-schooling of society. I dealt .with the problem in Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Skinner, 1971). To give a single example, we do not like to be told something we already know, for we can then no longer claim credit for having known it. To solve that problem, Plato tried to show that students already possess knowledge and have only to be shown that they possess it. But the famous scene in Plato's Meno in which Socrates shows that the slaveboy already knows Pythagoras's theorem for doubling the square is one of the great intellectual hoaxes of all time. The slaveboy agrees with everything Socrates says, but there is no evidence whatsoever that he could then go through the proof by himself. Indeed, Socrates says that the boy would need to be taken through it many times before he could do so. Cognitive psychology is causing much more trouble, but in a different way. It is hard to be precise because the field is usually presented in what we may call a cognitive style. For example, a pamphlet of the National Institute of Education (1980) quotes with approval the contention that \"at the present time, modern cognitive psychology is the dominant theoretical force in psychological science as opposed to the first half of the century when behavioristic, anti-mentalistic stimulus-response theories of learning were in the ascendance\" (p. 391). (The writer means \"ascendant.\") The pamphlet tells us that cognitive science studies learning, but not in quite those words. Instead, cognitive science is said to be \"characterized by a concern with understanding the mechanisms by which human beings carry

Evolutionary Biology and Personality Psychology Toward a Conception of Human Nature and Individual Differences

Abstract: Although personality psychology sub- sumes the study of both individual differences and species-typical characteristics, the field has not yet resolved several key concerns: (a) what are the most important species-typical characteristics; (b) what are the most important ways in which individuals differ; and (c) how can species-typical characteristics and individual differences be reconciled within a general theory of personality. Evolutionary biology provides one set of criteria for identifying these characteristics and for designating relative importance among them. Genotypic universality, automaticity, and adaptation are examined as potential criteria for identifying important species-typical characteris- tics. Heritability, inclusive fitness, sexual selection, and assortative mating are evaluated as criteria for designating important individual differences. Sug- gestions are made for resolving some of the conceptual and operational difficulties entailed by implementing these criteria. It is argued that, although substantial problems remain, evolutionary biology can provide one means for identifying relations between individual differences and species-typical characteristics. Evolutionary biology and personality psychology, broadly conceived, share several common concerns. Both fields seek to identify enduring organismic characteristics and to locate their origins and func- tional significance in environments. Both fields deal with past and present adaptation. And both grant a central role to individual variation, which is the focus of most personality research and the sine qua non of evolution. These shared concerns suggest intriguing potential connections. This article attempts to offer directions for an integrative effort, while identifying some of the difficulties of this endeavor. The first section of the article identifies several key issues in personality psychology, with particular attention given to the separation between approaches emphasizing species-typical tendencies and those focusing on systematic variation around those ten- dencies. The second section identifies themes in evolutionary biology that parallel those in personality psychology, typological and population approaches, and highlights some of the alternative aims, assump- tions, methods, and limitations of each. The third section outlines three major directions for linking evolutionary biology and personality psychology. The final section attempts to identify some of the most promising programs for future research. Some Key Concerns in Personality Psychology

The citation bias: Fad and fashion in the judgment and decision literature.

Abstract: is not dependent upon the following two conditions: (a) all zs above some c (e.g., 1.96) are reported in the literature, and (b) all reports in the literature contain zs above some c (e.g., 1.96). Condition b appears to be reasonably accurate (e.g., 37 of the 42 studies we reported have zs above 1.96). Condition a is probably not very accurate because studies can be rejected for reasons other than small zs. The alternative to the null hypothesis is that (because there is some effect of therapy) the distribution of zs—whatever it is—is centered to the right of 0 and hence the zs will be larger than predicted by the null hypothesis. To test this null hypothesis, we constructed 200 random samples of one z-value greater than 1.96 from each of our 37 studies reporting at least one value that large. Thus, there was no within-study dependence between zs (and no reason to expect between-study dependence). The average of the average zs was 2.77, not 2.34 as predicted by the null hypothesis. Because the variance of the normal truncated above 1.96 is .14, the test z comparing 2.77 to 2.34 is 7.56 (.43 divided by (. 14/37)). p is virtually 0. Similar results are found with cut points of 1.65, 2.33, and 2.58. Unfortunately, the results counterindicate going \"backwards\" from the hypothesized tail to infer the location of the hypothesized mean. The reason is that all the variances of the zs actually computed are four to six times larger than those based on normal curve theory. All we can do is reject—soundly—the null hypothesis, without introducing the \"small enough\" ambiguity of the Rosenthal method. The discrepancy between theoretical and observed variances mitigates against any normal curve \"correction\" of effect size. Sampling independent zs above 1.96 thus led to a mean very significantly larger than 2.34, the expected value if we were sampling zs above 1.96 from a unit normal distribution. Our conclusion is that we are not randomly sampling from a truncated normal. Specifically, the zs are larger. The significant effects of psychotherapy cannot be accounted for by selective reporting unless there is an additional bias that the larger the z beyond the standard significance level the more likely it is to be reported. If such a bias existed, we would expect the results above 2.58 to be nonexistent, or at least weaker than those above 1.96. But they are not (test z = 7.42, p virtually 0). Our basic assumption is quite broad. In fact, when c approaches — oo, it is the standard assumption underlying normal distribution significance tests. All we have done is to apply the same logic to a (truncated) part of that distribution.

The psychological impact of AIDS on gay men.

Abstract: The profound psychological impact of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) epidemic on gay men needs to receive greater attention from mental health professionals. The specific treatment approach depends upon the individuals location on the AIDS-related conditions continuum. For men already diagnosed with AIDS psychological themes include fears of death and dying guilt concerns about exposure of a homosexual life-style fear of contagion loss of self-esteem decreased social support and increased dependency needs stigmatization loss of occupational and financial security confusion over medical treatment options and severe depression. The integration of a mental health service into AIDS special care hospital wards and participation in support groups are particularly useful for men with AIDS. Anxiety is the major clinical symptom among those who have not developed full-blown AIDS but show signs of immune suppression. Issues for men in this "gray zone" include isolation poor social and occupational functioning due to fatigue shame and frustration of achievement needs. Stress- reduction techniques are especially important with this population to eliminate further compromise to the immune system or even to strengthen it. Many asymptomatic gay men ("the worried well") are manifesting acute psychological symptoms such as panic generalized anxiety obsessional thinking about AIDS and somatization. Training in the negotiation of safe-sex agreements can reduce some of this anxiety. In general the AIDS epidemic has introduced an existential component to psychotherapy with gay men with a concern over issues such as the meaning of life and death.