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JournalISSN: 0309-7013

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 

Oxford University Press
About: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume is an academic journal published by Oxford University Press. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Epistemology & Action (philosophy). It has an ISSN identifier of 0309-7013. Over the lifetime, 662 publications have been published receiving 15820 citations. The journal is also known as: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. & Aristotelian Society supplementary volume.


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TL;DR: In this article, the moral problem of the inconsistency between belief and desire is discussed. But there is no such connection between belief, desire, and reason, and it is not clear how to explain the apparent plausibility of at least one of (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16) and (16), (17), (18), (19), (20) ).
Abstract: (3) Motivating reasons are constituted, inter alia, by desires. The apparent inconsistency can be brought out as follows. From (1), the state expressed by a valuation is a belief, which, from (2), is necessarily connected in some way with having a motivating reason; that is, from (3), with having a desire. So (1), (2) and (3) together entail that there is some sort of necessary connection between distinct existences: a certain kind of belief and a certain kind of desire. But there is no such connection. Believing some state of the world obtains is one thing, what I desire to do in the light of that belief is quite another. Therefore we have to reject at least one of (1), (2) or (3). Call this the 'moral problem', and call those who respond 'revisionists' and 'reconciliationists'.1 Revisionists accept the inconsistency, and so seek to explain away the apparent plausibility of at least one of (1), (2) and (3). Thus, for example, emotivists, prescriptivists and projectivists

532 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently far, based on a shared assumption that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth.
Abstract: My life consists in my being content to accept many things (Wittgenstein On Certainty x344) Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted ‘Entitlement’, as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counter-exemplies that identication The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds of entitlement and explores the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently far Three kinds of entitlement are characterised and given prima facie support, and a fourth is canvassed Certain foreseeable limitations of the suggested anti-sceptical strategy are noted The discussion is grounded, overall, in a conception of the sceptical paradoxes not as directly challenging our having any warrant for large classes of our beliefs but as crises of intellectual conscience for one who wants to claim that we do

469 citations

Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Journal in previous years
YearPapers
202312
202214
202113
202013
201913
201813