Showing papers in "Asian Survey in 1992"

The "Wenzhou Model" of Development and China's Modernization

Abstract: One of the most significant aspects of the post-Mao economic and social development of China was the rise of many entrepreneurial rural communities, especially those along the eastern coast. Some of these had been promoted by Chinese journalists and scholars as "models" (moshi) for emulation by other rural communities.1 The term "model" meant that a community's social and economic program best represented the developmental strategy of the current national leadership. Accordingly, the post-1980 "models" had, in different ways, achieved the following: a rapid rise in personal income, use of the profit motive and the market mechanism, specialization, flexible patterns of ownership, and reliance on indigenous resources. This article deals with one of the most famous "models": Wenzhou municipality in Zhejiang Province. One virtue of any detailed study of a subsociety such as the present one in Wenzhou lies in depicting the nature of the social and cultural context within which development inevitably has to take place. Another possible gain of a study like this is to see Wenzhou's development as a microcosm of Chinese modernization. Important aspects and dilemmas of China's political and economic development may be thrown into relief by an analysis of Wenzhou.

The affirmative action debate in india

Abstract: Policies of affirmative action-subsidies and scholarships, reservation of government jobs, and special political representation-for the low castes were instituted by the British in India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and other colonies and have grown enormously since independence. India may well have the largest affirmative action program in the world. The scope of its various policies has been steadily enlarged, sometimes giving rise to violent protests, but the attempt by Prime Minister V. P. Singh to implement the recommendations of the Mandal Commission Report' led to an unprecedented degree of violence. More than 100 students killed themselves, to use just one indicator.2 It also evoked an active, even acrimonious debate in the press. Rather than the report itself, it is this debate and, in particular the attitudes of intellectuals, that is the subject of this article. Many of the arguments used both for and against the report naturally resemble those used in other countries pursuing affirmative action-whether or not role models are important, the relevance of "historical injustice," the effects on efficiency, and so on. But there are

Emigration and stability in Hong Kong.

Abstract: Current trends in emigration in Hong Kong are reviewed in light of the colonys scheduled 1997 reintegration with China. The author focuses on the alleged negative impact of the large-scale immigration of elites. Comparisons are made with other rapidly growing economies in the region that are also experiencing emigration of similar types of migrants. (ANNOTATION)

Democracy and the Crisis of Governability in Pakistan

Abstract: Four years have lapsed since democracy returned to Pakistan. For those Pakistanis who had looked to democracy to usher in an era of progress and prosperity in their country, the travails of the past four years have been far from comforting. The promise of democracy has been mired by its perils and pitfalls. Political problems have spiraled out of control and the popular enthusiasm that followed the reintroduction of democracy has been replaced with a sense of disillusionment, leading to what Huntington has termed "authoritarian nostalgia."' Far from a cure for the sociopolitical problems that face Pakistan, the advent of democracy has coincided with a steady decay of political institutions, social conflict, and economic stagnation. Since 1988, Pakistan has gone through two general elections and has been governed by three prime ministers, each belonging to a different party. Ethnic violence has escalated, policy making at the center and at local levels has become confused, institutional capacities have been stretched to their limits, and economic progress has ground to a standstill. In short, "the combination and interaction of low legitimacy and low effectiveness"2 have precipitated instability, placing democratic Pakistan in the throes of a "crisis of governability" that has emerged as a concomitant of the democratization process and as the single most visible hindrance to its ultimate success. A crisis of governability has been identified as the failure of rulers to: "maintain coalitional support, initiate

Export Processing Zones in Asia: A Comparative Study

Abstract: By 1970, some twenty export processing zones (EPZs) had been established in less than ten developing countries (LDCs); by 1986, there were 175 such zones in more than fifty LDCs. Over this period, employment rose from 50,000 to 1.3 million, while the estimated value of EPZ exports increased from US$150 million to US$10 billion.1 This rapid geographical spread represented an important policy change in the global economy and in North-South relations. Normally, EPZs are seen as vehicles for outward-oriented economic growth, based on the theory that active participation in international trade is an engine of growth, and "a second-best type solution for a country wanting to profit from a greater and more efficient integration into the international division of labour without subjecting the entire economy to trade liberalization and deregulation."2 The enclave nature of the zones minimized the exposure of the domestic economy to any uncertainty, while their openness supplemented and facilitated the state's overall outward-oriented development strategy. A variety of incentives were offered to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to export processing zones. Customs duties were usually waived on imported materials, intermediate

Social Policy and the Elderly in South Korea: Confucianism, Modernization, and Development

Abstract: Since the 1960s, South Korea has shifted from being mainly an agrarian, rural society to an urbanized and industrial, newly modernizing one. Of the Asian modernized or modernizing societies such as Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand that have Confucian ethical heritages, it appears that South Korea is one of the most closely bound to the relational aspects of this heritage. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is a society of some 44 million people in which 98 % of the population is literate and in which, in 1987, 78.1% of the labor force was in the secondary and tertiary industrial sector and 69% of the population lived in urban areas. Per capita GNP in 1989 was $4,550, and in 1990 an average wage earner's monthly family income was about $1,235. In 1990 the South Korean fertility rate was about 1.7 children per family and was expected to remain less than two children per family during the 1990s. On the other hand, life expectancy at birth in 1990 was 69.3 years for men and 75 years for women. In 1990, 4.7% of Korea's population was over 65 years old with the expectation that, by 2020, that figure would rise to 11%. ' Modernization, accompanied by demographic changes, urbanization, and industrialization, has contributed to changes in South Korea's family structure. Average household size for a family declined from 5.6 persons

Political Succession in Thailand

Abstract: The study of leadership succession in modem Thai politics is vexing because there are no clear patterns to explain the myriad changes of government since the 1932 revolt that overthrew the absolute monarchy. In the sixty years since then, political succession has at times been by peaceful and constitutionally sanctioned transfers of power, such as elections, but more often by nonauthoritative coups d'etat, usually led by dissident members of the military. These governmental changes do not appear to correspond to patterns of economic downturn or improvement, nor to foreign or internal threats to Thai security. Instead, political succession in Thailand, unguided by consistent norms, is best viewed as an unpatterned, ad hoc event dependent on changing allegiances and power advantages held by various elite groups, such as politicians, bureaucrats, capitalist business leaders, and military officers. Although it is too early to evaluate precisely the succession crisis of May 1992, the uprising of Thais against their military rulers suggests a continuation of ad hoc changes in government leadership. In modern Thai politics, the military has played the dominant role in determining succession changes. However, military coups have occurred in nonpatterned ways, as a function of varying perceptions of self-interest, and have resulted in diverse outcomes. Although the military has had the most to do with determining the success or failure of governmental change, the random nature of the succession changes has made it impossible to predict when coups will take place and with what results. Indeed, not only did Thai and Western scholars fail to predict the military coup of February 23, 1991, but they had asserted the conventional wisdom that coups were an anachronistic part of the nation's past, no longer pertinent to the "new" democratic kingdom. This article seeks to show that Thailand has not institutionalized a systematic succession process but that succession nevertheless has been

Second-Generation Diet Members and Democracy in Japan: Hereditary Seats

Abstract: Of the 133 candidates elected to the Japanese Diet in the 1990 general election, 60 of them (45%) were related to current or previous Diet members. In many of these cases, the "new" candidate ran for a seat vacated by his father or other relative. Thus, the rise of secondgeneration Diet members and the increasing number of hereditary seats has become a serious political issue in Japan. Succession by inheritance violates basic notions of democracy. The public and press tend to see the election of second-generation candidates as virtually guaranteed, offering the electorate no significant choices and threatening the legitimacy of Japanese democracy. Recruitment channels seem to be narrowing significantly. Sato Seizaburo and Matsuzaki Tetsuhisa estimated that, excluding incumbents and second-generation candidates, actual turnover in the Diet has only been about 3% per year since 1958.1 Certainly, we can agree that "entry of large numbers of second-generation politicians into the Diet in recent years is one of the most notable changes in the backgrounds of LDP Diet members over the thirty years of LDP rule."2 Second-generation Diet members and hereditary seats are a phenomenon primarily, though not exclusively, of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has ruled Japan since 1955. Just before the 1990 general election, there were 129 second-generation Diet members among the 496

Malaysia-Philippines Relations: The Issue of Sabah

Abstract: The level of irritation in the relationship between Malaysia and the Philippines is considered unnatural for two immediate neighbors who belong to a common regional grouping. In normal circumstances, their regional commonality would have served as a catalyst to cement and widen mutually beneficial ties of friendship and cooperation. Unfortunately, the relationship has been allowed to float and continues to be marked by mutual suspicion and distrust. The main contributing factor to this disturbing situation is the Philippines's claim on Sabah, one of Malaysia's 13 states. It is an issue that has remained unresolved for nearly 30 years. On historical and legal grounds, the administration of President Diosdado Macapagal officially initiated the Philippine claim to Sabah (North Borneo as the island was known under colonial rule) as it was about to be incorporated into the proposed Federation of Malaysia. The claim was relegated to the sidelines when it became entangled within the wider context of the Republic of Indonesia's \"confrontation\" with Malaysia and the Sukarno regime's threats to resort to military means to crush the fledgling nation. Upon termination of the confrontation, the dispute over Sabah was carried to Bangkok, where bilateral negotiations aimed at its resolution were abruptly aborted. In the United Nation's General Assembly, the disputants exchanged contentious charges and countercharges. Ironically, President Ferdinand Marcos recognized the formation of Malaysia in 1966, soon after he took over political power in the Philippines. With the inception of the five-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), there was a tacit agreement between Malaysia

Subregional Security Cooperation in ASEAN: Military and Economic Imperatives and Political Obstacles

Abstract: As the Cold War recedes and the superpower relationship that underpinned and ordered international interactions in so many parts of the world crumbles, region after region is having to confront the fallout from these global transformations and the disruptions they bring to existing patterns of relations. The ASEAN region-Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand-no less than any other area of the world has been greatly influenced by these events. Indeed, some important trends in the region's security and economic environment have started to take shape, and it is the purpose of this analysis to outline these trends and to argue that they will produce strains within the ASEAN grouping. More particularly, it is argued that Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia-what may be called the emerging "core" states of ASEAN-will be drawn closer together by security and economic interests that they hold in common and that are markedly different from those of Thailand and the Philippines. Brunei's size severely limits the role it can play, but its strategic location and wealth is such that it could well become something akin to an associate member of the "core" group. Yet, it will also be argued that the economic and security imperatives that appear to be pushing Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia toward a more integrated defense arrangement will be balanced by political factors

Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security

Abstract: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been a successful example of regionalism for a number of reasons, but the most important has been its ability to affirm a commitment to regional order based upon the territorial status quo. This commitment was enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation concluded during the first ASEAN summit in Bali in 1976. The devastation wrought by Indonesia's konfrontasi campaign against Malaysia (1963-66) exposed the dangers of territorial revisionism and the need for common affirmation of the postcolonial frontiers. Moreover, fear of communist insurgency throughout the late 1960s and 1970s prompted Southeast Asian leaders to develop bilateral or border security cooperation and to coordinate political responses against communism in general. I Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia (December 1978-September 1989) was the test of ASEAN's commitment to regional order, and its success in terms of focusing the international community's attention upon a territorial revision by force of arms endowed ASEAN with a unique sense of status. Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia was an indication that Vietnam recognized that the principle of the territorial status quo, which had governed relations between the ASEAN countries, extended to Indochina as well. The extension of this principle to a communist-dominated part of the region, which previously had been a source of instability, was indeed a crowning achievement. But where does ASEAN go from here?

Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S.-Pakistani Relationship

Abstract: Arms transfer is a multidimensional process involving complex sets of relationships, interests, and outcomes. Political or diplomatic influence is one of the many motives behind arms transfers from supplier states to developing countries. During the Cold War era, arms supply was perceived by both the United States and the USSR as an important tool for creating dependencies, patron-client ties, and alliance relationships. The superpowers behaved under a generally held, though not yet fully tested belief that the supply of arms served as a major instrument for international influence, often benefiting the strategic and political interests of the supplier. This article attempts to test the linkage between arms and influence by looking at the record of the U.S. arms transfer relationship with Pakistan during 1979-91. Two central questions are: did the U.S. succeed in building a patron-client relationship with Pakistan and to what extent did the arms supply provide the U.S. with tangible influence on outcomes in specific issue areas such as nuclear nonproliferation?

China and the Disintegration of the Soviet Union

Abstract: No single external event has had as much impact on the People's Republic of China as the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which had been both China's greatest ally in the 1950s and, by the 1970s, its greatest enemy. The Soviet Union was both the fount of the PRC's ruling ideology and then the most dangerous "perverter" of that ideology. What is more, the second Russian revolution in August 1991 was more far reaching than its predecessor in 1917, if only because it also led directly to the breakup of much of the Russian empire. By the end of 1991, China found itself with three new neighbors in Central Asia and uncertainty about the fate of the Russian union. But how can one assess the impact of the disintegration of the USSR on China when the changes are less than a year old? It is certainly difficult to find orthodox academic sources to substantiate what must remain essentially impressionistic judgements. Never has the tea leaf-reading style of China-watching been more difficult, yet more in demand. This article will, therefore, try to set out a range of issues to be considered rather than a comprehensive analysis, let alone a set of firm conclusions. In the end, it is a matter of major concern that China is increasing its defense spending, arms transfers, and even nuclear tests just when most other powers are reducing these features of their foreign policy. What are China's postCold War priorities, and why do they seem to differ from the other great powers?

Sri Lanka's Provincial Council System: A Solution to the Ethnic Problem?

Abstract: The demand for effective regional autonomy has been at the heart of the struggle by the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka to acquire a political structure more suited to its needs. While the public stance and activities of the most militant of the Tamil youth groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who favor a separate state, has captured the most international attention, the debate in Sri Lanka has recently been focused on a narrower question. Does the Provincial Council (PC) System put in place as a consequence of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of July 1987 offer a viable solution to the "ethnic problem" in the North and East of the island? This article will examine the potential that the PC system holds for resolving the conflict between the island's ethnic communities and for meeting the concerns of the Tamils, both in terms of the scope of the legal provisions and how these provisions have been implemented in practice. It will identify the factors that have had an impact on the manner in which the PCs have functioned so far and what aspects of the ethnic problem continue to remain highly contentious. In closing, the article will briefly evaluate the prospects for the system in the foreseeable future.

Pakistan's Lingering Crisis of Dyarchy

Abstract: The government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan is the third in a line in terms of representing a dyarchical arrangement for sharing power between the civil-military establishment on the one hand and political elite on the other. Nawaz Sharif and his predecessors, Mohammad Khan Junejo and Benazir Bhutto, ascended to power under a constitutional arrangement defined by the Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, which was passed by the National Assembly in November 1985 and bestowed supreme power on Pakistan's president. Both Junejo and Bhutto were unceremoniously dismissed from office, and the question is, will Nawaz Sharif succeed where his predecessors failed. His government is a coalitional arrangement among an alliance of parties called the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), of which his own Muslim League party is the chief component and a few smaller parties, including the MQM (Mohajir Qaumi Movement), the ANP (Awami National Party), and the Niazi group of the JUP (Jamiat Ulema Pakistan), are its partners. The political situation under Nawaz Sharif has remained in flux ever since he took over as prime minister. He has been unable to establish a working relationship with the main opposition party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and its alliance partners in the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA). Presidential references against ex-Prime Minister Bhutto and other leading members of the PPP have continued to vitiate relations between the two sides. Bhutto's husband, Asif Zardari, was arrested and put on trial on charges varying from illegally drawing money from banks to involvement in a case of abduction, and hundreds of PPP workers were arrested by the Sindh government of Jam Sadiq Ali. The caretaker government's alleged rigging of the 1990 elections, which put the IJI in power, continues to be a thorny issue. While the PDA's

China's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula

Abstract: Traditionally, China has had a vital interest and significant influence in the Korean Peninsula, and historically, there have been close political, military, and economic relations along with a shared cultural background. The peninsula has always been considered crucial to China's security, and the relationship has been perceived by generations of Chinese as much closer than that with many other important neighboring countries, such as Vietnam. Should an adversary force control the peninsula, China would be deprived of an indispensable security buffer proximate both to the nation's capital and to one of its most important industrial regions. However, with the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and particularly the developments of the last decade, three other factors have also played important roles in China's Korea policy, albeit with different weights under various circumstances. These factors are: China's calculation of the regional power equilibrium, its official ideology and domestic politics, and in recent years, the growing importance of Chinese economic interest in the region. In the following discussion, we will first examine the changing power configuration in the region in the post-Cold War era and the interplay between China and the other three major powers encircling the peninsula: Russia, the United States, and Japan. China's policy toward both North and South Korea, as well as China's stand on interKorean relations, will then be analyzed. In the final sections, after a brief

Upazila Development Planning in Bangladesh: Problems of Resource Mobilization

Abstract: The most significant attempt to date to reform local government in Bangladesh was made in 1982 through the introduction of the upazila system. Upazila parishads (UZP, subdistrict councils) were formed in 461 upazilas-the last one in 1990-and given responsibility for development planning. The main objective of the upazila system, as enunciated in government documents, was devolution of authority to local bodies, supposedly in order to induce faster development at the local level with the participation of the people. The government documents also expressed the hope that the system would help reduce the dependence of rural people on the national government and mobilize and utilize local resources. The four D's of decentralization-deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and debureaucratizationl-relate to spatial, functional, political, and structural decentralization, respectively. Devolution, the political decentralization, is a process where full responsibility for policy determination with regard to specified subjects is transferred to the recipients of authority, allowing them scope for self-management with a greater degree of self-

Chinese Perceptions in the Post-Cold War Era: Three Images of the United States

Abstract: The United States has always held a central place in China's analysis of international affairs. This has to do not only with the importance of Sino-U.S. relations in its own right, but reflects a long-time Chinese interest in "global structure" (shijiegeju) and its implication for China's national interest. With the long overdue rapprochement in SinoU.S. relations in the early 1970s, Chinese perceptions of American intentions and strategy in both global and bilateral terms underwent fundamental change. The U.S. was no longer seen as a rotten capitalist country threatening China's very existence, but as a strategic ally offsetting the military threat from the Soviet Union. With the normalization of the relationship and China's decision to open its door to the West in the late 1970s, the U.S. was further seen as a valuable source of capital, technology, and managerial expertise for China's modernization. Apparently, the United States not only ceased to be a security threat to China but was also no longer an ideological untouchable either. In retrospect, it is fair to say that these changes were initially imposed by structural constraints and out of expediency. Gradually, however, the changes took hold. With the proliferation of bilateral contacts in political, economic, cultural, and military spheres, some of the new perceptions were institutionalized and, in turn, helped shape Sino-U.S. relations. It is, therefore, somewhat unexpected that a new wave of structural dislocation since the end of the 1980s would have put these well-shaped Chinese images of the United States under serious test once again.

Cambodia in 1991: An Uncertain Peace

Abstract: Cambodia's once and future king, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, returned to Phnom Penh on November 14, 1991, 21 years and eight months after being overthrown by a military coup during the Second Indochina War. He was escorted from Beijing by Hun Sen, prime minister of the State of Cambodia (SOC), against whom Sihanouk had led a guerrilla insurgency for more than a decade. The United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), numbering 268 members, was already in Phnom Penh, to be followed in early 1992 by a multinational contingent of U.N. military peacekeepers and civil administrators. Ready to greet Sihanouk in his capacity as president of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia (SNC) were representatives of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and diplomatic missions from a score of countries. After decades of war, civil strife, and multitiered diplomacy, a compromise political settlement had finally come to Cambodia. How "comprehensive" the settlement actually was and how durable it would be remained in doubt. But clearly, Cambodia's best hope for peace had been realized during 1991. Sihanouk's return-arm in arm with his former enemy-to the royal palace overlooking the Tonle Sap River symbolized at once the rebirth of Cambodia and the uncertainties of a peace fraught with ambiguity and palpable dangers. The genesis of the peace settlement could be found in the decision of the "external factors" in the Cambodia conflictVietnam, China, and the Soviet Union-to remove Cambodia as a central irritant in their bilateral relations. For a number of reasons, these powers had concluded that the game was no longer worth the candle. The Soviet Union, in the throes of national disintegration, had neither the resources nor political inclination

The Future of Hong Kong

Abstract: With Hong Kong's reversion to PRC sovereignty only a half decade away, indicators concerning the future well-being of the territory are mixed. In the eyes of some, Hong Kong is lurching from crisis to crisis, and the future will consist of capital flight, emigration of key personnel, and potential panic as July 1997 approaches.1 According to others, the groundwork is being laid for successful reversion without great harm to the interests of Hong Kong's residents. Those adopting this more optimistic view point to the extensive, mutually beneficial economic connections that have already developed between the PRC and Hong Kong, and note that each major crisis to date (such as that over building an airport on Lantau Island) has been resolved short of a breakdown in relations with Beijing.2 The past year has in fact brought mixed evidence about Hong Kong's future. Local citizens continue to indicate their nervousness in every possible way. Emigration amounted to roughly 1,200 people per month throughout the year. The election to the Legislative Council in the fall of 1991 saw victories by the candidates most bitterly opposed to the Britishbrokered agreement with Beijing. Yet, this same period saw signs of greater stability in Hong Kong-PRC ties. Agreement was reached at the eleventh hour on the airport issue, and this has allowed plans for construction of this huge new facility to go forward. During the catastrophic floods in East China that summer, Hong Kong residents launched impressive voluntary drives to contribute to relief for the hard-pressed mainland

Sri Lanka's Tamil-Sinhalese Ethnic Conflict: Alternative Solutions

Abstract: Warfare between the Tamils and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka has been going on, with varying degrees of intensity, since the late 1970s. Thousands of young fighters on both sides have been killed, as well as tens of thousands of innocent men, women, and children who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. The ethnic conflict, while centuries old, has not always been violent. Depending on one's political predilection, the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict can be dated from the first South Indian invasions a thousand years ago, or one can move into recent times and point to the situation at independence from Britain in 1948. When the Portuguese arrived in Sri Lanka in 1505, they found separate Tamil kingdoms in the northern and eastern parts of the island and separate Sinhalese kingdoms in the south and in the Kandyan hills. Thus, it is difficult to argue that Sri Lanka is not now home to the Tamils as well as to the majority Sinhalese. By the time of independence, the Tamils held positions in the upper civil service and the professions far in excess of their proportion in the population. Again, depending on viewpoint, the Tamil position then could be explained as the consequence of British colonial efforts to divide and rule, or it could be because nothing much grows in the northern area and ambitious Tamils took to education and the jobs in the colonial system that could be had by those who were educated in English. So while it is true that the Tamils were very much over-represented in the most sought-after jobs at the time of independence, it is also true that Prime Minister S. W. R. D.

Mongolia's New Constitution: Blueprint for Democracy

Abstract: At the horse hour of the happy yellow horse day in the black tiger month of the water monkey year-midday on February 12, 1992-the former Mongolian People's Republic acquired a new Constitution, a new name, and new coat of arms. The Constitution, the country's fourth since November 1924 when the People's Republic was founded, proclaims Mongolia, with its capital in Ulan Bator, to be an independent sovereign republic that ensures for its people democracy, justice, freedom, equality, and national unity. It recognizes all forms of ownership of property including land, and affirms that Mongolia shall have a "multistructured economy which takes into account universal trends of world economic development and national conditions."' This auspicious moment was the culmination of the hard-fought struggle for multiparty democracy that developed in Mongolia in the aftermath of the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. It marked a watershed in the country's modern history as the Mongols cast off the constraints of the former ideology and its command economy to embrace universally accepted human rights enshrined in the new fundamental law. For the first time, there was the prospect that they would be honored in its implementation. The new Constitution was adopted on January 13, 1992, by the second annual session of the national assembly, the People's Great Hural (12th convocation). During the session, which began in early November 1991, the debate between the new democrats and the communist old guard was often fierce and occasionally had to be suspended to allow tempers to cool. The session lasted over two months, rather than the originally planned

The State and the Use of Coercive Power in India

Abstract: When India became independent in 1947 and chose democracy based on universal franchise as a system of governance, it was thought to be a brave choice but one that would not last long. As the country went to the polls for the second time in 1957, a commentator on Indian politics remarked that "the odds are wholly against the survival of freedom . . . in fact, the issue is whether any Indian state can survive at all."' More than thirty years have gone by since that remark was made, and while the test of survival probably has been passed, the processes of survival have not been easy. Indeed, the testing has become more and more stringent. There is a rise in social conflict, the economy does not show an adequate rate of growth, and democratic institutions, now being cited as reasons for the inability to cope with the social and economic problems, are losing their democratic character and are unable to stem the tide of violence in society. This article attempts to examine some of these issues and particularly focuses attention on the processes and the institutions by which the Indian state has expanded its capacity to use coercive power.

The Thai Parliamentary Elections of 1992: Return to Democracy in an Atypical Year

Abstract: Thai voters went to the polls on September 13 in the second general parliamentary election of 1992, called by Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun to end the political impasse caused by the May succession crisis, street violence, and subsequent failure of parties to form a coalition government. The two elections (March 22 and September 13) are significant because of three features: military leaders coopted political parties in a bid to support their involvement in politics; the prime minister created an independent election-monitoring body; and politicians in both elections laid a seemingly clear choice before the electorate of promilitary or prodemocracy parties. However, these features are all temporal and do not represent a basic change in Thai electoral politics; rather they make 1992 an atypical year. Elections in Thailand have not always been an important indicator of democratization; since 1932, they have more commonly been held to legitimize the seizure of power by a military faction. From 1978-91, however, Thailand experienced a period of mostly stable civilian government during which four parliamentary elections were held, the Parliament was revitalized, and the press reported more freely. In 1988 Chatichai Choonhawan became the first elected civilian prime minister since the 1970s. But the 1991 coup placed the future of democratization in doubt as military officers staged a coup and dismissed the elected politicians. The two general elections held this year signify not only the formal but also the substantive return of power to elected politicians and a resumption of the process of democratization.