Showing papers in "Australasian Journal of Philosophy in 2002"
TL;DR: Nussbaum and Nussbaum as mentioned in this paper discuss women and human development: The Capabilities Approach, and the role of women in the development of women and women in their own lives.
Abstract: Book Information Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach By Martha C Nussbaum Cambridge University Press Cambridge/New York 2000 Pp xxi + 312
254 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the present problem has been addressed in the literature on time, namely how we can know that we are present and not past (or future) in the sense that the present is privileged.
Abstract: There is a clear partition between tensed and tenseless theories of time: essentially, tense theorists, i.e., those who defend tensed theories of time, assert that in some objective, mind-independent sense or other, the present is privileged, whereas tenseless theorists, i.e., those who defend tenseless theories of time, assert that all times are real, no one of which is ontologically privileged. Many tense theorists hold that more than one time is real, yet one among them is privileged, namely the present. This, I claim, raises the question that has not been addressed in the literature on time, namely of how we can know that we are present and not past (or future). I shall call this the Present Problem:
56 citations
TL;DR: A Moorean Response to Brain-in-a-Vat Scepticism is discussed in this article, where a Moorean response to brain-ina-vat scepticism is presented.
Abstract: (2002). A Moorean Response to Brain-in-a-Vat Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 148-163.
47 citations
TL;DR: The Truthmaker Realism: Response to Gregory (2002) as mentioned in this paper is a response to Gregory's "truthmaker realism" (Tas mentioned in this paper ), which is based on the notion of truthmaker realism.
Abstract: (2002). Truthmaker Realism: Response to Gregory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 231-234.
36 citations
TL;DR: The Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality by Brad Hooker as mentioned in this paper, is an example of a rule-based theory of moral behavior.
Abstract: Book Information Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. By Brad Hooker. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xiii + 213. Hardback, £25.
36 citations
TL;DR: The Oxford Handbook of Free Will as mentioned in this paper is the most widely used handbook for free-will theory and it is published by Oxford University Press. Pp. xvii + 638.
Abstract: Book Information The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Edited by Robert Kane. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2002. Pp. xvii + 638.
34 citations
TL;DR: The Endurance/Perdurance Distinction as discussed by the authors is a measure of the endurance and perdurance of an individual. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 3, pp. 288-306.
Abstract: (2002). The Endurance/Perdurance Distinction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 3, pp. 288-306.
33 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a proper function account for human a-Rational Primary Process Mediated Mentation is presented. But it does not address the problem of paraphrasing and wish.
Abstract: (2002). Phantasy and Wish: A Proper Function Account for Human A-Rational Primary Process Mediated Mentation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 1-16.
29 citations
TL;DR: The Critical Notice of Knowledge and Its Limits by Timothy Williamson as mentioned in this paper is a critical notice of knowledge and its limits in the context of ontology, which is also related to our work.
Abstract: (2002). Critical Notice of Knowledge and Its Limits by Timothy Williamson. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 4, pp. 516-521.
28 citations
TL;DR: The Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology by Allen Colin, Bekoff Mark and Lauder George as mentioned in this paper is a good starting point for this paper.
Abstract: Book Information Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology. Edited by Allen Colin, Bekoff Mark and Lauder George. MIT Press. Cambridge. 1998. Pp. vi + 597. Paperback, US$31.50.
23 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a Pollyanna Realism: Moral Perception and Moral Properties, which is based on the notion of a "popeanna realism" in the Australian Journal of Philosophy (AJOP).
Abstract: (2002). Pollyanna Realism: Moral Perception and Moral Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 75-85.
TL;DR: Hanna as discussed by the authors presents Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy (FPA), a survey of Kant and analytic philosophy, with a focus on the relation between the two domains.
Abstract: Book Information Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy. By Robert Hanna. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xv + 312. Hardback, £45.00.
TL;DR: In this article, practical reason and desire are discussed in the context of practical reason in philosophy, and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 3, pp. 345-358.
Abstract: (2002). Practical Reason and Desire. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 3, pp. 345-358.
TL;DR: In this paper, the spatial relations between Universals are investigated in the context of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 17-23.
Abstract: (2002). Spatial Relations Between Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 17-23.
TL;DR: Agar et al. as mentioned in this paper presented Life's Intrinsic Value: Science, Ethics and Nature, by Nicholas Agar. New York. 2001. Pp. x + 200.
Abstract: Book Information Life's Intrinsic Value: Science, Ethics and Nature. By Nicholas Agar. Colombia University Press. New York. 2001. Pp. x + 200. Paperback, £17.00.
TL;DR: The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic as mentioned in this paper is a good starting point for a discussion of the relation between logic and philosophy. But it is not a complete guide. Pp. x + 510.
Abstract: Book Information The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Edited by Lou Goble. Blackwell Publishers. Oxford. 2001. Pp. x + 510. Paperback, £16.99.
TL;DR: A region of space is a set of points in space possibly exactly occupied by a material object as mentioned in this paper, and any region is a receptacle, even if some people disagree with this view.
Abstract: A region of space is a set of points in space. A receptacle is a region of space possibly exactly occupied by a material object. I believe that any region is a receptacle. Others disagree, often emphatically! In the interests of properly representing such disagreement and of forwarding the cause of my liberal view of receptacles, allow me to introduce some familiar machinery that will help us to frame the debate in a very precise manner. (D1) R is continuous =df R is not discontinuous (D2) R is discontinuous =df R is the union of two non-null separated regions (D3) R and R are separated =df (i) the intersection of R with the closure of R is null, and (ii) the intersection of R with the closure of R is null
TL;DR: The authors argue that Proclus' arguments are at least as worthy of our attention as one of Aristotle's most celebrated arguments in natural philosophy, and they identify the problems that arise when we survey the "platitudes" about a topic and then clear away many of these by drawing distinctions among the various senses of words.
Abstract: The Athenian neoplatonist Proclus (c. 410–485) is not regarded by most analytically inclined philosophers as one of antiquity’s better minds. After all, the work of Proclus with which most people are acquainted is the Elements of Theology. While one might admire its attempt at rigour in the 211 numbered propositions and their proofs, most contemporary philosophers will find the premises in these proofs pretty unlikely. Moreover, the resulting metaphysical edifice—with its various levels of entities from transcendent One to unqualified matter—is fairly alien to our more naturalist ontologies. I barrack for the St Kilda Football Club, so it should come as no surprise that I like to see the rehabilitation of the downtrodden and underappreciated. In what follows, I’ll argue that some of Proclus’ arguments are at least as worthy of our attention as one of Aristotle’s most celebrated arguments in natural philosophy. Part of what we admire about Aristotle is the methodology and cleverness. He proceeds in a way we approve of, first identifying the problems that arise when we survey the ‘platitudes’ about a topic and then clearing away many of these by drawing distinctions among the various senses of words. He typically offers a theory and tries to justify it by showing that it is better than its competitors at saving the appearances. Even when Aristotle gets to the wrong conclusion, we still find that he does things that we regard as methodologically virtuous in the process.
TL;DR: The main purpose of as discussed by the authors is to consider some of the more prominent reasons why realists have rejected the Humean theory of motivation, and to argue that these reasons are not persuasive, and that there is nothing about being a moral realist that should make us suspicious of Humeanism.
Abstract: It is widely accepted by philosophers that a broadly Humean account of moral motivation is correct. Roughly put, the Humean account of moral motivation says that an agent is motivated to act in some fashion that she believes is right, just, virtuous, etc., only if that agent desires to act in that fashion—where the desire in question is distinct from, and not entirely generated by, any belief that that agent has. A growing number of moral realists, however, have rejected this Humean account of moral motivation. Many of these philosophers defend a moral psychology according to which motivational states are fundamentally cognitive states. According to these philosophers, an agent’s believing that acting in some fashion is morally right, just, virtuous, etc., can itself motivate that agent to act appropriately, or can at least give rise to desires in that agent to act appropriately. The central purpose of this essay is to consider some of the more prominent reasons why realists have rejected the Humean theory of motivation. I shall argue that these reasons are not persuasive, and that there is nothing about being a moral realist that should make us suspicious of Humeanism. Let me immediately add a caveat to this, however: my central purpose here is not to show that anti-Humean—or as I shall hereafter call them, ‘Rationalist’—views of moral motivation are false. In fact, I think some are rather plausible. Nor, might I add, is my purpose to offer grounds for believing that the Humean theory of motivation is true. Rather, my central aim is the more modest one of providing reasons for thinking that the moral realist is free to combine her moral ontology with a Humean theory of motivation. However modest the aim of this essay might be, it is also, I think, important. For if the realist really is free to combine her theory with the Humean theory of motivation, then it cannot be complained that moral realism is suspect because it is incompatible with this widely accepted view. This, I claim, is the central purpose of this essay. But the essay also has an auxiliary aim. I want to suggest that, when understood aright, questions of motivational psychology do not really have an important bearing upon the moral realist/antirealist debate. The common assumption to the contrary, I propose, is mistaken.
TL;DR: A Pyrrhic Victory for Teleonomy as discussed by the authors is an example of such an approach, and it is based on the concept of a Pyrrhoric victory for teleonomy, as discussed in this paper.
Abstract: (2002). A Pyrrhic Victory for Teleonomy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 3, pp. 372-377.
TL;DR: In this article, Emotion and Perception in Aristotle's Rhetoric are discussed. But they do not consider the relationship between perception and emotion in the first-person dialogues.
Abstract: (2002). Emotion and Perception in Aristotle's Rhetoric. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 86-100.
TL;DR: In this paper, externalism, self-knowledge, and inner observance are discussed in the context of self-awareness and self-expectation in a philosophy journal, with a focus on the Australasian context.
Abstract: (2002). Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Inner Observation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 42-61.
TL;DR: This chapter discusses Olson's Embryo Problem, a treatment of the fertilisation of eggs by means of a probabilistic procedure.
Abstract: (2002). Olson's Embryo Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 4, pp. 502-511.
TL;DR: The logical difference argument as mentioned in this paper is based on the assumption that if someone who accepts sentences A1,..., An need not accept sentence B, then B does not follow from A1,..., An.
Abstract: Let us call this the logical-difference argument. Unstated but understood in the logicaldifference argument is the following principle concerning logic and belief: if someone who maintains (1) need not accept (2), then (2) does not follow from (1). In what follows I will use the same reasoning to show that (4) does not follow from (3). Before applying Dudman’s assumption concerning logic and belief ourselves, let us take a moment to be clear about its content. The general form of the assumption is this: if someone who accepts sentences A1, . . . , An need not accept sentence B, then B does not follow from A1, . . . , An. One might worry that this principle assumes or amounts to an epistemic account of logical consequence, an account which therefore conflicts with the usual analysis of logical consequence in terms of truth preservation, but this is not the
TL;DR: In this article, Descartes's Two Proofs of the External World are used to prove the existence of the external world, and they are discussed in detail in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Abstract: (2002). Descartes's Two Proofs of the External World. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 4, pp. 487-501.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine several arguments which receive some expression in Thomas Nagel's work, and examine the Argument from Dissociation, according to which my pain seems bad upon reflection, even without reflecting on its relation to me.
Abstract: Ethical egoism is a wicked doctrine that is wickedly hard to refute. On ethical egoism, the fact that I would suffer is no reason by itself for you not to torture me. This may seem implausible--monstrous, even--but what evidence can we offer against it? Here I examine several arguments which receive some expression in Thomas Nagel's work. Each tries to show that a normative reason to end my pain is a reason for all agents. The arguments in section I emphasize reasons that don't entail agents and thus purportedly apply to all agents. In section II, I examine the Argument from Dissociation, according to which my pain seems bad upon reflection, even without reflecting on its relation to me. Section III examines the Argument from Inability, which claims that my occurrent pains would seem bad to me, even if I couldn't think about their relation to me. Finally, I discuss the Argument from Introspection, according to which I seem, introspectively, to have a reason to end my pain, a reason that has nothing to do ...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on two widely discussed theses in the philosophy of science, namely realism and predictivism, and argue that novel confirmations of theories confirm theories more strongly than non-novel confirmations.
Abstract: This paper is focused on two widely discussed theses in the philosophy of science—these are realism and predictivism. Realism, as I shall construe it here, is the view that the theories of the so-called mature sciences are at least approximately true. Realists also typically hold that scientists have the ability to systematically identify and accept theories that are approximately true. Anti-realism is a sceptical position that repudiates the possibility of theoretical knowledge and holds that the empirical success of contemporary theories is no reason to regard them as approximately true. Predictivism is the view that novel confirmations of theories confirm theories more strongly than non-novel confirmations. A great deal has been written about what constitutes a novel confirmation. The temporal conception of novelty was apparently adopted by Lakatos in his influential (1970) paper, which claims that a true empirical consequence E of a theory T amounts to a novel confirmation of T if E comes to be known after T was formulated. Zahar (1973) countered that what mattered was not whether E was known at the relevant time but whether E was one of the empirical facts that T was intended to address. We will follow a more currently popular trend and say that the case in which T entails some true observation statement E amounts to a novel confirmation of T insofar as T was not ‘built to fit’ E (or, as it is often put, knowledge of E was not ‘used’ in the construction of T). Both predictivism and realism are the foci of large philosophical literatures. Realism has been a fairly popular philosophical position since the demise of positivism in the 1960s and philosophers continue to defend it (such as Leplin (1997) and Psillos (1999)) despite the existence of powerful anti-realist positions such as van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. Perhaps the most famous proponent of a predictivist-like position (though hardly the first) was Karl Popper who emphasized that confirmations count only when
TL;DR: Aesthetic concepts after Sibley as discussed by the authors is a collection of essays on aesthetic concepts after sibley, edited by Emily Brady and Jerrold Levinson, published by Clarendon Press.
Abstract: Book Information Aesthetic Concepts--Essays after Sibley. Edited by Emily Brady and Jerrold Levinson. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. ix + 239. £35.
TL;DR: The Warranted Christian Belief (WBC) as mentioned in this paper is a collection of articles written by Alvin Plantinga and published by Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xx + 508.
Abstract: Book Information Warranted Christian Belief. By Alvin Plantinga. Oxford University Press. New York. 2000. Pp. xx + 508.
TL;DR: Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on 'Morality' as discussed by the authors, by May Simon, is a collection of essays about Nietzsche and his war on'morality' that includes the following:
Abstract: Book Information Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on 'Morality'. By May Simon. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. xiv + 212. Hardback, £30.00.