Showing papers in "Berkeley Journal of International Law in 1985"
TL;DR: The patent system is often unsuitable as a means of providing effective protection for high-technology items as discussed by the authors, and many courts have difficulty fitting high technology innovations into the patent system, which was designed to foster the more traditional smokestack industries.
Abstract: With the explosion of domestic and international trade in the high-technology field, the issue of legal protection for the intellectual property components of high-technology products and processes has become increasingly important. While the standard protective mechanism for intellectual property has traditionally been the patent, this mechanism is often unsuitable as a means of providing effective protection for high-technology items.1 First, many courts have difficulty fitting high-technology innovations into the framework of the patent system, which was designed to foster the more traditional smokestack industries.2 Second, the long and complex patent application process is often not responsive to the rapid evolution of new inventions in the high-technology area.3 This lack of patent protection does not result from a failure to recognize the value of such products and processes. As far back as 1965, commentators noted the crucial role of unpatented information and know-how in the development and transfer of technology, whether between business enterprises or sovereign States.4 As one United Nations commentator noted, \"The nonpatented know-how, though in a license agreement it may appear as an implementing appendage of the patent, is often the more important and the more valuable component of the industrial property package covered.\" 5 High-technology firms have increasingly turned to alternative mechanisms to protect their valuable information. One such alternative has been the use of contractual restraints through trade secrecy. A 1978 survey
2 citations
TL;DR: The Commission's power to order interim measures in competition cases arising under articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome (hereinafter the Treaty)' was established in the 1980 Camera Care decision as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The power of the Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC) (hereinafter the Commission) to order interim measures in competition cases arising under articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome (hereinafter the Treaty)' was established in the 1980 Camera Care decision. In that case, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter the Court) first determined that the Commission had the implied authority under the Treaty Regulations to grant such measures. The Commission's power to order interim measures in competition cases is not specifically granted by the Treaty. Furthermore, EEC Council Regulation No. 17 of 1962, the main implementing regulation for the Commission's enforcement of competition rules, is also silent on the question of provisional measures. This silence is particularly striking in light of the earlier European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (hereinafter the ECSC Treaty), which expressly grants authority to the Commission to adopt interim measures. 3 Thus, Camera Care warrants close study as an important evolution in the enforcement of EEC competition rules.
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TL;DR: In the flush of rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China (hereinafter the PRC or China), much was said about the rosy future for United States-Chinese business cooperation.
Abstract: In the flush of rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China (hereinafter the PRC or China), much was said about the rosy future for United States-Chinese business cooperation. In fact, the fourteen intervening years since the historic Shanghai Communiqu6 have witnessed a profound transformation in United States-Chinese commercial relations. But the warming of the political climate between Washington and Beijing was not in itself sufficient to thaw commercial relations. China was essentially a terra incognita for foreign investment when it began to reopen itself to Western enterprise in the 1970s. Even with the resumption of the \"Four Modernizations\" policy in 1977 and its concomitant recognition of the need to encourage foreign investment aggressively, the PRC still lacked the basic legal infrastructure that serves as the foundation for commercial enterprises and transactions in and among most nations of the world. China's basic legal doctrines failed to define adequately the character of corporations and other business entities, their rights and responsibilities, and the extent of their protection from government expropriation. The Chinese legal system also lacked a clear articulation of the Chinese understanding of contracts and their functioning; of the access of foreign persons, legal or natural, to Chinese judicial forums; and of the system of taxation applicable to foreigners. Moreover, China appeared to recognize no personal property rights where industrial and intellectual property was concerned.'
1 citations
TL;DR: The European Economic Community (EEC) policy encourages total competition' in trade under the regime of the Treaty of Rome (hereinafter the Treaty) as discussed by the authors, which prohibits all agreements between undertakings, 3 decisions between associations of undertakings and concerted practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the Common Market.
Abstract: European Economic Community (EEC) policy encourages total competition' in trade under the regime of the Treaty of Rome (hereinafter the Treaty). 2 Article 85 of the Treaty prohibits all agreements between undertakings, 3 decisions between associations of undertakings, and concerted practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the Common Market. Article 85(2) automatically voids all restrictive agreements. Paragraph 3 of the article, however, provides an exception for agreements that, despite violating paragraph 1, in some other
1 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors evaluate the possibility of a group of the most impoverished countries defaulting or falling seriously into arrears in meeting their debt service or interest payments during the 1980s.
Abstract: Today, most of the nations of the world are deeply burdened with debt, not only to their own citizens but also to foreign banks and governments. At the end of 1983, the external debt of the poorest countries, the less developed countries (LDCs) that must import oil (hereinafter the non-oil LDCs), alone amounted to 900 billion dollars. Seven hundred and seventeen billion dollars of this amount constituted long-term debt, 472 billion dollars came from banks and private sources, and 245 billion dollars came from official lending agencies outside the market.1 The total equalled one-third of the aggregate gross national product (GNP) of the non-oil LDCs. 2 The LDCs' annual interest payments and debt service on this amount approached 150 billion dollars, between twenty and twenty-five percent of the hard currency earned by their export trade. 3 It has long been recognized that the largest portion of foreign debt principal will not be repaid in this century, but it is only in recent years that the issue of debt servicing and interest payments has provoked sharp concern. Today, the argument rages over a specific issue: will a group of the most impoverished debtors default or fall seriously into arrears in meeting their debt service or interest payments during the 1980s? The optimists claim that the \"Debt Crisis\" has passed; the pessimists warn that the worst is yet to come.4 The aim of this Article is to evaluate these two contradictory projections. No matter which side they argue, critics agree that the world banking system is not sufficiently stable to handle the crisis that might occur if a group of debtors should fail to honor their foreign obligations and interest payments. Many of the largest multinational banks in the United States and
1 citations