BMJ Quality & Safety 

About: BMJ Quality & Safety is an academic journal published by BMJ. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Patient safety & Health care. It has an ISSN identifier of 2044-5415. Over the lifetime, 2584 publications have been published receiving 103668 citations. The journal is also known as: Quality & safety & British medical journal quality and safety.

Enabling the implementation of evidence based practice: a conceptual framework.

Abstract: The argument put forward in this paper is that successful implementation of research into practice is a function of the interplay of three core elements--the level and nature of the evidence, the context or environment into which the research is to be placed, and the method or way in which the process is facilitated. It also proposes that because current research is inconclusive as to which of these elements is most important in successful implementation they all should have equal standing. This is contrary to the often implicit assumptions currently being generated within the clinical effectiveness agenda where the level and rigour of the evidence seems to be the most important factor for consideration. The paper offers a conceptual framework that considers this imbalance, showing how it might work in clarifying some of the theoretical positions and as a checklist for staff to assess what they need to do to successfully implement research into practice.

SQUIRE 2.0 (Standards for QUality Improvement Reporting Excellence): revised publication guidelines from a detailed consensus process

Abstract: Since the publication of Standards for QUality Improvement Reporting Excellence (SQUIRE 1.0) guidelines in 2008, the science of the field has advanced considerably. In this manuscript, we describe the development of SQUIRE 2.0 and its key components. We undertook the revision between 2012 and 2015 using (1) semistructured interviews and focus groups to evaluate SQUIRE 1.0 plus feedback from an international steering group, (2) two face-to-face consensus meetings to develop interim drafts and (3) pilot testing with authors and a public comment period. SQUIRE 2.0 emphasises the reporting of three key components of systematic efforts to improve the quality, value and safety of healthcare: the use of formal and informal theory in planning, implementing and evaluating improvement work; the context in which the work is done and the study of the intervention(s). SQUIRE 2.0 is intended for reporting the range of methods used to improve healthcare, recognising that they can be complex and multidimensional. It provides common ground to share these discoveries in the scholarly literature (http://www.squire-statement.org).

Systematic review of the application of the plan–do–study–act method to improve quality in healthcare

Abstract: Background Plan–do–study–act (PDSA) cycles provide a structure for iterative testing of changes to improve quality of systems. The method is widely accepted in healthcare improvement; however there is little overarching evaluation of how the method is applied. This paper proposes a theoretical framework for assessing the quality of application of PDSA cycles and explores the consistency with which the method has been applied in peer-reviewed literature against this framework. Methods NHS Evidence and Cochrane databases were searched by three independent reviewers. Empirical studies were included that reported application of the PDSA method in healthcare. Application of PDSA cycles was assessed against key features of the method, including documentation characteristics, use of iterative cycles, prediction-based testing of change, initial small-scale testing and use of data

Understanding adverse events: human factors.

Abstract: (1) Human rather than technical failures now represent the greatest threat to complex and potentially hazardous systems. This includes healthcare systems. (2) Managing the human risks will never be 100% effective. Human fallibility can be moderated, but it cannot be eliminated. (3) Different error types have different underlying mechanisms, occur in different parts of the organisation, and require different methods of risk management. The basic distinctions are between: Slips, lapses, trips, and fumbles (execution failures) and mistakes (planning or problem solving failures). Mistakes are divided into rule based mistakes and knowledge based mistakes. Errors (information-handling problems) and violations (motivational problems) Active versus latent failures. Active failures are committed by those in direct contact with the patient, latent failures arise in organisational and managerial spheres and their adverse effects may take a long time to become evident. (4) Safety significant errors occur at all levels of the system, not just at the sharp end. Decisions made in the upper echelons of the organisation create the conditions in the workplace that subsequently promote individual errors and violations. Latent failures are present long before an accident and are hence prime candidates for principled risk management. (5) Measures that involve sanctions and exhortations (that is, moralistic measures directed to those at the sharp end) have only very limited effectiveness, especially so in the case of highly trained professionals. (6) Human factors problems are a product of a chain of causes in which the individual psychological factors (that is, momentary inattention, forgetting, etc) are the last and least manageable links. Attentional "capture" (preoccupation or distraction) is a necessary condition for the commission of slips and lapses. Yet, its occurrence is almost impossible to predict or control effectively. The same is true of the factors associated with forgetting. States of mind contributing to error are thus extremely difficult to manage; they can happen to the best of people at any time. (7) People do not act in isolation. Their behaviour is shaped by circumstances. The same is true for errors and violations. The likelihood of an unsafe act being committed is heavily influenced by the nature of the task and by the local workplace conditions. These, in turn, are the product of "upstream" organisational factors. Great gains in safety can ve achieved through relatively small modifications of equipment and workplaces. (8) Automation and increasing advanced equipment do not cure human factors problems, they merely relocate them. In contrast, training people to work effectively in teams costs little, but has achieved significant enhancements of human performance in aviation. (9) Effective risk management depends critically on a confidential and preferable anonymous incident monitoring system that records the individual, task, situational, and organisational factors associated with incidents and near misses. (10) Effective risk management means the simultaneous and targeted deployment of limited remedial resources at different levels of the system: the individual or team, the task, the situation, and the organisation as a whole.

Educating the Reflective Practitioner. Towards a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions

Abstract: Relatively early in my own professional clinical practice I was deemed senior enough to take on the supervision of trainees. My initial pride and sense of achievement at being allowed to join the grown ups was rapidly dispelled by an anxiety that the trainees would find me out. Junior as I was, I knew that my own practice no longer conformed to the literature I had read in my own training years, and I also knew that my trainees