Showing papers in "Buffalo Law Review in 2015"
Journal Article•
TL;DR: Bagwat et al. as discussed by the authors acknowledge the ideas advanced by their colleague Professor Robert Schwartz in his presentations on this topic, which influenced the development of Part V of this manuscript and gratefully acknowledge the extremely helpful feedback on prior versions of the manuscript provided by their colleagues Ashutosh Bhagwat, James Dwyer, David Faigman and Robert Schwartz, Professor of Pediatrics Harvey Cohen, and by Charlotte Moser, Assistant Director of the Vaccine Education Center at the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia.
Abstract: †† Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law. The authors gratefully acknowledge the ideas advanced by their colleague Professor Robert Schwartz in his presentations on this topic, which influenced the development of Part V of this manuscript. See, e.g., Robert Schwartz, The Role of Law in Appropriately Encouraging Scientifically Valuable Childhood Vaccination, Controversies in Childhood Immunization Policy, UC Hastings College of the Law, March 2013; Robert Schwartz, Legal Tools for Promoting Vaccination, AALS Health Law Teachers Conference, San Francisco, CA, May 2014. In addition, the authors appreciate the extremely helpful feedback on prior versions of this manuscript provided by their colleagues Ashutosh Bhagwat, James Dwyer, David Faigman, and Robert Schwartz, Professor of Pediatrics Harvey Cohen, and by Charlotte Moser, Assistant Director of the Vaccine Education Center at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia.
11 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: A Renewed Interest in Class Immobility and Higher Education 992 Kahlenberg and Sander: Why We Do Not Have to Choose Between Race and Class 1000 III. Three Vantage Points on Socioeconomic Disadvantage as Diversity.
Abstract: A Renewed Interest in Class Immobility and Higher Education 992 Kahlenberg and Sander: Why We Do Not Have to Choose Between Race and Class 1000 III. Three Vantage Points on Socioeconomic Disadvantage as Diversity 1014 A. Diversity in Case Law: An Early Nod to Class ... 1014 1. Bakke’s Capacious Definition of “Diversity” ... 1014 2. Hopwood, Grutter, and Gratz: Limiting Diversity to Race and Ethnicity 1020 3. Souter’s Dissent in Gratz: Suggesting a Quid Pro Quo Between Race and Class. 1022 4. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: Turning the Value of Socioeconomic Diversity on its Head. 1024 5. Conclusion 1026
4 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In a recent, widely publicized study, a prestigious team of political scientists concluded that there is strong evidence of ideological in-group bias among the Supreme Court's members in First Amendment free-expression cases, with the current four most conservative justices being the Roberts Court's worst offenders as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In a recent, widely publicized study, a prestigious team of political scientists concluded that there is strong evidence of ideological in-group bias among the Supreme Court’s members in First Amendment free-expression cases, with the current four most conservative justices being the Roberts Court’s worst offenders. Beneath the surface of the authors’ conclusions, however, one finds a surprisingly sizable combination of coding errors, superficial case readings, and questionable judgments about litigants’ ideological affiliations. Many of those problems likely flow either from shortcomings that reportedly afflict the Supreme Court Database (the data set that nearly always provides the starting point for empirical studies of the Court) or from a failure to take seriously the importance of attending to cases’ details. Whatever the difficulties’ sources, the study’s uniform indictment of the Court’s current conservatives is manifestly flawed. More broadly, the study and its largely uncritical public reception -- as well as the authors' initial response to this critique of their work -- offer important cautionary lessons not only for those who study in-group bias, but also for all who conduct or rely upon empirical analyses of the justices’ ideological voting patterns.
3 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the current structure of author termination rights in the United States is at odds with its political justification, as well as the utilitarian purpose of copyright law.
Abstract: U.S. law grants authors a contract termination right thirty-five years after the license or transfer of their copyrights. This Article contributes to the ongoing debate over this law by providing economic perspective. Because of price changes, risk allocation, hold-up problems, and other effects on author and publisher incentives, it predicts that the economic costs of introducing termination rights will outweigh the benefits. This work concludes that the current structure of author termination rights in the United States is at odds with its political justification, as well as the utilitarian purpose of copyright law.
3 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: The 50th anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964's enactment brought forth a torrent of praise for the law and fulsome commemoration of its role in opening opportunities to minorities and women and broadly improving employment practices and working conditions as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Few statutes are as esteemed as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Celebrated by legal academics, lawyers, activists, and liberals of every bent as a triumph for workers' rights, the statute's vision of a workplace purged of discrimination is contested only by reactionaries and ignorant, if occasionally well-meaning, libertarians. Last year's 50th anniversary of Title VI's enactment occasioned even greater affirmation, bringing forth a torrent of praise for the law and fulsome commemoration of its role in opening opportunities to minorities and women and broadly improving employment practices and working conditions.' Indeed, among liberals and progressives, the only consistent
2 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a short history of the right to abortion in the United States and discuss the main obstacles that prevent women from exercising their right to choose to terminate pregnancy.
Abstract: INTRODUCTION 1142 I. ABORTION PROHIBITION = STATE-IMPOSED DETRIMENT . 1148 A. Physical Detriments: Pain, Morbidity, Mortality 1149 B. Non-Physical Detriments 1154 C. Offsets: A Few Benefits of Remaining Pregnant 1155 II. PRIOR VOLUNTARY CONDUCT NEEDED BEFORE THE STATE MAY IMPOSE DETRIMENT: THREE COMMON LAW POSSIBILITIES DISPATCHED 1159 A. Consent 1160 B. Undertaking 1165 C. Crime and Punishment 1168 III. COMMON LAW RIGHTS AND DOCTRINES PERTINENT TO ABORTION 1171 A. One May Repel an Invader with Deadly Force1171 B. One May Withhold Benevolence and Favors . 1183 IV. HOW COMMON LAW FUNDAMENTALS OF THE RIGHT TO ABORTION FELL FROM VIEW: A SHORT POLITICAL HISTORY 1191 A. Old Law, New Choice: Abortion Technology Moves Forward 1192 B. Patriarchy 1197 C. Individualism 1201 D. The Parallel to Slavery 1204 CONCLUSION 1208
2 citations
Journal Article•
2 citations
Journal Article•
2 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the impact of victim compensation funds on a victim's likelihood to sue using the tort system following a high-profile tragedy such as the Virginia Tech massacre.
Abstract: How do victim compensation funds (VCFs) impact a victim’s likelihood to sue using the tort system? This issue is of more than theoretical interest, as VCFs have become a seemingly ubiquitous feature of the policy landscape following high-profile tragedies. For example, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress created a special compensation fund for victims who waived their right to sue.1 After being swarmed with thousands of donations in the wake of the Virginia Tech massacre, Virginia Tech established the Hokie Spirit Memorial Fund to provide