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JournalISSN: 0008-1973

Cambridge Law Journal 

Cambridge University Press
About: Cambridge Law Journal is an academic journal published by Cambridge University Press. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Common law & Human rights. It has an ISSN identifier of 0008-1973. Over the lifetime, 2183 publications have been published receiving 13007 citations. The journal is also known as: The Cambridge law journal.
Topics: Common law, Human rights, Tort, Public law, Appeal


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Sixth Sir David Williams Lecture as discussed by the authors was the first lecture devoted to the rule of law in the UK, which was held at the University of Sheffield in the early 1990s.
Abstract: IT is an immense honour and privilege to give the Sixth Sir David Williams Lecture. It is also a formidable challenge, since Sir David's scholarly reputation is so high as to discourage comparison. But the great range of his achievement as legal scholar, university leader, head of house, public servant and loyal son of Wales gives the lecturer a broad range of subject matter from which to choose, without straying into fields Sir David has not adorned. In choosing to address the Rule of Law a big subject for a lecture my best hope must be that Sir David will himself be provoked into giving us, at greater length, his considered reflections on the subject. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 provides, in section 1, that the Act does not adversely affect "the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law" or "the Lord Chancellor's existing constitutional role in relation to that principle". This provision, the Attorney-General has suggested,' illustrates the importance attached to the rule of law in the modern age,2 which is further reflected in the oath to be taken by Lord Chancellors under section 17(1) of the Act, to respect the rule of law and defend the independence of the judiciary. But the Act does not define the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law, or the Lord Chancellor's existing constitutional role in relation to it. The meaning of this existing constitutional principle may no doubt have been thought to be too clear and well-understood to call for statutory definition, and it is true that the rule of law has been routinely invoked by judges in their judgments.3 But they have not

581 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the United States, the view of law as an instrument for carrying out the moral purposes of its own tradition and those of the society it rules, is a familiar touchstone of orthodox "Liberalism" as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: There may be a point in reviewing the controversy occasioned by Lord Justice Devlin's Maccabaean lecture from an American point of vantage. For the Justice's brilliant and original paper has been heatedly attacked as “illiberal.” In the popular sport of classifying all positions on all subjects as either Liberal or Conservative— and the sport is quite as popular in the United States as it is in other countries—there is an intriguing difference between the rules of the game as it is conventionally played on the opposite sides of the Atlantic. In Great Britain, the suggestion that law has a moral content seems to raise theocratic ghosts in many quarters, perhaps in most; and clearly, theocracy is “Conservative.” In the United States, however, it is just the other way around. Every American schoolboy—or at least every American law student—considers Austinian Positivism, and the strict separation of law and morals, to be certain hallmarks of a position labelled “Conservative,” “Rigidly Technical,” “Reactionary,” or worse. And the view of law as an instrument for carrying out the moral purposes of its own tradition, and those of the society it rules, is a familiar touchstone of orthodox “Liberalism.”

527 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Hart and Honore's book as mentioned in this paper is a thorough and scholarly study of the concept of causation in Anglo-American law, with full reference to the literature and a considerable treatment of Continental theories, it represents a serious attempt to restate the law in tort, contract and crime in an intelligible way.
Abstract: Hart and Honore's book is a thorough and scholarly study of the concept of causation in Anglo-American law. Closely reasoned, with full reference to the literature and a considerable treatment of Continental theories, it represents a serious attempt to restate the law in tort, contract and crime in an intelligible way. In future, any serious student of the subject will have to take note of it. Unfortunately for the authors they have backed a loser in supporting Re Polemis and criticising the foreseeability test; and since much of their argument depends upon their opinion on this question, their book must now be accounted largely out of date, if the decision of the Judicial Committee in The Wagon Mound receives the acceptance that seems probable. In respect of the general theory of causation, however, the discussion retains its intellectual interest; and the chapters on contract and crime, though relatively short, are largely unaffected by The Wagon Mound.

330 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Proudhon got it all wrong. Property is not theft, it is fraud, and it is a mere illusion as mentioned in this paper. But the ultimate fact about property is that it does not really exist: it is mere illusion.
Abstract: Proudhon got it all wrong. Property is not theft—it is fraud. Few other legal notions operate such gross or systematic deception. Before long I will have sold you a piece of thin air and you will have called it property. But the ultimate fact about property is that it does not really exist: it is mere illusion. It is a vacant concept—oddly enough rather like thin air.

188 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as mentioned in this paper contains a series of limitations to human rights, which are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
Abstract: ARTICLES 29 and 30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contain a series of limitations to human rights. Article 29(2) states:In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

179 citations

Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Journal in previous years
YearPapers
202329
2022110
202120
202022
201922
201835