Showing papers in "Canadian Journal of Philosophy in 2016"
TL;DR: The authors argue that Hobbes offers neither an account of the reference of evaluative terms nor a theory of the truth-conditions for evaluation statements, rather, he sees evaluativity language simply as having the non-representational function of prescribing actions and practical attitudes.
Abstract: Hobbes’s interpreters have struggled to find a plausible semantics for evaluative language in his writings. I argue that this search is misguided. Hobbes offers neither an account of the reference of evaluative terms nor a theory of the truth-conditions for evaluative statements. Rather, he sees evaluative language simply as having the non-representational function of prescribing actions and practical attitudes, its superficially representational appearance notwithstanding. I marshal the evidence for this prescriptivist reading of Hobbes on evaluative language and show how it sidesteps various textual and philosophical problems that bedevil the traditional interpretations.
36 citations
TL;DR: In this article, an alternative implementation of modal epistemology is presented, which takes our knowledge of metaphysical modality to arise, not from knowledge of counterfactuals, but from our knowledge from ordinary possibility statements of the form "x can F".
Abstract: Williamsonian modal epistemology (WME) is characterized by two commitments: realism about modality, and anti-exceptionalism about our modal knowledge. Williamson’s own counterfactual-based modal epistemology is the best known implementation of WME, but not the only option that is available. I sketch and defend an alternative implementation which takes our knowledge of metaphysical modality to arise, not from knowledge of counterfactuals, but from our knowledge of ordinary possibility statements of the form ‘x can F’. I defend this view against a criticism indicated in Williamson’s own work, and argue that it is better connected to the semantics of modal language.
24 citations
TL;DR: The authors provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of objections which all take as a premise a popular and attractive view in value theory, Neo-Sentimentalism, according to which values are analysed in terms of fitting emotions.
Abstract: Epistemic Perceptualists claim that emotions are sources of immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions that can (and do) sometimes ground undefeated immediately justified evaluative beliefs. For example, fear can constitute the justificatory ground for a belief that some object or event is dangerous. Despite its attractiveness, the view is apparently vulnerable to several objections. In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of objections which all take as a premise a popular and attractive view in value theory – Neo-Sentimentalism – according to which values are analysed in terms of fitting emotions.
24 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to say about (what they call) the subjects of infinitival clauses.
Abstract: Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to say about (what they call) ‘the subjects of infinitival clauses’.
22 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a leading naturalistic criterion suggests that psychopaths have an impaired capacity for moral judgment; the capacity is neither fully present nor fully absent; therefore, internalism is empirically problematic because it is unable to explain psychopaths' moral deficits.
Abstract: Do psychopaths make moral judgments but lack motivation? Or are psychopaths’ judgments are not genuinely moral? Both sides of this debate seem to assume either externalist or internalist criteria for the presence of moral judgment. However, if moral judgment is a natural kind, we can arrive at a theory-neutral criterion for moral judgment. A leading naturalistic criterion suggests that psychopaths have an impaired capacity for moral judgment; the capacity is neither fully present nor fully absent. Psychopaths are therefore not counterexamples to internalism. Nonetheless, internalism is empirically problematic because it is unable to explain psychopaths’ moral deficits.
21 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the modal logic of plurals is used to answer the question "Is the one thing necessarily one of the several?" and defenses of an affirmative answer are developed and compared.
Abstract: Consider one of several things. Is the one thing necessarily one of the several? This key question in the modal logic of plurals is clarified. Some defenses of an affirmative answer are developed and compared. Various remarks are made about the broader philosophical significance of the question.
19 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a theory-based epistemology of modality (TEM) is proposed, which is based on the idea that if we are justified in believing the extraordinary modal claims to which philosophers often appeal, such as the claim that I could be disembodied, or that there could be a maximally perfect being, it is because we can reason about the theories according to which those claims are true.
Abstract: This book articulates and defends a theory-based epistemology of modality (TEM). At TEM’s core is the idea that if we’re justified in believing the extraordinary modal claims to which philosophers often appeal—such as the claim that I could be disembodied, or that there could be a maximally perfect being—it’s because we’re justified in believing theories according to which those claims are true. This chapter articulates some of the assumptions that shape TEM, sketches the view, and then develops the basic argument for it, which is based on an analogy between a plausible modal epistemology for games and modal epistemology generally.
19 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a distinctively free logical approach to the intensional paradoxes is presented, which allows one to distinguish two different, though allied themes in higher-order necessitism.
Abstract: The principle of universal instantiation plays a pivotal role both in the derivation of intensional paradoxes such as Prior’s paradox and Kaplan’s paradox and the debate between necessitism and contingentism. We outline a distinctively free logical approach to the intensional paradoxes and note how the free logical outlook allows one to distinguish two different, though allied themes in higher-order necessitism. We examine the costs of this solution and compare it with the more familiar ramificationist approaches to higher-order logic. Our assessment of both approaches is largely pessimistic, and we remain reluctantly inclined to take Prior’s and Kaplan’s derivations at face value.
17 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches.
Abstract: In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to address this issue of moral uncertainty with respect to agents that have credence in moral theories that are not fully consequentialist.
15 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model, and argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.
Abstract: Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.
13 citations
TL;DR: The authors defend abolitionism against the claim, made by P.F. Strawson and others, that abandoning these attitudes precludes the formation and maintenance of valuable personal relationships, and argue that this objection exaggerates the role of reactive attitudes and underestimates the importance of non-reactive moral emotions.
Abstract: Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. This paper defends abolitionism against the claim, made by P.F. Strawson and others, that abandoning these attitudes precludes the formation and maintenance of valuable personal relationships. These anti-abolitionists claim (a) that one who abandons the reactive attitudes is unable to take personally others’ attitudes and actions regarding her, and (b) that taking personally is necessary for certain valuable relationships. I dispute both claims and argue that this objection exaggerates the role of the reactive attitudes and underestimates the importance of non-reactive moral emotions.
TL;DR: The authors defend a relational version of statism, arguing that human rights are ultimately grounded in a relational norm of reciprocal independence and set limits to the exercise of public authority, but, contra the cosmopolitan, the state is of fundamental moral significance.
Abstract: What is the relationship between human rights and the rights of states? Roughly, while cosmopolitans insist that international morality must regard as basic the interests of individuals, statists maintain that the state is of fundamental moral significance. This article defends a relational version of statism. Human rights are ultimately grounded in a relational norm of reciprocal independence and set limits to the exercise of public authority, but, contra the cosmopolitan, the state is of fundamental moral significance. A relational account promises to justify a limited conception of state sovereignty while avoiding the familiar cosmopolitan criticisms of statist accounts.
TL;DR: According to Timothy Williamson, the authors should accept the simplest and most powerful second-order modal logic, and as a result accept an ontology of "bare possibilia", which depends on a questionable assumption that modality is a fundamental feature of the world.
Abstract: According to Timothy Williamson, we should accept the simplest and most powerful second-order modal logic, and as a result accept an ontology of "bare possibilia". This general method for extracting ontology from logic is salutary, but its application in this case depends on a questionable assumption: that modality is a fundamental feature of the world.
TL;DR: The notion of prescriptive credibility deficits was introduced by as mentioned in this paper, in which a backlash effect leads to the assignment of a diminished level of credibility to persons who act in counter-stereotypic manners.
Abstract: In light of recent social psychological literature, I expand Miranda Fricker’s important notion of testimonial injustice. A fair portion of Fricker’s account rests on an older paradigm of stereotype and prejudice. Given recent empirical work, I argue for what I dub prescriptive credibility deficits in which a backlash effect leads to the assignment of a diminished level of credibility to persons who act in counter-stereotypic manners, thereby flouting prescriptive stereotypes. The notion of a prescriptive credibility deficit is not merely an interesting conceptual addendum that can be appended to Fricker’s theory without need for further emendation. I develop the wider implications of prescriptive credibility deficits and argue that they pose a challenge to Fricker’s conception of (1) the function of credibility assignments in conversational exchange and (2) how a virtuous listener should respond to the potential threat of a prejudicial stereotype affecting her credibility assignments.
TL;DR: The Dual Comparative View as mentioned in this paper holds that an upbringing is good enough when shortfalls from the best alternative upbringing in terms of the child's interests are no more significant than the parents' interest.
Abstract: Almost everyone accepts that parents must provide a good enough upbringing in order to retain custodial rights over children, but little has been said about how that level should be set. In this paper, I examine ways of specifying a good enough upbringing. I argue that the two dominant ways of setting this level, the Best Interests and Abuse and Neglect Views, are mistaken. I defend the Dual Comparative View, which holds that an upbringing is good enough when shortfalls from the best alternative upbringing in terms of the child's interests are no more significant than the parents' interest.
TL;DR: It is shown that there is at least one viable A-theory that does not require a logic with tense operators, and it is argued that three common indispensability arguments for tense operators are unsound.
Abstract: A-theorists think there is a fundamental difference between the present and other times. This concern shows up in what kinds of properties they take to be instantiated, what objects they think exist and how they formalize their views. Nearly every contemporary A-theorist assumes that her metaphysics requires a tense logic – a logic with operators like (‘it was the case that ...’) and (‘it will be the case that ...’). In this paper, I show that there is at least one viable A-theory that does not require a logic with tense operators. And I will argue that three common indispensability arguments for tense operators are unsound.
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TL;DR: The authors use Kripke models as representational devices that allow us to give a realistic interpretation of a modal language, with the help of an analogy with a relativist theory of spatial properties and relations.
Abstract: Kripke models, interpreted realistically, have difficulty making sense of the thesis that there might have existed things that do not in fact exist, since a Kripke model in which this thesis is true requires a model structure in which there are possible worlds with domains that contain things that do not exist. This paper argues that we can use Kripke models as representational devices that allow us to give a realistic interpretation of a modal language. The method of doing this is sketched, with the help of an analogy with a Galilean relativist theory of spatial properties and relations.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue for parity between groups' pro-tanto obligations and individuals' all-things-considered obligations to the same degree as individuals' pro tanto obligations.
Abstract: Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both counts.
TL;DR: Bostrom and Ord's reversal test has been used by many philosophers to substantiate the charge that preferences for status quo options are motivated by status quo bias as discussed by the authors, but their characterization of the reversal test needs to be modified, and their description of the burden of proof it imposes needs to clarify.
Abstract: Bostrom and Ord’s reversal test has been appealed to by many philosophers to substantiate the charge that preferences for status quo options are motivated by status quo bias. I argue that their characterization of the reversal test needs to be modified, and that their description of the burden of proof it imposes needs to be clarified. I then argue that there is a way to meet that burden of proof which Bostrom and Ord fail to recognize. I also argue that the range of circumstances in which the reversal test can be usefully applied is narrower than they recognize.
TL;DR: In this paper, the epistemicist theory of vagueness defended in Timothy Williamson's Vagueness (1994) is investigated in the context of a model-theoretic model theory.
Abstract: What kind of semantics should someone who accepts the epistemicist theory of vagueness defended in Timothy Williamson's Vagueness (1994) give a definiteness operator? To impose some interesting constraints on acceptable answers to this question, I will assume that the object language also contains a metaphysical necessity operator and a metaphysical actuality operator. I will suggest that the answer is to be found by working within a three-dimensional model theory. I will provide sketches of two ways of extracting an epistemicist semantics from that model theory, one of which I will find to be more plausible than the other.
TL;DR: In this article, the main arguments of Modal Logic as Metaphysics are discussed and a different way of thinking about the issues raised by those arguments is presented, and the role of higher-order logic in metaphysics is discussed.
Abstract: I critically discuss some of the main arguments of Modal Logic as Metaphysics, present a different way of thinking about the issues raised by those arguments, and briefly discuss some broader issues about the role of higher-order logic in metaphysics.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption is false and that either this assumption needs to be rejected or deprivationism does not accommodate the common sense assumption that we should lament our death.
Abstract: Deprivationism cannot accommodate the common sense assumption that we should lament our death iff, and to the extent that, it is bad for us. Call this the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption. As such, either this assumption needs to be rejected or deprivationism does. I first argue that the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption is false. I then attempt to figure out which facts our attitudes concerning death should track. I suggest that each person should have two distinct attitudes toward death: one determined by agent’s reasonable expectations about when she will die and one determined by the amount of metaphysically possible good one reasonably believes death precludes.
TL;DR: The authors attempt to meet some criticisms that Williamson makes of my attempt to carry out Prior's project of reducing possibility discourse to actualist discourse, and they attempt to answer some of the criticisms made by Williamson.
Abstract: I attempt to meet some criticisms that Williamson makes of my attempt to carry out Prior's project of reducing possibility discourse to actualist discourse.
TL;DR: The Plenitudinous Russellianism as mentioned in this paper is a variant of the traditional Russellian view of propositions, and it claims that Ahab is a whaler and Holmes is a wariner.
Abstract: ‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express different propositions, even though neither ‘Ahab’ nor ‘Holmes’ has a referent. This seems to constitute a theoretical puzzle for the Russellian view of propositions. In this paper, I develop a variant of the Russellian view, Plenitudinous Russellianism. I claim that ‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express distinct gappy propositions. I discuss key metaphysical and semantic differences between Plenitudinous Russellianism and Traditional Russellianism and respond to objections that stem from those differences.
TL;DR: The authors defend an alternative, methodologically-oriented position wherein the denial of genuine moral dilemmas functions as a regulative ideal for moral deliberation and practice, which is superior to both realism and irrealism in accounting for moral residue and other crucial phenomenological dimensions of our experience of moral dilemma.
Abstract: The traditional debate about moral dilemmas concerns whether there are circumstances in which an agent is subject to two obligations that cannot both be fulfilled. Realists maintain there are. Irrealists deny this. Here I defend an alternative, methodologically-oriented position wherein the denial of genuine moral dilemmas functions as a regulative ideal for moral deliberation and practice. That is, moral inquiry and deliberation operate on the implicit assumption that there are no genuine moral dilemmas. This view is superior to both realism and irrealism in accounting for moral residue and other crucial phenomenological dimensions of our experience of moral dilemmas.
TL;DR: In this article, a critical notice provides an overview of the main arguments in Frankfurt's On Inequality and assesses whether Frankfurt is right to argue that equality is merely formal and empty and counterargue that egalitarianism, properly tweaked and circumscribed, can be defended against Frankfurt's repudiation.
Abstract: This critical notice provides an overview of Harry Frankfurt’s On Inequality and assesses whether Frankfurt is right to argue that equality is merely formal and empty. I counter-argue that egalitarianism, properly tweaked and circumscribed, can be defended against Frankfurt’s repudiation. After surveying the main arguments in Frankfurt’s book, I argue that whatever plausibility the ‘doctrine of sufficiency’ defended by Frankfurt may have, it does not strike a fatal blow against egalitarianism. There is nothing in egalitarianism that forbids acceptance of the moral platitude expressed in sufficientarianism's positive thesis, (viz., it is morally important that everyone have enough). Nor is there anything in egalitarianism as such that makes it impossible to recognize the banal truth that there are many important things besides equality, and that many dimensions of human affairs are improperly appraised from a relational or comparative point of view. The fact that a relational or comparative point o...
TL;DR: So-called two-cardinal theorems from model theory are used to investigate the space of logics and consequence relations determined by pairs of infinite sets, and it is shown how to eliminate the assumption that worlds are individuals from Timothy Williamson's argument.
Abstract: I consider the first-order modal logic which counts as valid those sentences which are true on every interpretation of the non-logical constants. Based on the assumptions that it is necessary what individuals there are and that it is necessary which propositions are necessary, Timothy Williamson has tentatively suggested an argument for the claim that this logic is determined by a possible world structure consisting of an infinite set of individuals and an infinite set of worlds. He notes that only the cardinalities of these sets matters, and that not all pairs of infinite sets determine the same logic. I use so-called two-cardinal theorems from model theory to investigate the space of logics and consequence relations determined by pairs of infinite sets, and show how to eliminate the assumption that worlds are individuals from Williamson’s argument.
TL;DR: The authors show how universalism and nihilism can be defended against the objection that a great deal of what we ordinarily believe is false and that universalism is harder to defend than nihilism.
Abstract: Some philosophers (‘nihilists’) deny the existence of composite material objects. Other philosophers (‘universalists’) hold that whenever there are some things, they compose something. The purpose of this paper is to scrutinize an objection to these revisionary views: the objection that nihilism and universalism are both unacceptably uncharitable because each of them implies that a great deal of what we ordinarily believe is false. Our main business is to show how nihilism and universalism can be defended against the objection. A secondary point is that universalism is harder to defend than nihilism.
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that supersubstantivalism (in either its monist or pluralistic forms) carries significant advantages and encounters major difficulties, and that some of the latter motivate relationism and substantivalism.
Abstract: In both the historical and contemporary literature on the metaphysics of space (and, more recently, spacetime), a core dispute is that between relationism and substantivalism. One version of the latter is supersubstantivalism, according to which space (or, again, spacetime) is the only kind of substance, such that what we think of as individual material objects (electrons, quarks, etc.) are actually just parts of spacetime which instantiate certain properties. If those parts are ontologically dependent on spacetime as a whole, then we arrive at an ontology with only a single genuinely independent substance, namely the entire spacetime manifold. This is monist supersubstantivalism. A view on which the parts of spacetime are ontologically prior to the whole has been called pluralistic supersubstantivalism. As currently formulated, supersubstantivalism (in either its monist or pluralistic forms) carries significant advantages and encounters major difficulties. I argue that some of the latter motivate...
TL;DR: In the Second Paralogism and his lectures on metaphysics, Kant provides arguments that overcome these objections by showing that a composite could ground the unity of thought, that properties are powers and therefore the soul could possess multiple powers, and the soul is a thing in itself as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Kant’s claim in the Subjective Deduction that we have multiple fundamental mental powers appears to be susceptible to some a priori metaphysical arguments made against multiple fundamental mental powers by Christian Wolff who held that these powers would violate the unity of thought and entail that the soul is an extended composite. I argue, however, that in the Second Paralogism and his lectures on metaphysics, Kant provides arguments that overcome these objections by showing that it is possible that a composite could ground the unity of thought, that properties are powers and therefore the soul could possess multiple powers, and the soul is a thing in itself so it cannot be an extended composite. These arguments lend additional support to the attribution of multiple mental powers to us in the Subjective Deduction.