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Showing papers in "China Report in 1971"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The special number of China report on India-China relations as discussed by the authors is an admirable attempt to focus attention and crystallize different Indian view points on our unresolved problems with China, and each contribution to this issue reflects a certain individual approach, though some of these approaches are well-known to students of Chinese affairs.
Abstract: THE SPECIAL NUMBER of China Report on India-China relations is an admirable attempt to focus attention and crystallize different Indian view points on our unresolved problems with China. Each contribution to this issue reflects a certain individual approach, though some of these approaches are well-known to students of Chinese affairs. The most familiar approach is that which seeks to explain all that China does in ideological terms, even when ideology is tailored to suit concrete situations. It must be said to Mao’s credit that his ideo-

6 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In fact, it is ironical that Japan had to ask for US military presence on her own soil to ensure her security as discussed by the authors. But Japan had hoped that a glorious victory would also give her f’reedom of action with regard to China.
Abstract: the unwise decision of going to war with the USA. But Japan had hoped that a glorious victory would also give her f’reedom of action with regard to China. However, instead ol’driving out US influence, she only succeeded in embroiling the United States further in the Far Eastern situation. In fact, it is ironical that Japan had to ask for US military presence on her own soil to ensure her security. Further, she had to pay

5 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on China and Bangla Desh in the broader context of earlier Chinese inter-Chinese inter-Bangla Deshpande inter-Desh conflicts.
Abstract: THE BIRTH OF Bangla Desh raises issues which easily go beyond borders and battlefields. It demands a perspective which must transcend the neat emotional dichotomies of military junta versus oppressed Bengalis, socialist Russia versus imperialist America, virtuous India versus perfidious China. Logically, it raises problems of national morality and international law. But more than this, it also raises problems of knowledge of societies (their behaviour patterns and sources of motivation) as well as of the sociology of knowledge (ideological and situational determinants of ’stands’ and ’reactions’). The need right now is to disengage oneself from the constraints of immediacy. In this paper, I shall focus attention primarily on China and Bangla Desh in the broader context of earlier Chinese inter-

3 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: One of the most outstanding characteristics of the present world order is that both superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, appear to be &dquo;conservative&dqo; in the sense that neither of them seeks a drastic change in the distribution of power in the world.
Abstract: ONE OF THE most outstanding characteristics of the present world order is that both superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, appear to be &dquo;conservative&dquo; in the sense that neither of them seeks a drastic change in the distribution of power in the world.’ The Soviet intervention in Hungary and her &dquo;invasion&dquo; of Czechoslovakia and the LT.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic and her &dquo;invasion&dquo; of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs were basically defensive actions, carried out for the purpose of restoring the status quo in those areas. The second characteristic of the present world order is that the military, economic and political capabilities of the two superpowers are greater than these of any other country in the world. Only they possess the overwhelming military and economic resources necessary to qualify them as &dquo;superpowers&dquo;. Only they have greater power to coerce and reward other countries. Consequently, they have been able to restrain other countries from venturing into large-scale military activities in the world, especially in Asia. Thus in the Taiwan Straits crisis, the United States forced the Taiwanese Government to promise that it would not attack Mainland China ; in 1958 the Soviet Union refused to support Chinese bombardment of the Taiwanese offshore islands and, in subsequent years, refused to build up a nuclear force for China ; in 1962 both superpowers pressed their respective factions in Laos to reach a settlement. Through their efforts the super1 These drastic changes may or may not be carried

3 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The only explanation one can think of for this sense of relief is that they believe that China's behaviour will now be at least predictable as discussed by the authors, and therefore re-introduces some sort of consensus about the behaviour pattern of the international community.
Abstract: before and after its delegation took its place in the United Nations has been a considerable diminution of its revolutionary image. This has given rise to a strange phenomenon. Some of those very countries which have been agitating against the game of power politics among nations are among those that seem relieved by what they see as recent indications that China too is playing by the unwritten rules of this game. The only explanation one can think of for this sense of relief is that they believe that China’s behaviour will now be at least predictable. This, therefore, re-introduces some sort of consensus about the behaviour pattern of the international community. In short, it makes the game easier to understand if all the players follow the same rules. International politics and national responses can then be predicated on basics

1 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The concept of limited adversary is introduced in this paper, which adequately explains the relations of conflict and cooperation between the big powers and explains why none of the three superpowers can afford to treat either of the other two as an implacable and permanent enemy.
Abstract: necessitated a reversal 01’ American postures and priorities. One curious aspect of current international politics, which is dominated by a balance of deterrence, is that a big nation facing an external crisis is more likely to be bailed out by an adversary than by an ally. Hence the concept of &dquo;limited adversary&dquo; which adequately explains the relations of conflict and cooperation between the big powers. None of the three superpowers can afford to treat either of the other two as an implacable and permanent enemy. It should, therefore, not surprise anybody if the Chinese devised some facesaving formula for Nixon to extricate himself from the Vietnam muddle, or if USA

1 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is, however, a relatively well established fact now that the purely economic aspect of the Communist argument for collectivization of agriculture is not valid as mentioned in this paper, and that a large farm holding is not as such essential for increased land productivity.
Abstract: forces of production in two principal ways: first, the small peasant farms, which are characteristic of feudal agriculture, are not conducive to the application of science to agriculture; and secondly, the feudal relations of production, based as they are on the exploitation of the poor peasants and landless labourers, lead to the alienation of the mass of peasants from the productive system with consequent loss of productivity. The Communist solution to the agricultural problem, especially as practised in the Soviet Union, was, therefore, that of collectivization, which would simultaneously increase the size of holdings and identify the masses of peasants with the productive system. It was this Communist theory of agricultural organization, especially the historical Soviet model of it, which constituted the basis of the Chinese collectivization programme. It is, however, a relatively well established fact now that the purely economic aspect of the Communist argument for collectivization of agriculture is not valid. First, a large farm holding i.e., an agricultural collective, instead of small individual peasant farming, is not as such essential for increased land productivity. Increased productivity per acre of land depends not so much upon the size of the farm itself, but

1 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that what appears as China's dominant strategy is misleading because, having followed a revolutionary and a nuclear path, the Paking decisionmakers are now faced with a set of priorities which require decisions for which the Chinese are not yet ready.
Abstract: strategy or a larger number of strategies. This paper seeks to show that what appears as China’s dominant strategy is misleading because, having followed a revolutionary and a nuclear path, the Paking decisionmakers are now faced with a set of priorities which require decisions for which the Chinese are not yet ready. Consequently, it is suggested that Indian scholars and other analysts should take a close and hard look

1 citations


Journal ArticleDOI

1 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A systematic comparison of the relevant variables and the pattern of their interrelationships in the process of social change has been carried out in the context of area studies by collatiiig the data and deducing meaningful generalizations about the individuality of the modernizing patterns as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: There was a time when intellectual expertise required the lumping together of India and China to denote a typical Asiatic mode backward, unhistorical, unchanging, and destined to doom but for the gracious intervention of the West’s civilizing mission. Both Marx and Max Weber, starting from radically different conceptions of historical forces, shared this western prejudice. Only recently, one notices a gradual shift towards a more differentiated conceptualization of the Asian social reality. As area studies have progressed, it has become tempting to undertake comparative studies by collatiiig the data and deducing meaningful generalzations about the individuality of the modernizing patterns. But this venture, like all others, is fraught with grave risks. A systematic comparison presupposes adequate understanding of the relevant variables and the pattern of their interrelationships in the process of social change. Even at the lowest level, it requires a twofold specialization to appropriately evaluate the distinct categories of structure and function inherent in the particular social system of a given nation. Both these requirements are difficult to fulfil. But first approximations have to be made.

1 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For too long, debate in India on the sensitive question of Sino-Indian relations has been carried on more by reference to the imagined authority of sympathetic or hostile foreigners than by direct confrontation between Indian intellectuals of dinering views as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: FOR TOO LONG, it would seem, debate in India on the sensitive question of SinoIndian relations has been carried on more by reference to the imagined authority of sympathetic or hostile foreigners than by direct confrontation between Indian intellectuals of dinering views. Against this background, China Report’s special number on Sino-Indian relations (vol. VI, no. 6 November-December 1971) and, in particular, Mira Sinha’s recent article, &dquo;Wanted:

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Singapore was separated from the Federation of Malaysia in August 1965 against the wishes of its leaders as discussed by the authors and the ambiguity of the terms of Singapore's entry into Malaysia and the racial nature of power struggle were responsible for Singapore's expulsion.
Abstract: It was separated from the Federation of Malaysia in August 1965 against the wishes of its leaders. The ambiguity of the terms of Singapore’s entry into Malaysia and the racial nature of power struggle were responsible for Singapore’s expulsion. The points of friction between the government of Singapore and the federal government were constitutional, political, ethnic and personal. All these issues i.e. political, constitutional (share in tax revenue), ethnic are mixed up and it is very difhcult to separate one from the other. Ambiguity remained in the continuation of two Prime Ministers and over the control of broadcasting and television. Lee Kuan Yew’s utterances during his tour of Australia and New Zealand in March-April 1965 made the matter more confusing. Political ambiguity existed in the extent of the insulation of Malayan politics from politics in Singapore. Here again, Lee Kuan Yew’s effort at extending his political sway over Malayan by the participation of his party (PAP) in the Malaysian elections made matters worse for Singapore. His need to evolve a non-racial

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the hope of eventual convergence dissolves and the depth of basic conflicts is revealed, and the greatest pathologies become the iinoblest goals of the educational system.
Abstract: are telescoped into proximate processes, the hope of eventual convergence dissolves and the depth of basic conflicts is revealed. Our greatest pathologies become theiinoblest goals. What to us is undisciplined unrest on the campuses becomes to them a manifestation of the cultural revolution. While we are concerned to restrain student participation in politics and to maintain university autonomy, they are concerned with installing politics as the &dquo;commander and soul&dquo; of the educational systen~. What is hailed as the

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the main female protagonist, Sister AhChing, who also happens to be Secretary of the Party Branch, once surreptitiously enters the enemy camp, casts a spell of feminine friendliness on the enemy leaders, slowly utilizes the contradictions within the enemy groups, seductively wins over the majority, ruthlessly isolates the few and cruelly wipes them out one by one.
Abstract: On &dquo;revolutionary tactics of double-dealing&dquo; IN THE &dquo;MODEL&dquo; Chinese opera Sliachiapaiig the main female protagonist, Sister AhChing, who also happens to be Secretary of the Party Branch, once surreptitiously enters the enemy camp, casts a spell of feminine friendliness on the enemy leaders, slowly utilizes the contradictions within the enemy groups, seductively wins over the majority, ruthlessly isolates the few and cruelly wipes them out one by one. Chairman Mao is


Journal ArticleDOI

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a study of competing ideologies in a social system is necessary for understanding the character of revolutionary organizations and their strategies and for measuring the significant aspects of the revolutionary process, like disequilibrium, elite's loss of authority and popular consciousness, we need to take account of the alternative ideological claims.
Abstract: in the society. Secondly, a study of competing ideologies in a social system is necessary for understanding the character of revolutionary organizations and their strategies. Thirdly, for measuring the significant aspects of the revolutionary process, like disequilibrium, elite’s loss of authority and popular consciousness, we need to take account of the alternative ideological claims. Ideology has been treated as a &dquo;value system&dquo; (Mannheim), an &dquo;alternative value

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argued that American decisions on Vietnam by and large reflect the institutional and doctrinal preconceptions and rivalries among the various interest groups and agencies which represent the massive American bureaucracy, and that these decisions were rather more like reactions to events in Vietnam over which American decision-makers did not have much control.
Abstract: some insights into American decisionmaking procedures relating to strategic issues. The interaction between American institutions and doctrines provides the basis for the argument that American decisions on Vietnam by and large reflect the institutional and doctrinal preconceptions and rivalries among the various interest groups and agencies which represent the massive American bureaucracy. It is a point of this paper that even the conscious decisions of the American leaders were really products of internal political pressures, and that these decisions were rather more like reactions to events in Vietnam over which American decision-makers did not, and still do not, have much control. Foreign policy decision-making is by definition ad Izoc and based on a tenuous