Showing papers in "China Report in 1983"

The Great Leap Forward in Hunan

Abstract: on the one hand, would result in ’greater, faster, better and more economical results’ and on the other, keep alive the Chinese revolutionary ideology. As is well known, on this issue Mao was unable to carry the rest of the party with him. The central leadership of the party, by and large, did not see any urgent need for discountinuing the Soviet style economic system. During the period 1955-58 the party remained in a constant dilemma as to whether it should continue with or change its policies. Major debates occurred in party forums between leaders who adhered to an urban model of socialism, those who stressed industrial

China's Modernization and the Policy of 'Self-Reliance':

Abstract: western political analysis has anticipated a reduction in the radical politics of Maoist socialist justice in favour of what is seen to be a more rational advocacy of the ’four modernizations’. This reduction has often been interpreted to include ’the shift away from selF reliance’.1 The persistent advocacy of ’self-reliance’ since Mao’s death in 1976 may, however, challenge western historiographical assumptions as to the continuity of meaning and the practical policy implications of the term ’self-reliance’. A precise understanding of the dimensions of ’selfreliance’ as formal policy would seem to be crucial to any larger analytical treatment oi the role which foreign investment and technology might play in the context of China’s modernization. Particularly with respect to the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, ’self-reliance’ has in western historiography been described in terms of an autarchy irrationally opposed to an international division of labour based on the classical theory of the law of comparative advantage in trade. ln so far as the Chinese are concerned such an interpretation is controversial. This concept orginated from within a revolutionary matrix of thought which integrated a burning rationalist concern for China’s survival with an aspiration to socialism in a world of competitive ’imperialism’, However, according to the Chinese argument on the level of formal policy, this concept has never agreed with xenophobic autarchy. On the contrary, past and present expositions of ’self-reliance’ are said to be quite consistent with a commitment to the expansion of China’s international trading relations. Under the historiography of the current Chinese leadership, China’s Cold War condition of semi-isolation in the 1950s

The People's Republic of China and the Nordic Countries in the 1970s

Abstract: THERE is a proverb: a dull history makes happy countries. It could be applied to the rclations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Nordic countriesDenmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. However, this dull history may bear some interest to the western student of Chinese foreign policy and international behaviour, since normalization of relations has taken place between the PRC and many other western countries. Through increasing tradc and interaction in the technological, scientific and cultural spheres with the western countries, the PRC is approaching a state of

Moscow's Strategic Link with New Delhi: An Interim Assessment

Abstract: new imponderables. His funeral provided both Moscow and Beijing with the excuse to hold a political dialogue stalled for the last thirteen years without having to go through the motions of elaborate preparation. Thus 1982 has seen an unusual surface flurry of cvents with a bearing on Indo-Soviet relations. Against this background, the present article will explore how Moscow views the Indo-Soviet strategic ties and how these ties have been affected by the events in 1982.

China's Normalization Diplomacy Towards India

Abstract: As EARLY as in October 1950 the Tihetan uprisings and India’s role therein convinced the communist leadership of the newly formed People’s Republic of China of the potential of India for making trouble and the likelihood of a conflict with it in the near future. From the very beginning, therefore, China embarked upon a curse ris-avis India which reminds one of the Chinese thinking in Owen Lattimore’s words ’what could not be included must be excluded’.’ In pursuit of this strategy the Chinese leadership charted a course in foreign poiicy which aimed at dowgrading India in the Afro-Asian countries in general, as was evident at Bandung, and in South Asia in particular. China’s discreet silence and studied ambiguity on the conflict in South Asia throughout 1950s was primarily motivated by such thinking. However, for reasons of its alliance obligations to and dependence on the Soviet Union and Pakistan’s membership of US-sponsored alliances, China adopted a policy of wait and watch on the question of Kashmir over which the two principal South Asian neighbours were much exercised. The superpower conveniently used it

Sino-Japanese Economic Relations: A Look into the Eighties:

Abstract: SINCE the historic normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in September 1972, special kinds of relationship has emerged between them. This is evidenced in the intensification and diversification of economic exchanges as well as in the steady maturing of political relations. The emerging economic rclationship can possibly be explained by the combination of a number of factors which cannot be replicated elsewhere. Besides the well-known factors, such as geographical proximity, the long history of political relations, and their extensive historical cultural linkages which have propelled both nations to adopt policies oi mutual interest, the urge to meet the challenge of western technological advances and of developing political and economic systems to harness society to achieve national goals, are other important factors in the development of economic and political interchangc between the two countries. Both are endowed with complementarv economic resources, and perceive the political and military threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Channellization of Youth Energies for Economic Development in India and China I950-80

Abstract: WHILE the developing countries have been faced with the problem of mobilizing the unutilized and underutilized labour force for the development of their backward economies, the 70s witnessed even the advanced countries finding it difficult to make full utilization of the existing manpower.’ The nature of the problem in the two worlds is, however, different. In the developing world, rapid growth of population, meagre resources of land and capital and the scarcity of marketing facilities have resulted in nonutilization or underutilization of the existing manpower. Secondly, in most of the developing countries there is a wide gulf between the rich and poor. While the vast majority of the poor are unable to fulfil their minimum basic needs, a small section of rich, by virtue of their economic power, control the means of production and influence the development strategies pursued by their respective countries. In India many welfare measures taken by the state to protect the interests of the weaker sections have been manipulated in such a way that they mostly benefit the rich. Consequently, over the years the number of people below the poverty line and the number of unemployed have increased. China, both during the liberation struggle and thereafter, evolved an eqalitarian model of development. After collectivizing the ownership of the means of production, attempts were made to have all-round balanced development, with its benefits reaching the common man. The employment requirements of the various sections of the pupulation were by and large co-ordinated with the manpower needs of different sectors of

Coup in Guangxi

Abstract: ALL TOO frequently, foreign observers of China make the mistake of taking for granted that events in Beijing are automatically and almost instantaneously replicated in other parts of China. This is why so little attention is paid to what is happening in China’s provinces. The fact of the matter-which every one will readily admit and then proceed equally readily to ignore-is that most Chinese provinces are at least as large as the larger European countries and have quite distinct cultures and polities. In April or May-one cannot be sure of . the exact date-t.he central leadership in Beijing engineered a coup in the Provincial Party Committee of Guangxi, a large auto-

A Cultural Account of Chinese Local Politics Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting: A Field Study of Mazu Township, Taiwan by J. Bruce Jacobs, Contemporary China Centre, Canberra, 1980

Abstract: Firstly, and perhaps foremostly, it provides a sensitive ’cultural account’, based on extensive field experience, of the idiom of politics in a Chinese setting: what motivates people to political participation? what are the norms of political conduct? how do the participants perceive, describe and account for their own and others’ actions? how are political goals defined’? and how do the actors go about achieving these goals’? At the same time, however. it fails to come to grips, in my opinion, with the social-structural problem of how the local levcl is related to

Chinese Interest in Bhutan : Evolution of the British Indian Perspective

Abstract: ’ Tibet in 1950-51, if not earlier, started working on a policy of extending her sway and influence over the peoples and territories of the Himalayan region comprising Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and even parts of India’s north and northeast frontier. ln pursuit of this objective, she adjusted her strategy from time to time and from region to region. India’s reactions, on the other hand, were slow and and hoc, to meet a situation here

Japanese Socialist Party: On the Road to Regeneration?

Abstract: THE Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), which has been maintaining its position as the major opposition party in spite of the gradual decline in its strength in the Diet, received the hardest blow in the House of Councillors elections held on 23 June 1983, when it failed to win a single seat in the six big cities and reduced its strength further by four seats., While it is hard to say that the JSP has been successful in giving leadership to form united opposition, the drastic decline of the party has caused concern among the people. JSP has served both as an irritant and a deterrent to the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the past. The Japanese, even while not convinced that the JSP would be able to provide a viable alternative government. had the expectation that it would continue to be a restraining influence on the government’s possible shift to authoritarianism and militarism. The role of the JSP in helping Japan uphold the principles of peace and democracy was appreciated. Does the decline of JSP then signify the growing rightwing trends and acceptance of a greater military role for Japan? Or should this be interpreted as reflecting the loss of confidence of the people in JSP’s positive role and a shift of their trust to other opposition parties?

Education in China

Abstract: WHEN the new educational policy of the Cultural Revolution was spelled out and began to be implemented, it was thought that the Chinese were out to overturn the educational pyramid which dominated the superstructure of the world. It was thought that this was the end of elitist education fostered by Liu Shaoqi and buttressed by the ancient mandarin tradition of the country. The Maoists hardly saw any difference between the pre-liberation education and the one imparted after liberation under Liuist dispensation. Just as the aim of preliberation education was to produce comprador intellectuals, cultural puppets of foreigners and politicians of all sorts, the purpose of post-liberation education likewise was to nurture cultural mandarins, bureaucrats and self-seeking intellectuals. Instead of producing ’worthy successors to the revolutionary cause’, what the Chinese schools and universities were churning out were careerists or lily-white scholars who considered physical or manual work to be meant only for the uneducated worker and farmer.

Some Aspects of the Chinese Petroleum Industry : Present and Prospect ive

Abstract: UNTIL 1960, scholars of Chinese economy had considered the PRC as being poorly endowed with oil resources, a vast nation with perhaps no more than a limited number of scattered pools and isolated deposits of shale. At that time the few known deposits were located away from the industrial centres and in regions characterized by unfavourable climatic conditions. Crude oil production in 1950 was a scant 200,000 metric tons, but by the conclusion of the decade the PRC increased its annual output to 3.7 million metric tons, 18-1/2 times over. When output rose to 11 million metric tons in 1965, even the most sceptical observers came to accept China as a potentially important oil producer. Ranking ninth among the world’s major oil producers, China’s output currently exceeds 100 million tons, and its reserves are estimated at 70 billion barrels. Some scholars consider a production level of 300 to 350 million metric